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New Poinl 
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■  The Regional Economy Contracts: Defense spending continues to
cushion our economic downturn, but two other major drivers, the port and
tourism, have contracted. We also report stress tests for our major regional
banks.
■  The Hotel Industry: Stagnant or declining patronage and excess
capacity have made this a very challenging time for an industry that is vital to
our future.  
■  The “Silver Tsunami”: In recognition of our aging population, we
present extensive data and ratings concerning 57 nursing home facilities,
104 assisted living facilities and eight continuing care facilities in Hampton
Roads.  
■  Gasoline Prices, Carbon Emissions and Other Unpleasant
Subjects: Carbon emissions are on nearly everyone’s mind. We trace our
regional carbon emissions and explore the ways (including higher prices) that
we might deal with them.
■  Climate Change, Global Warming and Ocean Levels: To the
extent that global warming occurs, it will bring with it rising sea levels,
which, in the absence of new dikes and levees, will cover vast areas of the
Peninsula and Norfolk, Chesapeake and the Virginia Beach oceanfront.    
■  Traffic Congestion: Identifying and Measuring Our
 Bottlenecks: A well-known national analysis of traffic congestion identifies
the 15 worst choke points in Hampton Roads. Most of them are connected to
our tunnels.
■  The Tunnels That Connect Hampton Roads: Wonderful Assets or
Potential Achilles’ Heels? The prosperity of our region depends upon five
major bridge/tunnel installations, all of which potentially can be closed either
by accidents or terrorism. As we recently have discovered, they are vulner-
able to a variety of possible threats.   
■  The Chrysler Museum in 2009: The Chrysler Museum of Art is one of
the foremost cultural jewels of our region, but now faces challenges that stem
both from significant economic constraints and internal reorganizations.  
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October 2009
Dear Reader:
T
his is Old Dominion University’s 10th annual State of the Region report. While it represents the work of many people connected in various ways to the university,
the report does not constitute an official viewpoint of Old Dominion, or its president, John R. Broderick. The State of the Region reports maintain the goal of stim-
ulating thought and discussion that ultimately will make Hampton Roads an even better place to live. We are proud of our region’s many successes, but realize it
is possible to improve our performance. In order to do so, we must have accurate information about “where we are” and a sound understanding of the policy
options available to us.
The 2009 report is divided into eight parts:
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Old Dominion University, via the president’s and provost’s offices, and the
 College of Business and Public Administration, via the dean’s office, continue to
provide support for this report. However, it would not appear without the vital
backing of the private donors whose names appear below. They believe in
Hampton Roads and in the power of rational discussion to improve our circum-
stances, but are not responsible for the views expressed in the report.
The Aimee and Frank Batten Jr. Foundation Kaufman and Canoles
Frank Batten Sr. Thomas Lyons
R. Bruce Bradley Arnold McKinnon (in memoriam)
Ramon W. Breeden Jr. Patricia W. and J. Douglas Perry
Arthur A. Diamonstein Anne B. Shumadine
George Dragas Jr.
I am delighted to announce that Kaufman and Canoles has agreed to provide
financial support for all State of the Region presentations subsequent to the
 traditional Lead Hampton Roads/Chamber of Commerce opening breakfast.
The following individuals were instrumental in the research, writing, editing,
 design and dissemination of the report:
Vinod Agarwal Elizabeth Janik
John R. Broderick Yingxue Li
Grace Chen Feng Lian
Chris Colburn Sharon Lomax
Vicky Curtis Linda McGreevy
Steve Daniel Janet Molinaro
Larry Filer Jason Phenicie
Adrian Gheorghe Ken Plum
Susan Hughes Gilbert Yochum
Special recognition is merited for Vinod Agarwal and Gilbert Yochum of the
Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project, which Professor Yochum
directs. Their penetrating analyses of the regional and Commonwealth
economies are by consensus the baseline by which numerous economic activi-
ties are measured.
My hope is that you, the reader, will be stimulated by the report and will use it
as a vehicle to promote productive discussions about our future. Please contact
me at jkoch@odu.edu or 757-683-3458 should you have questions.
All 10 of the State of the Region reports may be found at
www.odu.edu/forecasting and www.jamesvkoch.com.
Sincerely,
James V. Koch
Board of Visitors Professor of Economics
and President Emeritus
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THE REGIONAL ECONOMY CONTRACTS:
FEELING PAIN, BUT DOING BETTER THAN MOST OF THE REST
It’s a recession when your neighbor loses his job; it’s a depression when you lose yours.  
– President Harry S. Truman
S
ince fall 2008, serious financial and structural problems within the national and global economies have spread to Hampton
Roads. When combined with economic issues peculiar to our region, these problems have put a crimp in our economic well-
being. Hence, in 2009 we will experience negative eco-
nomic growth. That is, our gross regional product (GRP),
adjusted for prices, actually has declined in 2009. Table 1 estimates
our negative economic growth at -.3 percent in 2009, a far cry from
the heady 5+ percent growth rates we experienced early in this
decade.
TABLE 1
ESTIMATED HAMPTON ROADS GROSS REGIONAL
PRODUCT (GRP) NOMINAL AND REAL, 2000 TO 2009
Year Nominal GRPBillions of $
Real GRP
(2000=100)
Billions of $
Real GRP
Growth
Rate Percent
2000 48.36 48.36 2.4
2001 51.16 49.96 3.3
2002 54.83 52.63 5.3
2003 58.89 55.34 5.2
2004 62.80 57.37 3.7
2005 66.51 58.86 2.8
2006 70.80 60.74 3.2
2007 74.24 62.04 2.1
2008 76.79 62.73 1.1
2009 76.84 62.55 -0.3
Sources: Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. (Data incorporate U.S.
 Department of Commerce personal income revisions through May 2009.)
While a .3 percent decline in our GRP may seem modest, this recession will be
our worst in 40 years. Graph 1 reveals that although the Hampton Roads
economy flirted with negative growth in 1990 and 1995 during the post-Cold
War defense drawdown, the region has not had a year of gross output decline
since 1975, when GRP dropped by .2 percent. Further, the region has not
experienced a larger output decline since 1970, when our gross output fell by
.6 percent. In 1970, Hampton Roads reeled from a one-two punch in the form
of a national recession and cuts in the region’s military presence because of
Vietnam.  
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But There Is Some
Good News
The decline in our region’s economic growth rate will be tem-
pered by the large military presence in Hampton Roads and
increased funding for U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) pro-
curement and military operations. Since 2000, estimated DOD
spending in the region has nearly doubled (see Graph 2). Department of
Defense direct spending in Hampton Roads for 2009 has approximated $18.9
billion, a 4 percent increase over 2008. The Old Dominion University Eco-
nomic Forecasting Project estimates that the sum of both direct and indirect
effects of this spending accounts for roughly 45 percent of gross economic
activity in Hampton Roads. This makes defense spending in the region a nice
umbrella to keep us dry during the recessionary rain.  
Of course, there is no guarantee that defense spending in the region will con-
tinue to rise, though it is worth noting that aggregate DOD spending in
Hampton Roads in 2009 has increased despite the continuing negative impact
of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) decisions. The effect
of BRAC on the region’s economy in 2009 approximates a $200 million loss in
GRP and about 1,800 jobs. 
Looking down the road, however, it may well be the case that
defense spending in Hampton Roads will stagnate. This could
occur for two reasons. First, we may lose yet another aircraft carrier battle group
to another state (such as Florida or Hawaii), or to the Pacific Rim. Each month
an aircraft carrier task force is gone from Hampton Roads, this reduces our
annual GRP by almost .1 percent. This translates to approximately $900 million
per year and constitutes a big hit by any standard – substantially larger than the
negative economic impact of the Ford Motor Co. plant closure, for example.   
The second potential adverse influence on regional defense spending relates to
the increased emphasis within the Department of Defense on “boots on the
ground,” that is, ground forces. This could cause marginal changes in defense
spending that would benefit other regions of the United States more than
Hampton Roads.
Against this, in the next few years, there is likely to be sustained interest in mod-
eling and simulation projects within the DOD. Hampton Roads is well posi-
tioned to take advantage of such an emphasis.  
Nevertheless, all things considered, only Dr. Pangloss (who always foresaw the
“best of all possible worlds”) would forecast defense expenditures within
Hampton Roads that consistently exceed the growth of the consumer price
index. We have been fortunate during this decade to be favored by significant
increases in defense spending. However, we should remember that this has not
always been the case. We would be well advised to remember the observation
of economist Herb Stein: “If something cannot go on forever, it doesn’t.” Simple
advice, but worth remembering. 
6 THE STATE OF THE REGION    HAMPTON ROADS 2009    
2009 State of the Region Booklet:Layout 1  9/3/09  10:58 AM  Page 6
7THE REGIONAL ECONOMY CONTRACTS
GRAPH 2
ESTIMATED DIRECT DOD SPENDING IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2000-2009*
Source: Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
*Includes federal civilian and military personnel and procurement
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However, Bad News
 Predominates
Defense spending not withstanding, the economic downturn in
the national economy, as well as the lagged effect of the Ford
plant closing and implementation of the BRAC directives, led to
continuously declining employment in Hampton Roads
throughout 2008. Still, the region’s output growth rate exceeded that of the
nation. Job losses were particularly heavy in the fourth quarter of 2008. U.S.
Department of Labor data indicate that the region lost about 7,755 jobs
between the fourth quarter of 2007 and the same period in 2008. Like their
national counterparts, Hampton Roads employers struggled with declining
demand for services and products, rising inventories and a significant tightening
of available credit.   
Regional employment losses continued into 2009, although the rate of decline
began to taper off. We have, however, done better than most comparable met-
ropolitan areas on the eastern seaboard (see Graph 3). Given that most of
these regions outperformed us job-wise earlier in this decade, perhaps Hampton
Roads can be permitted a tiny bit of Schadenfreude. Even so, as Graph 4 dis-
closes, our region lost jobs in both 2008 and 2009.  
Job losses in 2008 in Hampton Roads were concentrated in construction and
retail trade (see Graph 5). Construction industry contractions that we docu-
mented in previous State of the Region reports have continued into 2009. Retail
trade employment has found itself in a similar fix. Year-to-date through April
2009, this sector was 3,000 jobs below that of the same period in 2008, and
the decline is expected to continue through the rest of the year. 
Job losses in manufacturing have resulted primarily from the
decline, and in some cases disappearance, of the support
industries for Ford truck production. This process will continue
through 2009. The final toll of job losses attributable to Nor-
folk’s Ford Motor Co. closing is expected to approach 7,000
jobs.  
On a more positive note, however, employment in another major contributor to
Hampton Roads manufacturing jobs – ship and boat building – remained rela-
tively stable in 2008, and continued stable employment is likely through 2009
because DOD procurement funds are continuing to flow to this industry. 
Employment in the transportation and warehousing sector suffered from
declining port cargo, which fell by 13 percent in the fourth quarter of 2008, as
well as from a lower volume of retail trade.  
The region’s job losses between September 2008 and May 2009 resulted in a
dramatic increase in the number of people collecting unemployment insurance.
Graph 6 shows that this number jumped by more than 50 percent between
September 2008 and December 2008, and nearly doubled between Sep-
tember 2008 and March 2009 to 19,345, as job losses peaked. But all is not
lost. Claims fell by 500 between March 2009 and May 2009, and the
number of insurance recipients declined to 18,810. This suggests that our
regional economic decline may be “bottoming out,” to use popular terminology.
We expect the regional unemployment rate to top out at about 7.5 percent in
late 2009 and recovery, albeit modest, to take hold thereafter.
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GRAPH 3
APRIL 2008 TO APRIL 2009 CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT GROWTH RATE IN SELECTED MSAs AND THE U.S.
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor (5/26/08) and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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GRAPH 4
NET NEW PRIVATE-SECTOR WAGE AND SALARY JOBS CREATED IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2000-2009
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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GRAPH 5
EMPLOYMENT GAINS AND LOSSES IN HAMPTON ROADS IN 2008
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project, as revised on March 10, 2009
Losers (Jobs) Gainers (Jobs)
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GRAPH 6
HAMPTON ROADS ANNUAL UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, 2000-2009
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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Focus Upon Particular
 Sectors of Our Economy
AUTOMOBILES
Retail automobile sales revenue, represented by its close proxy, taxable sales,
declined substantially during the past year. The 6.5 percent fall in sales
depicted in Graph 7 is the largest year-over-year decline since at least 1991, a
time of national recession. New auto registrations dropped even more
 dramatically over the period, falling 37.5 percent.   
TOURISM
Regional tourism activity did not escape the national and local
economic downturn. Hotel revenue in Hampton Roads declined
by 4.5 percent between the first quarter of 2008 and the first
quarter of 2009. Grim as these data are, regional tourism fared better than
for the nation as a whole, where hotel revenue dropped by an estimated 11.6
percent. (In a succeeding chapter of this report, we focus more intently upon the
hotel industry in Hampton Roads.)
The decline in hotel revenues was not spread equally across the region, how-
ever. Williamsburg, in particular, has suffered significantly during this recession,
as one can see in Graph 8. This graph also reveals that the plunge in tourism
revenues was much more dramatic after September 2008, when several major
 national financial organizations, such as Lehman Brothers, either failed or had
to be rescued.   
THE PORT
During 2008, the Port of Hampton Roads experienced a modest increase of .6
percent in its general cargo tonnage. However, this figure obscures the fact that
both the amount of cargo tonnage and containers handled, much like tourism
within the region, fell dramatically from September to December of 2008 as
international trade throughout the world declined substantially. Graph 9 reveals
that what looked like a reasonable year of modest growth evolved into some-
thing much different in the latter part of 2008. A review of Graph 7
reminds us that cargo tonnage shipped through the Port of
Hampton Roads fell by almost 25 percent from first-quarter
2008 to first-quarter 2009.
13THE REGIONAL ECONOMY CONTRACTS
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GRAPH 7
ANNUAL PERCENT CHANGES IN TAXABLE SALES, PORT TONNAGE, HOTEL REVENUE AND 
AUTO SALES, HAMPTON ROADS, 1ST QTR 2008 TO 1ST QTR 2009
Source: Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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GRAPH 8
CHANGE IN HOTEL REVENUES FROM 2007 TO 2008, 
JANUARY TO AUGUST, AND SEPTEMBER TO DECEMBER
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report, Feb.10, 2009, and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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Sources: Virginia Port Authority and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
GRAPH 9
CHANGE IN CARGO TONNAGE AND CONTAINERS FROM 2007 TO 2008, 
JANUARY TO AUGUST, AND SEPTEMBER TO DECEMBER
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Households Under Siege
We estimate that household income in Hampton Roads rose by about 3 percent
in 2008 and is expected to remain relatively stable in 2009. If this is true, then
why have local retail and auto sales, noted previously, suffered so much? We
believe there are three reasons: 
■  Significant declines in regional household wealth
■  Tightening of lending standards and credit
■  Higher household savings rates.  
We’ll now discuss each of these trends. Household wealth is very different from
income. Wealth refers to household assets that have fluctuating value and
includes houses, cars, retirement accounts, savings accounts and stock market
holdings. There is a “wealth effect” associated with assets. For every dollar
increase in their wealth, households are likely to spend an additional four cents.
Thus, if the value of one’s home increases by $100,000, then this is likely to
spur an additional $4,000 of consumption by that individual.  
The opposite holds true if wealth is declining. Graph 10 reports that the
household net worth (wealth) of Hampton Roads families
declined by an estimated 16.6 percent, or about $47 billion in
2008. If the 4 percent rule holds true, then this would lead to a
$1.88 billion decline ($47 billion x .04) in regional household
consumption. This is not peanuts and goes far to explain declining retail
sales, automobile purchases and tourism expenditures in our region.
The tightening of lending standards and falling housing prices has made credit
harder to obtain for Hampton Roads households. It is also true that households’
demand for credit have slowed as they attempt to repair the damage inflicted
upon their balance sheets by recent economic events. Graph 11 provides esti-
mates of the changes in outstanding quarterly consumer loan balances for
Hampton Roads households for 2007 and 2008. Included in these balances
are mortgages, home equity loans, auto loans, and consumer and student
loans. While the size of overall household debt balances actually is increasing,
note the continuous decline in the rate of growth of these balances from the
fourth quarter of 2007, through the fourth quarter of 2008. This means that the
discretionary spending capability of Hampton Roads households has tapered
off substantially.    
One indicator of loan balances that have become too large for households to
handle is the volume of bankruptcy filings. Unfortunately, these have roughly
quadrupled in Hampton Roads between 2006 and 2009 (see Graph 12).
However, this is due not only to deteriorating economic conditions, but also to
the passage of the new bankruptcy law in 2005. The 2009 number (8,020)
translates roughly to 1 in every 77 households in the region – historically a high
number, but only a fraction of the bankruptcy rates in states such as California,
Florida and Michigan. Regardless, households that declare bankruptcy usually
are not eligible for new credit, and therefore this is another reason why the total
amount of credit extended to households in the region has grown only modestly
in recent months.
The third prong of our explanation of why retail sales have fallen in Hampton
Roads even while income has been rising is household savings rates. Graph 13
illustrates that personal savings rates have spiked upward since first-quarter
2008. In the long term, this is quite a good thing, as it will result in fewer bank-
ruptcies, larger pools of funds to finance vital investments, a stronger dollar and
lower interest rates. All of these developments usually spur economic growth. In
the short term, however, higher savings rates put a damper on consumption and
many merchants in Hampton Roads are feeling the effects.
17THE REGIONAL ECONOMY CONTRACTS
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GRAPH 10
ESTIMATED HOUSEHOLD NET WORTH, HAMPTON ROADS, 2000 TO 2008, BILLIONS OF $
Source: Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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GRAPH 11
PERCENT QUARTERLY CHANGE, CONSUMER LOAN BALANCES, 
HAMPTON ROADS, 1ST QUARTER 2007 TO 4TH QUARTER 2008
Sources: Equifax, Moody’s Economy.com and The Wall Street Journal, March 30, 2009
(Balances include mortgages, and home equity, auto, consumer and student loans.)
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GRAPH 12
HAMPTON ROADS BANKRUPTCIES, 2006-2009
Source: Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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GRAPH 13
PERSONAL SAVINGS RATES, U.S.: 2000-2008
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
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Housing Markets in
 Hampton Roads
We now return to a hardy perennial in the State of the Region reports – the
status of our housing markets. Our region is in the process of working
through wrenching housing market adjustments that feature
falling prices, excessive inventory due at least partially to past
overbuilding, relatively low rental rates, relatively high home-
owner vacancy rates, and longer times between listing and
sale. As if this laundry list of maladies were not enough, until late into the first
quarter of 2009, many prospective borrowers found that mortgages were quite
difficult to obtain. Or, if they were offered a mortgage, it often featured rela-
tively high interest rates and high down payments. Recent actions by the Federal
Reserve System have whittled down these difficulties, though the heady days of
“NINJA” mortgage loans (no income, no job or assets) are long gone. This also
is distinctly a good thing, but the adjustment process is not easy.
What follows is a wide-ranging discussion and documentation of different
aspects of Hampton Roads housing markets.   
HOUSING PRICES
Housing sale prices have fallen across the board regionally over the past sev-
eral years. In every category – new homes, existing homes, condominiums –
prices have fallen. Graph 14 provides a specific example, the decline in the
median (50th percentile) prices of existing homes, both in Hampton Roads and
the United States. However painful housing market adjustments have been
locally, they pale before those afflicting many other areas of the country. That
said, we do need to point out that the data presented in Graph 14 are in some
ways “apples and oranges” sales numbers because they reflect the reported
selling prices of all homes, not comparable homes. Thus, these data do not con-
trol for changes in the mix of houses that are sold from one year to the next, and
therefore may not provide us with the information we seek. With this caveat in
mind, however, we have confidence in asserting that the price of the median
house sold in Hampton Roads has been declining. It appears that housing
prices in our region peaked in the third quarter of 2007, two years later than
the entire country.  
If there is an exception to our sweeping dictum about falling
home sale prices, it is lower-priced, existing homes, most often
those $225,000 and below. Prices in this category have been sticky
downward, though even here, effective sales prices actually may be falling
because real estate agents tell us that price concessions averaging 7 percent of
sales prices have become routine. Rather than settle for and publicize lower
prices, sellers will pick up closing costs, pay for upgrades, etc. Published resi-
dential housing price data therefore may be a less reliable guide today than
they have been for some time.      
As shown in Graph 14, the decline in Hampton Roads existing home prices has
been half that of U.S. prices. Housing prices in the region continued to fall on a
year-to-date basis through May 2009, the latest data available at this writing.  
RESIDENTIAL HOME INVENTORIES
The inventory of residential homes is the number of homes that are listed for
sale, but as yet unsold. As can be seen in Graph 15, Hampton
Roads’ existing residential home inventory more than quadru-
pled since 2004, while our inventory of new homes more than
tripled over the same period. Even though home prices have fallen by
13 percent since the third quarter of 2007, the price decline has not been suffi-
cient to reduce inventory significantly. Nevertheless, the inventory of unsold
homes would be much larger were it not for the decline in home prices. We
estimate that the total inventory of new and existing homes will decline from
15,324 houses in 2008 to 14,325 houses in 2009. According to some vet-
eran observers of local real estate markets, this rather modest decline may
reflect the reality that some homeowners who have wished to sell their houses
have not placed them on the market and instead have decided to wait for
improved selling conditions. If so, then these homes progressively will trickle into
the market and prop up inventory numbers. 
The region’s large housing inventory has influenced the behavior of local
builders. Graph 16 shows that new-home builders reacted to the relatively large
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increase in 2006’s new-home inventory with a 22 percent reduction in construc-
tion in that year. Those reductions continued through 2009, when new-home
permits sank to approximately 1,250, the lowest in 30 years. Prior to 2007,
the lowest new-home permit year was 1981, with 4,674 permits. Because
housing permits from previous years can be utilized by builders, it appears that
the actual number of new homes constructed in Hampton Roads in 2009 has
been 1,887, a 76 percent decline from 2003.
Graph 16 also demonstrates a crucial relationship – that between total regional
employment and the level of new-home construction in Hampton Roads. In fact,
total employment, including military personnel, is an important aid in predicting
new-home construction. Military employment is likely to remain stable in 2009.
However, civilian employment has fallen in 2009. Given falling employ-
ment numbers and an already large inventory of homes for
sale, it does not seem likely either that new-home construction
will increase significantly, or that housing markets will
improve dramatically in 2010.
HOUSING FORECLOSURES
A housing foreclosure is the legal process whereby the ownership of a property
is terminated. Typically, it involves the forced sale of the property by the lender
to a new owner, sometimes at a public auction. Foreclosures influence both the
existing and future supplies of for-sale housing. Graph 17 reveals that
foreclosure filings in Hampton Roads were 11 times higher in
2009 than in 2006. Although the federal government has allocated signifi-
cant financial resources through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in an
effort to help keep stressed homeowners in their houses, 2009 filings in
Hampton Roads are expected to rise by 30 percent over those of 2008. The
large number of recent foreclosure filings (some of which involved renegotiated
mortgages with easier terms) poses a serious threat to home prices in Hampton
Roads and will delay housing price stabilization. 
VACANCY RATES
Oftentimes, homes that cannot be sold either stand vacant, or they are rented.
What has been happening in this regard in Hampton Roads? Approximately
14,200 homes stood vacant in 2008. This is about 4,500 units above the his-
torical mean for our region. Large numbers of home vacancies help create
impressions of weak and struggling housing markets. Graph 18 demon-
strates that home vacancy rates are higher now than they
have been in the past 20 years. Meanwhile, rental vacancy
rates have fallen more than 50 percent since 2004-05. In a
nutshell, many people have chosen to rent rather than to own.
This could reflect the fact that their economic circumstances have deteriorated,
or that higher mortgage standards mean they cannot obtain a mortgage.  
COMPARING OWNING TO RENTING
Rational home buyers weigh the price of renting against that of owning before
purchasing a home. Table 2 compares the median cost of renting a three-bed-
room home to the monthly mortgage payment for a comparable home. One
can see that in 2003, owning one’s own home, and paying down a mortgage,
appeared to be a better deal than renting the same home. However, as housing
prices inflated rapidly, by 2006 it was clear that renting was increasingly
 attractive.  
The “owning versus renting” ratios in Table 2 tell us that the
calculus has recently swung in favor of buying rather than
renting. While many factors determine whether one chooses to own or rent,
the limited analysis presented in Table 2 informs us that the general economics
of owning a home are about as favorable in 2009 as in 2001, before the
housing bubble inflated. Viewed historically, mortgage rates are relatively low
and this contributes to the lower ratios.  
The decline in the owning versus renting ratio should add buyers to the housing
market, assuming they have jobs generating respectable incomes and can
obtain mortgages. Let’s focus on the income aspect of this situation. Since
2006, median household income needed to pay the principle and interest on a
mortgage for the purchase of the median-priced home in Hampton Roads has
fallen by one-third. Indeed, Graph 19 shows that by this measure, regional
housing is at its most affordable level in 10 years and is not very far away from
its most affordable scenario in the past 30 years. Housing prices have fallen,
mortgage rates are modest and regional incomes have been rising, albeit not
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by a lot. The bottom line? The data tell us this is one of the best
times in recent decades to purchase a home.
The increased affordability of housing enhances the pool of buyers eligible to
purchase homes in Hampton Roads, if these individuals have the confidence to
do so and can qualify for a mortgage. Of course, realism requires us to note
that one’s ability to obtain a mortgage is not the same in 2009 as it was in
2001. A non-negligible down payment now is required in most cases, prospec-
tive borrowers must have good credit records, and they must be able to docu-
ment their employment and income stream. These requirements may seem to
represent the essence of common sense, but often were relaxed or eliminated in
the first half of this decade by many lenders. This ill-advised behavior was one
of the causes of the housing crisis we now are observing.    
RELATING HOUSING SUPPLY TO HOUSING DEMAND
Despite the recent draconian reductions in new-home building, the current
supply of houses in the Hampton Roads housing market is near historical highs.
On the demand side, rising unemployment and rising consumer caution have
more than offset the decline in the relative price of owning versus renting and
the greater affordability of housing. Putting these two sides of the Hampton
Roads housing market together, it appears that 2009 will see continued distress
as housing prices continue to edge downward to correct the imbalance
between demand and supply.  
Graph 20 displays estimates of excess supply and demand in regional housing
markets relative to annual changes in real (inflation-adjusted) house prices for
1995 to 2009. For example, in 1996, there was an excess supply of housing
amounting to more than 2,000 units in light of the supply-and-demand influ-
ences we have just sketched. By 2004, things had reversed and there was
excess demand for housing by 5,028 units. In that year, home prices increased
22 percent in Hampton Roads. Many readers may remember homes being sold
before even going formally on the market; unsolicited buyers appearing at
someone’s front door; buyers actively bidding against each other for specific
properties; low interest rates; lax lending standards; and homes selling for more
than their owners’ asking prices. It appeared that there was a shortage of
homes for sale. This was excess demand in full flower and it contributed to the
housing price bubble, which began to deflate already in early 2007.
By 2008, the estimated excess supply of housing had risen to 4,555 units and
remains historically high at 4,318 units in 2009. It is this excess supply that
continues to put downward pressure on prices in the region’s housing market.  
Is the current excess supply condition likely to change? The Old Dominion
University Economic Forecasting Project estimates that home
prices will decline another 5 percent in 2009. It seems likely
that additional downward price adjustments are likely in
2010. Graph 21 shows that it will take time to bring the housing market back
to equilibrium. Sales have been declining and the typical home now remains on
the market 83 days, up from only 27 days in 2004. This will do little to
diminish the excess supply of homes for sale.  
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TABLE 2
ESTIMATED HOUSE RENTAL AND PRINCIPLE AND INTEREST
FOR A HOUSE PAYMENT IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2000-2009
Median Monthly
Rent for a Three-
Bedroom House
P&I Monthly
for a Median
House
Ratio of Monthly
P&I to Rent
2000 $882 $ 854 0.97
2001 911 809 0.89
2002 1,037 827 0.8
2003 1,044 779 0.75
2004 1,087 971 0.89
2005 1,118 1,202 1.08
2006 1,164 1,459 1.25
2007 1,257 1,495 1.19
2008 1,336 1,472 1.1
2009 1,315 1,171 0.89
Sources: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Old Dominion University
 Economic Forecasting Project
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Ironically, if the housing crisis had been deeper in Hampton Roads, and home
prices had fallen more, then the region’s chances for a quick rebound would be
more favorable. It’s not a mystery. Other things held constant, falling prices stim-
ulate sales. When prices don’t fall very much (and they have fallen much less in
Hampton Roads than nationally), it takes housing markets longer to “clear,” that
is, to attain rough equilibrium between supply and demand.   
Miscellaneous blips in housing numbers during the past year
have caused some observers to posit that regional residential
housing markets are “turning around.” There are at least four
major measures of residential housing market performance –
unsold inventory, number of sales, sales price and days on
market until sale. In any given month, one of these variables
might reverse course, but it sig-
nals little. When all four indica-
tors reverse course, it will be
time to take notice. The harsh
reality is that this is unlikely to
occur unless employment within
the region begins to move
upward. Until then, regional
housing markets are unlikely to
change significantly.  
Since World War II, Hampton Roads has experienced several spells when
housing markets were in the doldrums for half a decade. We could be tra-
versing such a time period now – one that began in early 2007, but still has a
ways to go. We have spoken of several harsh realities. Yet another is that the
general, overall economic conditions to which our housing markets are so sensi-
tive are determined substantially by factors well outside of our local and
regional control. Let’s examine one of those outside factors, the federal govern-
ment’s economic stimulus plan, in the next section.    
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GRAPH 14
CUMULATIVE DECLINE IN MEDIAN SINGLE-FAMILY HOUSE PRICES FOR 
EXISTING HOMES, FROM PEAK* TO 1ST QUARTER 2009
Sources: National Association of Realtors (NAR), the Real Estate Information Network Inc.(REIN) and the Old Dominion University Economic 
Forecasting Project
*U.S. house prices peaked in 3Q 2005 (NAR); Hampton Roads in 3Q 2007 (REIN)
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GRAPH 15
ESTIMATED INVENTORY OF TOTAL (NEW CONSTRUCTION AND EXISTING) RESIDENTIAL HOME 
IN HAMPTON ROADS, ACTIVE LISTINGS ON MAY 31 OF EACH YEAR
Sources: Real Estate Information Network Inc. and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project (information deemed reliable but not guaranteed)
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GRAPH 17
HAMPTON ROADS RESIDENTIAL FORECLOSURE FILINGS, 2006 TO 2009
Sources: Realty Trac and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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GRAPH 18
RENTAL AND HOMEOWNER VACANCY RATES, HAMPTON ROADS, 1990-2008
Source: U.S. Census Bureau
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GRAPH 19
HOUSING AFFORDABILITY: MONTHLY PAYMENT FOR A MEDIAN PRICE RESALE HOUSE AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD MONTHLY INCOME IN HAMPTON ROADS AND THE U.S., 1979 TO 2009
Source: Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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GRAPH 20
ESTIMATED EXCESS SUPPLY/EXCESS DEMAND OF HOUSES IN THE HAMPTON ROADS 
SINGLE-FAMILY HOUSING MARKET (RIGHT SCALE) RELATIVE TO THE ANNUAL 
CHANGE IN REAL HOUSE PRICES (LEFT SCALE)
Source: Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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GRAPH 21
HAMPTON ROADS EXISTING RESIDENTIAL HOMES SOLD AND AVERAGE NUMBER 
OF DAYS ON THE MARKET (1995-2008)
Sources: Real Estate Information Network Inc. and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
(Days on market calculated from the date listed to the date under contract for existing homes sold.)
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The Economic Stimulus Plan
In February 2009, Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act of 2009, or “Economic Stimulus Plan” (ESP), with a budget of $787 billion.
The plan consists of a combination of tax cuts and additional spending financed
by the federal government. The plan could have a positive and significant effect
on our regional economy in 2009, if people spend rather than save their tax
cuts and if the monies scheduled for Virginia and Hampton Roads actually are
spent. Neither of these conditions should be taken as a given. Recent “one-time-
only” tax cuts have hardly registered a blip on the screen of household con-
sumption. Perhaps households will view these tax cuts as “permanent” and
behave differently. By mid-summer 2009, only about 10 percent of all ESP
monies actually had been expended nationally. The upshot is that the economic
impact of the ESP may be smaller than anticipated and will only begin to be felt
in the latter months of 2009 and in 2010.
Spending from the ESP will reach Hampton Roads from multiple sources,
including direct Virginia allocations to the region’s local governments, increased
Commonwealth spending that affects the region (for example, increased unem-
ployment compensation eligibility and road repair), federal tax reductions, fed-
eral spending and subsidies, and increased demand for goods produced in
Hampton Roads and sold outside of the region.
Virginia’s allocation from the ESP is $7.19 billion, to be spent
over the period from 2009 to 2011. Taking into account money
allocated back to Virginia’s “rainy day” fund, based on a per
capita estimate, Hampton Roads might receive about $1.4
 billion in tax and spending benefits between now and 2011.
Bear in mind, however, that at this stage in the allocation
process, there is no precise way to know the final tally of
 Virginia ESP funds that eventually will be spent in Hampton
Roads.  
Even so, we can gain a sense of spending that might be targeted here. By mid-
summer 2009, the Commonwealth had committed $318.8 million of ESP funds
to Hampton Roads governmental units. The data in Table 3 reflect the reality that
our current allocation is heavily concentrated upon spending for education:
$275 million, or 86 percent of ESP funds, is targeted for education. It is likely
that there will be more funds directly allocated to Hampton Roads as spending
plans submitted by localities wend their way through the approval process.  
How will these dollars affect economic life in Hampton Roads? That is, what
impact upon employment and GRP (gross regional product) will these expendi-
tures have? There is some economic controversy attached to the administration’s
ESP score card in this regard. Using the administration’s methodology (Christina
Romer and Jared Bernstein, “The Job Impact of the American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Plan,” Obama Administration Transition Papers, Jan. 11, 2009), the
Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project has developed ESP job
and GRP estimates for Hampton Roads. Table 4 reveals these estimates, which
predict that 8,537 jobs will be “saved” or created in 2009, and that $314 mil-
lion will be added to the GRP. Comparable predictions for 2010 are 20,131
jobs and $988.5 million added to the GRP.   
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TABLE 3
ECONOMIC STIMULUS FUNDS (AMERICAN RECOVERY AND
RE-INVESTMENT ACT) ALLOCATED DIRECTLY TO
HAMPTON ROADS AS OF JUNE 2009
Purpose Allocation (Millions)
Education
K-12 $166.2
Higher Education $50
Special Education $58.8
Highways and Budgets $34
Other $9.8
Total $318.8
Source: Commonwealth of Virginia
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Graph 22 estimates how the predicted “saved” or created jobs will be distrib-
uted across major segments of the regional economy by the end of 2010. Con-
struction jobs (presumably reflecting building and road construction) will increase
the most. Curiously, even though the lion’s share of expenditures thus far has
focused on education, the combined category of education and health services
ranks only seventh among segments in terms of the predicted jobs impact.
There are several problems with the Romer-Bernstein methodology that stand
behind these projections. First and foremost, the notion of a “saved” job ulti-
mately is impossible to know or to measure. It is based upon a counterfactual
examination of what would have happened except for ESP tax cuts and
spending. An econometrician can generate a mathematical answer in such a sit-
uation. But, that answer will rely upon critical assumptions such as how much of
their tax cuts households actually will spend and how quickly monies allocated
for particular tasks such as construction will be spent. Recall the flaccid effect
upon consumer spending of stimulus checks sent to American taxpayers in the
past few years. Households chose to save these monies rather than spend them,
and this confounded the forecasts of some. Pursuing this illustration, in 2009
and 2010, rising savings rates (review Graph 13) could stifle expenditures and
wreak havoc on the optimistic Romer-Bernstein projections.  
A second problem is that the models of Romer-Bernstein predicted that the
national unemployment rate would top out at 8 percent if the ESP were passed.
It did pass in February 2009, but in mid-summer 2009, the rate of unemploy-
ment already was 9.1 percent and at this writing appears headed for the 10
percent neighborhood. This suggests either that the duo’s models are inaccurate,
or that they are politically driven. 
Those criticisms understood, we should offer some charitable words about the
work of Romer-Bernstein. The current economic recession is the most compli-
cated contraction since the Great Depression of the 1930s. This recession is
complicated by the implosion of major financial institutions, massive uncertainty
associated with new asset packages that few actually understand, and an
anguishing housing crisis brought on by the failure or malfeasance of multiple
institutions and trainloads of unwise behavior by both businesses and individ-
uals. It is not easy to model such circumstances and to make projections that
could be invalidated in a minute by the actions of uncontrollable factors such as
the weather, the decisions of the mullahs of Iran, or the missile shots of the “Dear
Leader” of North Korea. A well-known aphorism among economic
forecasters is that those who rely upon the crystal ball sooner
or later are destined to eat glass. So also is it here. This is an
unpredictable time and individuals such as Romer-Bernstein
face huge obstacles as they attempt to model what is going on
in the American economy. However, these uncertain circum-
stances also warn us that perhaps we should take the already
outdated Romer-Bernstein projections cum grano salis.
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TABLE 4
ESTIMATED JOBS “SAVED” OR CREATED IN HAMPTON ROADS
BY THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT
AS OF THE FOURTH QUARTER OF EACH YEAR, AND
ESTIMATED ADDITION TO GRP
Year Estimated Jobs
Saved or Created as
of the 4th Qtr
Estimated Output
Added to the GRP
(Millions of $)
2009 8,537 $314.4
2010 20,131 $988.5
Source: Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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The Regional Banking
 Industry
Since the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, news about the
banking industry and the viability of banks has been prominently featured in the
media. In April 2009, the Federal Reserve Bank completed a well-publicized
“stress test” of the 19 largest banking organizations located in the United States.
The objective of this test was similar to that of the Bank Holiday of 1933:
restore confidence in the banking system by demonstrating that the examined
banks are healthy. If the stress test demonstrated that banks were sufficiently cap-
italized, and consequently their prospects for survival likely under the most
adverse economic circumstances, then confidence in the banking system would
be restored.  
Many of these 19 institutions take deposits in Hampton Roads, including
 SunTrust, Bank of America, Wachovia (now Wells Fargo) and BB&T. All of these
banks were recipients of U.S. Treasury Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)
money and as a result are better capitalized than they would have been without
this program. The stress test provided much readily available information about
the financial status and potential viability of these banks. However, what about
other banks that take deposits in Hampton Roads? What about our local and
regional banks? Are they well capitalized? Can they withstand a severe eco-
nomic downturn?   
BASEL 1 REQUIREMENTS AND THE FED’S STRESS TEST
Two useful statistics that provide us information about the soundness of a bank
are the relative size of its Tier 1 risk capital and its non-performing loans as a
percentage of its total assets. Let’s examine each of these measures in greater
detail.   
The Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio measures a bank’s ability to maintain its sol-
vency, both today and in the future. It represents a bank’s immediate ability to
satisfy its depositors if they wish to withdraw funds and/or to survive and
prosper if those it has lent money to cannot pay that money back. What is the
appropriate Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio for a bank? A set of banking agree-
ments known as the Basel Accords (1988 and subsequent years) established
internationally recognized comparative standards and benchmarks for bank per-
formance. The Basel 1 standard requires that banks hold capital equal to at
least 4 percent of their risk-weighted assets for “minimum adequacy” to protect
those banks against future credit and lending risks.1 Nevertheless, in its spring
2009 bank stress test, the Federal Reserve set an even higher standard – 6 per-
cent Tier 1 capital – that banks needed to meet.  
Table 5 reports Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio data for 10 local and regional
banks (but none of the 19 nationally oriented banks already subjected to a
stress test by the Federal Reserve). RBC Centura, though a Canadian bank with
an international presence, was included among the 10 local and regional
banks because it was not given a stress test by the Fed. We also have supplied
data on each bank’s non-performing assets as a percentage of its total assets.
Non-performing refers to a loan at least 30 days in arrears.  
As of first-quarter 2009, all 10 of the banks we tested clearly
exceeded both the Basel 1 and the Fed’s Tier 1 risk-based cap-
ital standards. There is, however, considerable variation among the banks
with respect to the percentages of their non-performing loans. Nevertheless,
even if these banks were able to recover only 30 cents on the dollar of their
non-performing loans and were forced to write those loans off their books today,
all of them would pass the Federal Reserve’s more stringent capital standard as
of the first quarter of 2009.
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1  The asset weights (to reflect risk) are: 0 percent for cash, central bank and government debt and any OECD government debt; 0 percent, 10 percent, 20 percent or 50 percent for public-sector debt; 20 per-
cent for development bank debt, OECD bank debt, OECD securities firm debt, non-OECD bank debt (under one-year maturity) and non-OECD public-sector debt, cash in collection; 50 percent for residential mort-
gages; and 100 percent for private-sector debt, non-OECD bank debt (maturity over a year), real estate, plant and equipment, and capital instruments issued at other banks. A bank must maintain capital equal to
at least 4 percent of its risk-weighted assets. For example, if a bank has risk-weighted assets of $100 million, it must maintain capital of at least $4 million.
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WHAT IF? SCENARIOS
The 10 Hampton Roads banks in Table 5 pass the Fed’s 6 percent risk capital
benchmark. Even so, what if the recession worsens and unemployment in
Hampton Roads climbs to 8 percent or 9 percent in 2010 from its current level
of 6.5 percent (April 2009)? Such an economic scenario would place strains
on our banks and likely would cause more delinquencies and defaults in the
loan portfolios of the region’s banks. This “what if” is the motive behind stress
testing banks. Let’s consider some of these possibilities.  
Based on the Federal Reserve’s stress test methodology (“The Supervisory Cap-
ital Assessment Program: Design and Implementation,” Board of Governors,
Federal Reserve Bank, April 24, 2009), the State of the Region report has
designed and conducted a more demanding stress test of banks with home
offices in Hampton Roads for the period covering 2009 and 2010. The home
office banks included in the test sample are Bank of Hampton Roads, Bank of
the Commonwealth, Towne Bank, Heritage Bank, Monarch Bank, Old Point
Bank, Virginia Company Bank and Farmers Bank. RBC Centura (with its U.S.
home office in North Carolina) and Fulton Bank (with its home office in Pennsyl-
vania) were not included in this stress test sample because they carry large loan
portfolios outside of Hampton Roads. 
Table 6 presents an alternative economic scenario for Hampton Roads that is
much less attractive than the scenario posed by the Federal Reserve in its stress
test. For example, if the unemployment rate in 2010 is 10.3 percent rather than
8.8 percent, then how will this affect our local and regional banks? The dif-
ferent scenarios create different loan loss rates, which negatively affect a bank’s
Tier 1 risk-equity capital. A range of projected loan loss rates was set by the
Fed for the baseline and more adverse scenarios.
By the fourth quarter of 2010, the stress test results for Hampton Roads, dis-
played in Graph 23, found cumulative loan losses of $376 million for all eight
of the banks in the sample when the simulation was conducted under the condi-
tions of the baseline economic scenario described above and in Table 6. The
loan losses in this scenario are heavily concentrated in commercial real estate
loans. CRE loans account for two-thirds of the projected total losses in the base-
line scenario.   
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TABLE 5
FIRST QUARTER 2009 BANK RISK-BASED EQUITY CAPITAL
AND NON-PERFORMING LOANS FOR REGIONAL BANKS IN
HAMPTON ROADS 
Tier 1 Risk-Based
Capital Ratio
(Regulatory)
Non-Performing
Loans* as
a % of Assets
Monarch Bank 10.69% 1.29%
Towne Bank 12.15% 0.34%
Old Point National 11.62% 1.41%
RBC Centura** 9.63% 3.32%
Heritage Bank 12.12% 0.01%
Fulton Bank 8.70% 1.36%
Bank of the
Commonwealth 11.63% 5.69%
Bank of Hampton Roads 13.26% 1.61%
Farmers Bank 13.01% 1.85%
Virginia Company Bank 9.06% 0.91%
Sources: Federal Financial Institution Examination Council; the Federal Reserve Board; FRY-9C
 reports; and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
*Loans past due more than 90 days and still accruing plus all non-accruing loans, leases and other
assets.
** RBC Centura is not a Hampton Roads-based bank. However, it has numerous branches
throughout the region. It was not one of the 19 banks the Federal Reserve publicly subjected to
stress tests.
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When simulating the more adverse scenario, cumulative loan losses through the
fourth quarter of 2010 rise to $666 million, a 77 percent increase over the pro-
jected baseline losses. As with the baseline losses, the more adverse scenario
losses are heavily concentrated in CREs and again accounted for nearly two-
thirds of the projected total. 
Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio stress test results are presented in Graph 24. Each
ratio represents an average of all eight banks in the sample. For example,
based on Federal Financial Institution Examination Council (FFIEC) data, in the
fourth quarter of 2008 the average actual Tier 1 capital ratio for the eight
banks was 11.9 percent. By the first quarter of 2009 the ratio had increased to
12 percent, double the Federal Reserve’s stress test standard. 
For the baseline case, which projects loan losses through the fourth quarter of
2010, despite loan losses of $376 million, Hampton Roads-based banks as a
group did well with respect to the average bank’s Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio.
The average for the sample of the eight banks, 8.9 percent, was well above
that of the Federal Reserve’s standard of 6 percent. Only one of the eight banks
fell below the standard, and it would require only a modest infusion of equity
capital, estimated at $1.2 million, to bring it up to the Fed’s standard. 
Loan losses of $666 million through the fourth quarter of 2010, generated by
the economic conditions of the more adverse scenario, yield much different
results. The Tier 1 capital ratio of the average bank in the sample group falls
from the baseline scenario to 5.3 percent, well above the “minimum adequacy”
requirement of Basel l but below that of the Federal Reserve’s standard. Further-
more, six of the eight banks fall below the Federal Reserve standard in the more
adverse scenario. To get these banks back above the standard would require
an estimated capital infusion of $21.57 million.  
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TABLE 6
BANK STRESS TESTS: BASELINE AND MORE ADVERSE
 ECONOMIC SCENARIOS
Real GDP 2009 2010
Average Baseline -2.0% 2.1%
More Adverse -3.3 0.5
Civilian Unemployment Rate
Average Baseline 8.4% 8.8%
More Adverse 8.9 10.3
House Prices
Baseline -14% -4%
More Adverse -22 -7
Source: “The Supervisory Capital Assessment Program: Design and Implementation,” 
Board of Governors, Federal Reserve Bank, April 24, 2009 
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GRAPH 22
ESTIMATED EMPLOYMENT IMPACT BY INDUSTRY WITHIN HAMPTON 
ROADS OF THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT OF 
2009 (ECONOMIC STIMULUS) THROUGH THE 4TH QUARTER OF 2010
Source: Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
(Estimates are based on the methodology presented by Christina Romer and Jared Bernstein in “The Job Impact 
of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Plan,” Obama Administration Transition Papers, Jan. 11, 2009.)
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GRAPH 23
STRESS TEST RESULTS: HAMPTON ROADS’ REGIONAL BANKS ESTIMATED CUMULATIVE LOAN LOSSES 
BY ECONOMIC SCENARIO AND TYPE OF LOAN THROUGH 4TH QUARTER 2010
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
Source: Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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GRAPH 24
STRESS TEST RESULTS: ESTIMATED AVERAGE TIER 1 RISK-BASED CAPITAL RATIO F0R HAMPTON ROADS’ 
REGIONAL BANKS UNDER VARIOUS SCENARIOS THROUGH 4TH QUARTER 2010
Source: Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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Providing Some Context
These are historic times, economically speaking. Unprecedented events,
 particularly in financial markets, have whizzed by our eyes in a blur since the
middle of 2008. Like a “100-year” hurricane that we expect to see only once
per  century, the financial havoc of 2008 and 2009 was thought by most
experts to be highly unlikely (at least, until it actually occurred!). Indeed, sophisti-
cated quantitative risk evaluation models suggested that events such as the col-
lapse of Lehman Brothers and AIG, while not unthinkable, were certainly highly
improbable.
The problem was these models ingested faulty data that generated rose-colored
predictions. Economic modelers, in fact, virtually all of the professionals in the
financial system, did not sufficiently understand many of the new financial vehi-
cles that had been developed. Some of these contained assets combinations
(“tranches”) that disguised the presence of risky subprime mortgages and other
potentially perilous asset blends. Hence, they relied upon data and risk esti-
mates that were erroneous and subsequently underpriced those risks. Under-
priced risks encouraged individuals, firms and the government to expose
themselves to hazards that ordinarily they would eschew.
We have seen the results of these miscalculations, both nationally and in
Hampton Roads. However, for us, there have been two important differences.
First, regional economic conditions continue to lag national events. An important
reason for this is that Hampton Roads contains fewer of the technology-intensive
and manufacturing-heavy industries that usually lead national economic declines
and expansions. Second, Department of Defense expenditures, which now
account for more than 40 percent of our regional economy, have increased
over the past year in Hampton Roads and therefore have diminished the impact
of the national recession on us. Consequently, while unemployment rates have
risen and housing prices have declined, these changes have been much more
modest than those nationally.
Hampton Roads will recover economically when the country as a whole
recovers. In the last analysis, our economic fate is largely dependent upon
events and decisions that take place elsewhere. Because our residential housing
markets are highly sensitive to overall economic conditions and regional employ-
ment numbers, we should not expect significant recovery in housing markets
within Hampton Roads until we begin to see national economic recovery. Even
then, the very high number of unsold houses that currently clogs our markets will
cause that recovery to be gradual.
43THE REGIONAL ECONOMY CONTRACTS
2009 State of the Region Booklet:Layout 1  9/3/09  10:59 AM  Page 43
2009 State of the Region Booklet:Layout 1  9/3/09  10:59 AM  Page 44
The Hotel Industry
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There are two primary ways to analyze the health of the hotel industry. The first
is to undertake a macro-level examination of revenue trends for the industry as a
whole. Graph 1 does so by displaying the historical trend of total hotel revenue
in Hampton Roads from 1988 to 2008. One can see that regional
hotel revenue more than doubled, from $355 million in 1988
to $718 million in 2007, a healthy upward surge of 102 per-
cent. However, hotel revenue declined in 2008 to $680 million
(-5.3 percent), due to increased gasoline prices observed
during the first eight months of 2008, slightly higher average
room rates and the economic recession that took firm hold in
fall 2008.  
The hotel industry in Hampton Roads has been getting larger, at least in terms of
the number of rooms available for rental. Between 1988 and 2007, the
number of hotel rooms in our region increased by 25.4 percent (see Graph 2).
Further, in 2008, the number of rooms grew by another 1,000 to a total of
38,000. 
The second major way to analyze the economics of the hotel industry is to take
a micro-level approach and focus upon individual hotels. This approach usually
looks at measures of single-hotel performance, such as a hotel’s room occu-
pancy rate, the average daily revenue it receives per occupancy (ADR) and the
revenue it generates per available room (REVPAR). 
A hotel’s occupancy rate is straightforward – the ratio of room nights rented to
the number of rentable room nights it has available. ADR is the average room
rate collected by a hotel. REVPAR combines these two measures and is the ratio
of hotel revenue received during a specified period of time to the total number
of room nights available to rent during the same period. It is the preferred
measure of the economic performance of a hotel.  
If two comparable hotels have the same REVPAR, then the hotel with a lower
occupancy rate usually is viewed as having a better performance. There are
two reasons for this. First, the operating costs of a hotel will be less for the hotel
with the lower occupancy rate. Such a hotel doesn’t have to incur as many costs
in order to attain a given REVPAR. Second, many hoteliers believe it is easier to
drive up their revenue by paying for additional advertising and marketing that
results in greater occupancy than it is for them to augment revenue by raising
prices. If competitors do not increase their room rates at the same time, then a
single hotel that increases its room rates likely will encounter problems.
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THE HOTEL INDUSTRY IN HAMPTON ROADS
A hotel isn’t like a home, but it’s better than being a house guest.
– William Feather (American business author, d. 1981)
R
eal estate professionals often divide the commercial real estate market into five sub-markets: (1) Multifamily Housing, (2) Office Space, (3) Industrial Space, (4)
Retail Space and (5) Hotels and Casinos. In this chapter, we focus on the hotel market, which is in a state of flux because of economic recession.  
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GRAPH 1
TOTAL HOTEL REVENUE IN HAMPTON ROADS, 1988 TO 2008
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report, May 6, 2009, and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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GRAPH 2
NUMBER OF HOTEL ROOMS IN HAMPTON ROADS, 1988 TO 2008
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report, May 6, 2009, and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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Graphs 3 through 5 record the occupancy rates, ADR and REVPAR for hotels in
Hampton Roads between 1988 and 2008. Hotel occupancy rates
(Graph 3) have fluctuated between 55 percent and 63 percent
over the past two decades, with the average occupancy rate
being 59 percent. Nevertheless, in 2008, occupancy rates fell
to a much lower level, 55.1 percent. The villains appear to be higher
gasoline prices, slightly higher average room rates, deteriorating economic con-
ditions and the addition of 1,000 hotel rooms in the region.  
Graphs 4 and 5, respectively, show ADR and REVPAR between 1988 and
2008. Note that ADR (average room revenue) increased in all but three years
during that time, and even increased slightly in 2008. As Graph 4 illustrates,
ADR increased 64 percent during this two-decade time period. However,
REVPAR (revenue earned per available room) has been much more variable and
declined in about one-third of those years. The REVPAR for the typical hotel in
the region took a steep fall in 2008, primarily due to the decline in occupancy
that we noted above (see Graph 5).  
The Old Dominion University Forecasting Team projects a
decline of 2.2 percent in total hotel revenue in Hampton Roads
in 2009. This will be compounded by the fact that yet an addi-
tional 877 hotel rooms could potentially open in Hampton
Roads in 2009. Needless to say, this does not bode well for the
profitability of the hotel industry in the region because a
smaller revenue pie will be divided among a larger number of
rooms and operators. We expect REVPAR to decline further, to
about $47 in 2009, a level not seen since 2002.  
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GRAPH 3
OCCUPANCY RATES OF HOTELS IN HAMPTON ROADS, 1988 TO 2008
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report, May 6, 2009, and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report, May 6, 2009, and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
GRAPH 4
AVERAGE DAILY RATE OF HOTELS IN HAMPTON ROADS, 1988 TO 2008
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GRAPH 5
REVENUE PER AVALIABLE ROOM FOR HOTELS IN HAMPTON ROADS, 1988 TO 2008
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report, May 6, 2009, and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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Comparing Hampton Roads
to Other Metropolitan Areas
Let’s accept as a given that the hotel industry in Hampton Roads currently is
facing significant economic challenges. How are we doing relative to compa-
rable metropolitan areas? Tables 1 and 2 provide information in that regard for
the years 1988 to 2007, and 2007 to 2008, respectively.
It is evident from Table 1 that the hotel industry in Hampton
Roads is much larger than any of those in the other five
Atlantic Coast metropolitan areas drawn for comparison. In
fact, the hotel industry in our region
is 52 percent greater than its next
largest competitor, Jacksonville, in
terms of total annual hotel revenue
earned. From 1988 through 2007, our
average annual hotel revenues totaled
$491.8  million, more than double those
 generated in Richmond. 
During this approximate two-decade time
period, Hampton Roads offered, on average,
33,220 rooms, 42 percent more than the
next largest market in this regard (Charlotte).
Nevertheless, we also can see that the growth
in total hotel revenues easily was the smallest
in Hampton Roads compared to the other five
regions. Between 1988 and 2007, hotel
 revenues in Hampton Roads grew by 102
percent, while they increased 312 percent in
Charleston and more than 250 percent in
both Charlotte and Raleigh-Durham-Chapel
Hill.
One also can see in Table 1 that the Char-
lotte metropolitan area led the pack insofar as
adding additional hotel rooms was concerned. No doubt this spurt has been
tempered by the serious economic problems the city’s major banks have encoun-
tered over the past year. 
In addition, the average occupancy rate of hotel rooms in Hampton Roads was
lower than the rates of all five of the other metropolitan regions (59 percent
compared to Charleston’s leading 67 percent). 
REVPAR, an important key to hotel industry health, also lagged in Hampton
Roads and grew only 61.5 percent. The highest growth (139.5 percent)
occurred in the Charleston market. 
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TABLE 1
COMPARING AVERAGE HOTEL INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE:
HAMPTON ROADS AND OTHER METROPOLITAN AREAS, 1988-2007
Measure
Hampton
Roads, VA
Jacksonville,
FL
Charlotte,
NC
Raleigh,
NC
Charleston,
SC
Richmond,
VA
Hotel Industry
 Revenue (Average)
$491.8 M $323.9 M $311.1 M $282.2 M $246.2 M $208.3 M
Hotel Rooms
 (Average)
33,220 19,939 23,466 18,848 12,678 15,821
Change in Hotel
Revenue 
102.0% 222.0% 267.8% 260.0% 311.5% 163.1%
Change in Hotel
Rooms
25.4% 50.3% 95.0% 72.4% 72.3% 47.1%
REVPAR (Average) $40.2 $43.1 $35.3 $39.9 $51.2 $35.3
Change in REVPAR 61.5% 114.8% 89.1% 109.4% 139.5% 79.3%
Occupancy Rate
(Average)
59.0% 63.6% 59.2% 64.0% 67.0% 60.6%
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report, May 6, 2009, and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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Of course, economic conditions have changed substantially in the past two
years. Among other developments, housing markets deteriorated substantially,
gasoline prices spiked during summer 2008, and the economy plunged into a
recession that now has been dated as beginning in December 2007. All of
these events adversely affected the hotel industry in Hampton Roads and Table
2 shows how. Regional hotel revenue declined by 5.3 percent in 2008, our
occupancy rate fell by 8.7 percent and REVPAR decreased by 8.1 percent.  
All in all, 2008 was not a good year for the hotel industry in
Hampton Roads. Further, the hotel industry here fared worse than in the
other five Atlantic Coast metropolitan areas in our comparisons. In Table 2, one
can also see that total hotel revenue, REVPAR and occupancy all declined more
in Hampton Roads in 2008 than in any of the other five metro areas. 
That generalization, however, hides some interesting differences during 2008
and does not speak to 2009, which has been agreeably different. Let’s see how.  
The highly publicized crisis in the banking system accelerated dramatically in
the public consciousness in September 2008. It’s useful, therefore, to compare
what happened to the hotel industry prior to Sept. 1 to what occurred after that
date. And, to put this in perspective, let’s compare those time periods in 2008
to the identical time periods of 2007.  
Table 3 reveals that in contrast to Hampton Roads, total hotel revenue actually
increased in three of the other five markets, while REVPAR increased in one of
these markets. Occupancy rates fell noticeably in all five of the other markets.
Thus, for the first eight months of 2008, the hotel industry deteriorated more rap-
idly in Hampton Roads than in these other regions.
Table 4 undertakes the same type of analysis, but focuses on the Sept. 1 to
Dec. 31 time period. Once again, 2008 is compared to 2007 in Hampton
Roads and the other five metropolitan areas. One can see that the differences
between Hampton Roads and the other regions moderated substantially, and in
one case (occupancy rates), Hampton Roads no longer was last.
Things began to change, however, in 2009. During the first
three months of 2009, Hampton Roads experienced the
smallest declines in hotel revenue, REVPAR and occupancy
rates of any of the regions in our comparison. By way of illustra-
tion, REVPAR declined 7.6 percent in Hampton Roads, but between 17.1 per-
cent and 21.7 percent in the other five regions (see Table 5). It would be a
misnomer to label this a recovery for the Hampton Roads hotel industry since all
of our region’s critical numbers are negative. Even so, it is correct to observe
that hotels in Hampton Roads now are weathering this economic contraction
much better than the hotels in comparable metropolitan areas along the Atlantic
Coast. Of the other five regions, Charlotte appears to be suffering the most. This
is not surprising, given the demise of Wachovia Bank and the teetering financial
circumstances of Bank of America, both of which are headquartered in Char-
lotte.  
We observed at the beginning of this report that Hampton Roads has been less
severely impacted by this economic recession than most other metropolitan
areas in the United States. Indeed, a June 2009 study issued by the Brookings
Institution Metropolitan Study Program reported that, economically speaking,
Hampton Roads had fared 16th best among the 100 largest metropolitan areas
in the country up to that point. It is apparent that the significant expenditures the
Department of Defense makes within Hampton Roads have cushioned our eco-
nomic descent. In years past, some critics have faulted Hampton
Roads for a lack of diversification in its economic base. More
than 40 percent of our region’s economy is related to defense
spending. In the current economic milieu, however, this has
turned out to be an important advantage. We are not as
dependent upon private-sector business travel as other metro-
politan areas, and this has diminished the economic damage
done to our region’s hotels and motels.
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TABLE 2
CHANGES IN REVENUE AND OCCUPANCY, 2007 TO 2008
Measure
Hampton
Roads, VA
Jacksonville,
FL
Charlotte,
NC
Raleigh,
NC
Charleston,
SC
Richmond,
VA
Change in Hotel
Revenue 
-5.3% -3.0% -2.6% 0.1% -0.7% -1.9%
Change in
REVPAR
-8.1% -7.8% -3.5% -2.5% -4.9% -5.7%
Change in
 Occupancy Rate
-8.7% -7.5% -8.1% -5.7% -7.7% -8.5%
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report, May 6, 2009, and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
TABLE 3
CHANGES IN REVENUE AND OCCUPANCY,
JANUARY-AUGUST 2007 VERSUS JANUARY-AUGUST 2008
Measure
Hampton
Roads, VA
Jacksonville,
FL
Charlotte,
NC
Raleigh,
NC
Charleston,
SC
Richmond,
VA
Change in Hotel
Revenue 
-3.3% -1.2% 0.9% 2.2% 3.5% -0.3%
Change in
REVPAR
-5.8% -5.8% 0.2% -0.3% -1.2% -3.1%
Change in
 Occupancy Rate
-7.2% -6.7% -6.2% -4.5% -5.8% -7.0%
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report, May 6, 2009, and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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Summing It Up 
These are difficult times for the hotel
industry in Hampton Roads, though not
quite as difficult as those being experi-
enced by hotel owners in at least five
other comparable metropolitan areas
along the Atlantic Coast. All of the most
important variables relating to hotel eco-
nomics (total hotel revenue, average
rates, revenue per room and occupancy
rates) have been deteriorating. Despite
these discouraging developments, an
additional 1,000 hotel rooms were
added in 2008 in Hampton Roads and
another 877 hotel rooms currently are
under construction. Hence, the regional
hotel industry appears to be expanding
its capacity at a time when the demand
for its rooms has been declining. 
Should these conditions continue, it is
likely that marginal hotel operations will
be forced out of the Hampton Roads
market. Marginal here should be under-
stood to mean unprofitable and does not
connote expensive versus inexpensive
hotels, or nationally branded hotels
versus those that are not. A veteran real
estate broker in Hampton Roads told us,
“There is excess capacity now in hotel
markets in Hampton Roads and this will
drive the least capable operators out.”
This is a harsh conclusion, but one that
actually could hasten recovery in the
industry, if it comes to pass. 
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TABLE 5
CHANGES IN REVENUE AND OCCUPANCY,
JANUARY-MARCH 2008 VERSUS JANUARY-MARCH 2009
Measure
Hampton
Roads, VA
Jacksonville,
FL
Charlotte,
NC
Raleigh,
NC
Charleston,
SC
Richmond,
VA
Change in Hotel
Revenue 
-4.5% -17.4% -18.0% -14.1% -16.2% -11.7%
Change in
REVPAR
-7.6% -21.7% -20.3% -17.1% -17.5% -18.6%
Change in
 Occupancy Rate
-4.5% -13.9% -16.8% -12.4% -10.8% -16.5%
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report, May 6, 2009, and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
TABLE 4
CHANGES IN REVENUE AND OCCUPANCY,
SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 2007 VERSUS SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 2008
Measure
Hampton
Roads, VA
Jacksonville,
FL
Charlotte,
NC
Raleigh,
NC
Charleston,
SC
Richmond,
VA
Change in Hotel
Revenue 
-10.9% -7.4% -10.0% -4.1% -10.4% -5.2%
Change in
REVPAR
-14.4% -12.5% -11.2% -7.2% -13.5% -10.9%
Change in
 Occupancy Rate
-12.2% -9.1% -12.4% -8.2% -12.2% -11.5%
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report, May 6, 2009, and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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Long-term care has been defined as “the services and supports that people need
when their ability to care for themselves has been reduced by a chronic illness
or disability.”1 Long-term care may include assistance or supervision with “activi-
ties of daily living” (ADLs) such as bathing, dressing, eating or toileting, or with
“instrumental activities of daily living” (IADLs) such as shopping, cleaning,
driving or managing money. People of all ages can require long-term care, but
seniors are the primary users. A 2005 study in the health care journal Inquiry
indicated that more than two-thirds (69 percent) of people over 65 eventually
would need some kind of long-term care, with an average duration of about
three years.
The costs of long-term care are substantial. According to the MetLife Mature
Market Institute’s 2008 survey, the average annual base rate at an assisted
living facility is $36,372. Nursing home private-pay rates are steeper still –
$77,380 for private and $69,715 for semiprivate accommodations (see Table
2). These costs can quickly eradicate the savings of otherwise financially com-
fortable seniors. Thus, the greatest share of all long-term care spending ($97 bil-
lion in 2007) has fallen to Medicaid, the payer of last resort. The informal costs
of long-term care are larger still. AARP researchers estimate that the total eco-
nomic value of (unpaid) family care-giving reached $375 billion in 2007,
 easily surpassing all Medicaid spending for institutional and home- and commu-
nity-based long-term care service.
Long-term care is an issue that affects us all, both as taxpayers and potential
beneficiaries of its services. Yet, public awareness about the functioning and
costs of long-term care is regrettably low. Media coverage too often swings
between extremes: on one hand, hair-raising exposés of neglect or abuse in
deficient institutions; on the other, upbeat features about active seniors taking up
arts and crafts or ballroom dancing. This chapter strives for a more comprehen-
sive assessment of long-term care in Hampton Roads, focusing on the quality
and accessibility of the region’s nursing homes and assisted living facilities.
The Continuum of Care
Social workers, health care providers and other advocates for the disabled
often refer to long-term care as a “continuum.” In part, this refers to the broad
spectrum of needs that can require some caregiving. In Virginia, all recipients of
publicly funded long-term care services are first evaluated by a diagnostic tool
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THE “SILVER TSUNAMI”: RESIDENTIAL LIFE AND CARE FOR
SENIORS IN HAMPTON ROADS
I
n 2011, the oldest members of the baby boom generation will turn 65. The upcoming “silver tsunami” will transform the demographics of American society, stretching the
resources of our country’s health care and Social Security systems as never before. Virginia’s senior population is expected to double between 2007 and 2030; the
number of Virginians 85 and older will increase by 114 percent (see Table 1). Ongoing medical advances against cancer, heart disease and other once-fatal afflictions
will extend the life spans of both the boomers and their parents – while simultaneously increasing the likelihood that they will at some point require long-term care.  
1 Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, “Long-Term Care: Understanding Medicaid’s Role for the Elderly and Disabled” (2005), available at: http://www.kff.org/medicaid/longtermcare.cfm
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called the Uniform Assessment Instrument. The UAI considers social and eco-
nomic resources, mental and physical health, as well as proficiency in the activi-
ties and instrumental activities of daily living (ADLs and IADLs). The UAI can
provide a basis for an individualized service plan that may include one or more
sources of external support. Hampton Roads’ two Area Agencies on Aging, the
Peninsula Agency on Aging (PAA) and Senior Services of Southeastern Virginia
(SSSEVA), administer the UAI without cost. Together these agencies provided or
helped to coordinate services for more than 28,000 Hampton Roads seniors in
the 2007-08 fiscal year.
The “continuum of care” likewise refers to the broad spectrum
of supports and services that are available to assist disabled
persons. These include nursing homes and assisted living facili-
ties, but also a wide variety of home- and community-based
services (HCBS) such as personal health care, companion care,
home-delivered meals, assisted transportation and adult day
care centers. Whereas in decades past the notion of long-term care may
have been nearly synonymous with nursing home residence, today an array of
resources exists that provides different levels of assistance entirely in a home- or
community-based setting. Surveys consistently demonstrate that the over-
whelming majority of seniors would prefer to “age in place,” remaining in their
own homes as long as possible. The work of the Area Agencies on Aging in
Hampton Roads and elsewhere is grounded upon this very principle – “to help
seniors live independently and with dignity,” as stated succinctly in SSSEVA’s
2008 annual report.
Residential facilities remain, however, among the most established and numeri-
cally influential providers of long-term care. Despite a growing movement
among federal and state policymakers to balance long-term care spending more
equitably between institutional services and HCBS, 73 percent of all Medicaid
long-term care spending for older people and adults with physical disabilities is
currently paid to nursing homes. (Although this percentage varies widely from
state to state, Virginia’s Medicaid program approaches the national average,
directing 74 percent of this spending, or $720 million, toward nursing homes in
2007.) Further, the regulatory standards that govern nursing homes are more
uniform and specific than those for most HCBS. The diversity of HCBS con-
tributes to their appeal, yet as a consequence there are less data available for
evaluating their performance comparatively. For practical purposes, then, the
State of the Region report focuses on residential long-term care facilities –
nursing homes, assisted living facilities and Continuing Care Retirement Commu-
nities (CCRCs).
Nursing Homes 
Nursing homes serve seniors (and others) with the most intense long-term care
needs. These facilities provide not only skilled nursing care, but also room and
board, assistance with ADLs, and social and recreational activities. There are
nearly 29,000 nursing home residents in the Commonwealth of Virginia. Table
3 summarizes nursing facility data for Hampton Roads and other jurisdictions.  
Despite an aging population, the number of nursing home residents in Virginia
and elsewhere has remained steady or increased only gradually throughout the
past decade. This is largely attributable to the expansion of assisted living and
other home- and community-based long-term care services. As a consequence,
the percentage of nursing home residents who are sicker and more frail is
higher than in the past. One recent study notes that “three-fourths of people
living in nursing homes need assistance with three or more ADLs”; they are also
more apt to suffer from Alzheimer’s disease and related dementias than other
users of long-term care.2
Today’s nursing homes are largely a product of the Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1987 (OBRA 87), landmark legislation that reformed the U.S.
nursing home system. Motivated by repeated exposés of institutional fraud,
abuse and neglect, OBRA 87 upgraded staffing requirements, established new
regulatory standards, and tightened inspection and enforcement. Perhaps most
significantly, the new standards placed greater emphasis on residents’ quality of
life, in addition to a facility’s maintenance and cleanliness. The Medicare and
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2 National Commission for Quality Long-Term Care, “Long-Term Care in America: An Introduction” (2007), www.qualitylongtermcarecommission.org/pdf/ltc_america_introduction.pdf
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 Medicaid certification processes merged into a single system, eliminating the
largest state-to-state disparities that had previously characterized nursing home
standards.  
THE CMS RATINGS
Survey data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) informs
the Nursing Home Compare Web site, http://www.medicare.gov/NHCom-
pare, which has been online since 1998. CMS-certified nursing homes – in
other words, all those that accept Medicare or Medicaid – are rated in three
different categories: health inspections, staffing and quality measures. (Quality
measures include an array of statistics such as the percentage of residents suf-
fering from bedsores, or the percentage that have been immunized against the
flu.) Ratings range between 1 (much below average) and 5 (much above
average). As of December 2008, each nursing home receives a composite 5-
star quality rating as well. Thus, consumers in Hampton Roads and elsewhere
have ready access to a comprehensive rating system for nearly all U.S. nursing
homes (see Table 4).
How accurate are these ratings? Even the CMS emphasizes that they are no
substitute for observing a facility’s premises and daily routine in person. Some
aspects of the CMS ratings derive from a single annual inspection, and thus
may not accurately reflect an institution’s overall quality. Differences also persist
among state inspection authorities, leading to inconsistencies from place to
place. Further, much of the data that informs the CMS ratings is reported by the
nursing homes themselves. No ratings system is perfect, but Nursing Home
Compare offers consumers at least a rough measure of a facility’s overall per-
formance. While the distinction between a 3-star and a 4-star rating may be
slight, nursing home residents and their families would be well advised to con-
sider the larger divide between a 1-star and 5-star rating. Ratings are updated
on a monthly basis; we consulted the site at the end of January 2009.
Of the 54 ranked facilities in the Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News Metro-
politan Statistical Area (excluding Currituck County, N.C.), 19 (35 percent)
received above average or much above average grades. Twenty-two, or 41
percent, ranked below average or much below average. The distribution of
Hampton Roads’ scores resembles that of the entire United States (35 percent
with 4- or 5-star ratings, and 44 percent with 1- or 2-star rank). Overall, our
facilities stand out positively compared to others in the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia. On average, Hampton Roads nursing homes outperform those in
Northern Virginia (29 percent with 4- or 5-star ratings, and 51 percent with 1-
or 2-star ratings) and the Greater Richmond area (21 percent with 4- or 5-star
ratings and 63 percent with 1- or 2-star ratings).   
On the other hand, Hampton Roads bears the dubious distinction of hosting two
of Virginia’s three “Special Focus Facilities.” The CMS has singled out these facili-
ties as having “a history of serious quality issues” and required their participation
“in a special program to stimulate improvements in their quality of care.” Beacon
Shores Nursing and Rehabilitation Center in Virginia Beach has been on the Spe-
cial Focus Facility list for 13 months; Harbour Pointe Medical and Rehabilitation
Center in Norfolk has stayed there for 48 months (see Table 4).
Four- and 5-star nursing facilities are located in nearly all Hampton Roads cities.
Their most significant common bond is ownership. Fifteen out of 19 are
nonprofit institutions, in many cases affiliated either with a
religious denomination, or with a hospital network such as
Riverside or Sentara. Conversely, 18 of the 22 1- and 2-star facilities in
Hampton Roads are operated for profit, and many of these are affiliated with a
large nursing home chain. This list includes four homes owned by Kindred
Healthcare (which operates 226 nursing facilities nationwide), as well as four
homes owned by Medical Facilities of America (which owns 31 facilities in Vir-
ginia). The correlation between nursing home ownership and quality of care has
been raised elsewhere in the national media, notably Consumer Reports3 and
The New York Times. A Times investigative report from Sept. 23,
2007, highlighted the decline in nursing care among facilities
that were recently acquired by large private equity firms.
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Table 4 also reveals that staffing poses a persistent problem for all nursing
homes, regardless of ownership, and Hampton Roads is no exception. Only
11, or 22 percent of our region’s nursing homes, earned a 4- or 5-star rating in
this category; 31, or 62 percent, received one or two stars. These numbers do
not directly address quality of care, but rather the average number of staff hours
per resident per day. High vacancy and turnover rates contribute to low staffing
ratings. According to a 2007 survey conducted by the American Health Care
Association, the staff turnover rates in Virginia nursing facilities exceeded
national averages. Data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, meanwhile,
show that the wages of both licensed nurses (RNs and LPNs/LVNs) and certified
nursing assistants (CNAs) in Virginia lag behind national averages. Readers of
this report should note that CNAs provide the majority of direct care (in Virginia,
an average of 2.1 hours per day) to nursing home residents. CNAs’ compensa-
tion, however, is not much higher than that of many unskilled workers with signif-
icantly lesser responsibilities and training requirements. One of the greatest
challenges facing nursing homes in Hampton Roads and elsewhere is attracting
and retaining talented caregivers amidst the backdrop of ever-tightening budget
constraints and a chronic U.S. nursing shortage. 
OTHER NURSING HOME QUALITY INDICATORS
Surprisingly, there is not a dominant type of accreditation (outside of CMS certi-
fication) that is decisive for nursing facilities. The Joint Commission, which is best
known for accrediting hospitals, does offer long-term care accreditation. But the
Joint Commission’s “Gold Seal of Approval” has been acquired by only one
Hampton Roads nursing facility that is not affiliated with a larger hospital, the
James River Convalescent and Rehabilitation Center in Newport News. CARF,
the Commission on Accreditation of Rehabilitation Facilities, also offers accredi-
tation for nursing facilities and other “aging services.” In the aging services
field, CARF is most influential in the accreditation of Continuing Care Retirement
Communities. Fifteen CCRCs in Virginia have obtained this qualification,
although none are in Hampton Roads. Thus, while accreditation from CARF or
the Joint Commission can be a positive indicator of nursing home quality, neither
agency currently bears much influence in our region.
Perhaps the most visible alternative to the CMS ratings is the “Quality First” ini-
tiative of the American Health Care Association (AHCA), the organizational arm
of the nursing home industry itself. Unsurprisingly, the AHCA is among the most
vocal critics of the CMS 5-star ratings, which it believes to be premised upon a
flawed survey system. Alternatively, Quality First represents a “public commit-
ment by long-term care providers to voluntarily and collectively agree to work
toward the highest standards of quality.” Twenty-two nursing facilities in
Hampton Roads have pledged their allegiance to Quality First principles. The
initiative rightfully emphasizes that regulatory compliance alone (the CMS’s chief
concern) cannot fully assess an institution’s quality of care. In the absence of out-
side monitoring or evaluation, however, the Quality First pledge remains more a
statement of goodwill than a reliable quality assurance.   
ACCESSIBILITY AND COST AT NURSING HOMES
Virginia’s supply of nursing beds is overseen by the Certificate of Public Need
(COPN) division within the Department of Health. At present, a new nursing
facility (excepting those affiliated with CCRCs) may be established only when
the COPN division issues a specific request for applications. Such requests are
rare, since the occupancy rate of Virginia’s nursing homes has held steady at
91 percent or lower over the past several years. According to COPN analyst
Sam Clement, 93 percent occupancy is the division’s indication that a need
exists for more nursing beds in one of the state’s 22 planning districts. The
average occupancy rate in Hampton Roads, which roughly encompasses Plan-
ning Districts 20 and 21, is just under 92 percent. There have been few recent
additions to our region’s established nursing homes. The most recently estab-
lished or expanded facilities – including Harbor’s Edge, Windsor Meade of
Williamsburg and Westminster-Canterbury on Chesapeake Bay – are all affili-
ated with Continuing Care Retirement Communities.   
According to figures from the 2009 edition of the AARP’s “Across the States:
Profiles of Long-Term Care and Independent Living,” there are 35 nursing home
beds in Virginia for every 1,000 residents ages 65 and above, 10 beds fewer
than the national average. Our own investigations indicate that the Hampton
Roads region also has 35 beds per 1,000 seniors, mirroring the Common-
wealth of Virginia as a whole. The Greater Richmond area has slightly more
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beds (38 per 1,000 seniors), while Northern Virginia has fewer (25 per 1,000
seniors). Despite the proportionally low number of beds in Northern Virginia, the
region’s occupancy rates (averaging 88 percent) are also among the lowest in
the Commonwealth. Given the region’s high cost of living and nursing facility
private-pay rates, it seems likely that some seniors leave Northern Virginia for
cost reasons when making the transition to nursing care. From a national per-
spective, however, even Northern Virginia nursing homes are comparatively full.
(The average national rate of occupancy is 85 percent, ranging from 65 per-
cent in Oregon to 95 percent in Hawaii.)  
These statistics suggest that it may be more difficult for seniors in Hampton
Roads and elsewhere in Virginia to obtain space in a desirable facility.
According to our conversations with long-term care specialists in the region,
however, much depends upon prospective residents’ individual needs. Most
Hampton Roads seniors are able to locate a convenient and appropriate
facility. Those with severe symptoms of dementia, particularly when accompa-
nied by aggressive or other troublesome behaviors, are much more likely to
encounter difficulties. Many nursing homes are reluctant or unable to provide
space for these patients, whose caregiving needs are particularly intensive.
Only one facility in Hampton Roads is dedicated solely to the care of this popu-
lation: the 150-bed Hancock Geriatric Treatment Center, part of Eastern State
Hospital in Williamsburg.
From the perspective of cost, Hampton Roads nursing facilities appear to be a
relative bargain. According to the MetLife Mature Market Institute’s 2008
survey, the average daily room rate in a U.S. nursing facility is $191 for private
and $212 for semiprivate accommodations; in Virginia, the average rates are
$182 and $202. The average daily room rates in Hampton Roads, according
to Virginia Health Information figures, are $172 and $190 – below the aver-
ages in the Greater Richmond area as well as in Northern Virginia.  
Intriguingly, there is no obvious correlation between the room rates of Hampton
Roads facilities and their CMS ratings; consumers should not assume that
paying more money ensures a higher standard of care. (The exception to this
rule may be Continuing Care Retirement Communities, which are not included
in the averages because of their different cost structures.)
Assisted Living
In recent decades, assisted living has emerged as an increasingly popular long-
term care option for seniors who need assistance with some ADLs or IADLs, but
not round-the-clock nursing care. In 2007, Virginia had 583 assisted living facil-
ities (ALFs) with a total licensed capacity of 31,964 (see Table 5). Virginia’s
ALFs are roughly equitable to nursing homes in terms of resident population.
There are, however, more than twice as many ALFs as nursing homes, a figure
that reflects their diversity and, in many cases, smaller size. A licensed ALF in
Virginia may house as few as four residents, while nursing homes rarely have
fewer than 50 beds. The 100 ALFs in Hampton Roads vary in size between five
and 153 licensed beds. The smallest facilities are the Open Arms and Hemal
Blossom Village Adult Homes in Newport News and Hampton (five beds each);
the largest are Atria Assisted Living (153) and Brighton Gardens by Sunrise
(150), both of which are affiliated with large national chains and located in Vir-
ginia Beach (see Table 6).
The services provided by Hampton Roads’ ALFs are equally diverse. A minority
are licensed to provide “residential living care” only, meaning “minimal assis-
tance with the activities of daily living.” Most facilities possess “assisted living
care” licensure, meaning that they offer moderate assistance to residents in need
of care. In addition to help with ADLs, facilities may provide housekeeping and
laundry services, meal plans, medication management, transportation, and a
menu of social and recreational opportunities. Some are specially qualified to
care for non-ambulatory residents “who by reason of physical or mental impair-
ment are not capable of self-preservation without the assistance of another
person.” Others maintain special care units for residents with Alzheimer’s dis-
ease or other forms of dementia. While some ALFs resemble nursing homes,
others are more like no-frills boarding houses; still others function almost as full-
service hotels.
A SOMEWHAT CHECKERED PAST FOR ASSISTED LIVING
“Assisted living” is a relatively young concept. Many ALFs that cater to seniors
were founded only in the 1980s or 1990s. These facilities were patterned after
European models of social care that encouraged seniors in need of some
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 assistance to live as independently as possible, in private units within a larger
community. Assisted living became a booming business, and numerous for-profit
chains sprung up across the United States. Harder times have since befallen the
industry, a result of over-building and, more recently, the dramatic reduction of
seniors’ home equity and nest eggs for retirement (encouraging many to delay
their moves to assisted living as long as possible). In March 2009, The Wash-
ington Post reported that the Northern Virginia-based Sunrise Senior Living
chain, one of the largest in the country, might soon seek bankruptcy protection.
Other ALFs, however, are less dependent upon market fortunes. The social and
legal concerns that led to the nursing home reforms of OBRA 87 also encour-
aged the growth of another branch of today’s assisted living industry. In the
1970s and 1980s, social workers and other policy experts worked to move
mentally ill and disabled patients out of large government-run institutions into
smaller, more home-like settings. In practice, this meant that private “adult
homes” that had traditionally taken in elderly boarders increasingly served a
new clientele as well. The number of Virginia’s “assisted living facilities” – as
such homes now came to be known – grew by leaps and bounds. The best-run
ALFs provided a humane (and cost-effective) residential alternative for Virginians
with mild disabilities. In the worst cases, however, the facilities became “a
housing solution of last resort,” mixing “disabled young adults and the elderly,
brain-injury victims and Alzheimer’s patients, the mentally ill and the mentally
retarded, as well as the criminally insane, convicted murderers and sex
offenders.”
This volatile mixture became the subject of a hair-raising Washington Post
exposé of abuses at Virginia assisted living facilities, which was published over
four days in May 2004.4 The Post series drew attention to the insufficient regula-
tory oversight of ALFs all across Virginia. (The articles singled out very few
Hampton Roads institutions, however.) Indirectly, The Post series highlighted the
inconsistent – and often weak – regulation of ALFs throughout the United States.
Since Medicare and Medicaid rarely pay for assisted living, no federal regula-
tions govern the industry. Licensing requirements vary from state to state, as do
the authorities that enforce them. Virginia’s ALFs are licensed by the Department
of Social Services (as opposed to its nursing homes, which are licensed by the
Department of Health). In the immediate aftermath of The Post articles’ publica-
tion, the Department of Social Services (DSS) and a state task force on aging
began to assemble proposals to reform Virginia’s assisted living industry.
A MORE PROMISING FUTURE FOR ASSISTED LIVING?
As a result of these efforts, Gov. Mark Warner signed an assisted living reform
bill into law in March 2005. The legislation addressed management and
staffing concerns by mandating that all ALF administrators receive professional
licensure, and by requiring formal training for all workers entrusted with adminis-
tering medications. Maximum monetary penalties for regulatory violations
increased from $500 per inspection to $10,000 within a 24-month period,
and tougher procedures for inspection and enforcement were introduced as
well. In December 2006, the DSS instituted further regulations that raised min-
imum standards for ALFs in areas such as staff qualification and training, emer-
gency preparedness, coordination with mental health services, and the
installation of air conditioning in at least the “largest common area used by
 residents.”
A 2007 report by the Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission (JLARC) to
the governor and General Assembly of Virginia asserts that “taken together, the
new regulations will lead to substantial improvements in assisted living,” with the
qualification that “strong enforcement will be necessary to ensure these results.”5
However, as the report’s authors also note, “quality of care” is difficult to
measure. The nationwide data that inform the CMS nursing home ratings are
not collected for assisted living facilities. Thus, JLARC’s final report on the impact
of Virginia’s assisted living facility regulations uses regulatory compliance and
verified complaints as “proxies” for assessing quality of care. The report’s
authors find that “89 percent [of Virginia’s 583 licensed ALFs] have no recent
history of compliance problems, and 59 percent have no recent verified
 complaints.”
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On the other hand, the JLARC report identifies 114 (or, 20 per-
cent of all licensed facilities) as “ALFs of Concern.” These facili-
ties do have a history of compliance problems, and/or a
relatively high number of verified complaints. As noted in the
report, ALFs of Concern are located disproportionately in Virginia’s northern and
western regions. Using additional data supplied by JLARC staff, we determined
that Hampton Roads had 13 ALFs of Concern – or, roughly 13 percent of all
ALFs in our region – in 2007. (Three of these facilities are no longer licensed.)
By contrast, 8 percent of facilities in the Greater Richmond area and 22 percent
in Northern Virginia were designated as ALFs of Concern.   
Consumers can learn more about the compliance histories of these and all other
ALFs in Virginia at the Department of Social Services’ Web site,
http://www.dss.state.va.us/facility/search/alf.cgi, where the facilities’ inspec-
tion reports have been placed online dating back to July 2003. The site con-
tains a wealth of information about each ALF, although it does not translate this
information into quantifiable ratings. Rather, visitors to the DSS Web site must
draw their own conclusions about the dozen or more inspection reports posted
for each facility. Unlike the Nursing Home Compare site, which allows users to
compare and contrast a large number of institutions at a glance, the DSS site is
more suited to investigating individual facilities in depth. In general, the inspec-
tion reports reveal most about what a facility may be doing wrong or badly (as
opposed to how well it cares for residents). Thus, users will likely find the site
helpful in determining which ALFs they would prefer to avoid, if not necessarily
in identifying which ones provide the best care.
Nearly every inspection report records some violations. These range from minor
infractions like small oversights in record-keeping or not holding a fire drill within
a designated period of time, to much more serious conditions that could directly
threaten residents’ well-being. In examining the recent inspection reports of
Hampton Roads facilities that were designated as “ALFs of Concern” in 2007,
we found a wide spectrum of outcomes. Some facilities had comparatively few
violations. Other reports related disturbing incidents such as:
 The death of a Chesapeake Home resident who drank “an unknown
quantity of a liquid cleaning product” that was left in his room by a staff
member.
 At Living Options of Chesapeake, there were several occasions when
no staff member was present overnight. Other problems included rest-
rooms without hand soap or toilet paper, sagging and torn mattresses,
as well as the presence of flies throughout the facility.
 Poor maintenance throughout Suffolk’s Nub Jones ALF: cracked or lifting
floor tiles, broken heating/cooling units, inoperable signaling systems in
resident rooms.
 Brighton Gardens by Sunrise in Virginia Beach “failed to notify the
licensing office of a serious incident which negatively affected the health,
safety, & welfare of a resident in seven out of seven incidents for the
period of 12/05/08 through 12/30/08.” Earlier inspections indi-
cated that residents’ call bells had not been answered in a timely way.
Clearly, these kinds of violations are not the norm for Hampton Roads ALFs – but
they are also not as exceptional as one might hope. A brief exploration of the
DSS Web site reveals that the so-called “ALFs of Concern” are not the only facil-
ities in our region with troubling compliance histories. 
What is to be done with low-performing ALFs? Washington Post reporters raised
this question five years ago, but it remains largely unresolved, the reforms of
2005-06 notwithstanding. The Commonwealth of Virginia relies
upon ALFs to house disabled persons who may be unable to
afford different or better care. In many cases, no ready
housing alternative exists. Shutting down a facility can place
tremendous pressures on a social services network that is
already stretched thin. Lynne Williams, director of licensing programs at
DSS, emphasized to us that the agency’s goal is to bring ALFs into compliance
wherever possible, taking away their licensure only as a last resort.
The DSS issues five different kinds of licenses to assisted living facilities: condi-
tional, one-year, two-year, three-year and provisional. Newly opened facilities
receive conditional licenses, while facilities that are “temporarily unable to
comply” with regulatory requirements receive only provisional licenses. Both are
valid for only six months. Most of Virginia’s ALFs possess one-year licenses; facil-
ities with a record of meeting and exceeding minimum standards may receive
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licensure for two or three years. When we consulted the DSS Web site in
March 2009, no facility in Hampton Roads operated under a provisional
license. Eight of our region’s 100 ALFs possessed a desirable three-year license:
The Devonshire and Shelton on the Bay (Hampton), Assisted Living at Warwick
Forest and The Chesapeake (both Newport News), Dominion Village at Poqu-
oson, Hillcrest Retirement Center (Suffolk), Our Lady of Perpetual Help (Virginia
Beach) and Woodhaven Manor at Williamsburg Landing. Five of the eight are
nonprofit facilities; three are a part of Continuing Care Retirement Communities
(CCRCs).  
ACCESSIBILITY AND COSTS AT ASSISTED LIVING FACILITIES
Residence in a well-appointed assisted living facility can approach or exceed
the costs of skilled nursing care. The 2008 MetLife Market Survey (which did
not isolate Hampton Roads as a region) found that the base rates of Virginia
ALFs ranged between $1,900 and $5,800 per month. However, as Table 7
reveals, residents in these facilities often pay substantially more, depending on
the services they require. Most ALFs charge higher fees for dementia or
Alzheimer’s care; others offer services such as transportation or medical care at
additional cost. Moreover, the average stay in assisted living is longer than in
nursing homes, where residents are older and sicker (or may require only short-
term care). Since Medicare and Medicaid rarely pay for assisted living, resi-
dents and their families may eventually be unable to cover the costs.
By contrast, owning a successful assisted living facility can be
a profitable undertaking. For-profit facilities prevail in
Hampton Roads and elsewhere, since assisted living has – at
least until recently – been a lucrative and growing industry,
constrained by comparatively few government regulations. Sev-
enty-one percent of Hampton Roads’ ALFs operate on a for-profit basis (in con-
trast to 54 percent of our region’s nursing homes). The nation’s largest assisted
living chains are, however, underrepresented in Hampton Roads. Regionally, the
two most influential chains are Commonwealth Assisted Living, which operates
12 facilities throughout Virginia (eight of which are located in Hampton Roads),
and Five Star Quality Care, which has 140 facilities nationwide (including five
in Hampton Roads).  
JLARC’s Final Report on the Impact of Assisted Living Facility Regulations states
that “there are no indications that individuals with the financial resources to pur-
chase long-term care face significant barriers to assisted living care. Although
there can be waiting lists for private-pay residents, these waiting lists usually
reflect strong demand for popular facilities.” The barriers for those without such
financial resources, however, are considerable.  
Medicaid pays for home- and community-based services (HCBS) chiefly through
waiver programs that vary considerably from state to state. Most long-term care
policy experts support the expansion of HCBS waiver programs as a cost-effec-
tive means of paying for long-term care, as well as a means of providing sen-
iors in need of care with alternatives to nursing homes. In Virginia, only one
Medicaid waiver program helps to cover the costs of assisted living. Established
in 2005, the Alzheimer’s Assisted Living (AAL) Waiver Program may pay $50 a
day to as many as 200 Virginians with Alzheimer’s disease or a related
dementia that would otherwise require nursing home care. Thus far, the pro-
gram’s enrollment is small – only 26 individuals, according to DMAS (Depart-
ment of Medical Assistance Services) administrator Steve Ankiel. There are
several preconditions for participation: waivers may be used only in facilities
with secure special care units that have formally enrolled in the waiver program.
These ALFs must also accept auxiliary grants, which the AAL waivers are
intended to supplement.
At present, the most influential source of public support for Virginians in assisted
living is the auxiliary grant program funded jointly by the state (80 percent) and
individual localities (20 percent). Recipients of Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) are eligible to receive the grants, which provide a small personal
allowance and contribute to the cost of residence at an assisted living facility.
ALFs are not, however, compelled to accept auxiliary grants – and in fact most
do not, given their low rate of reimbursement. The current auxiliary grant rate is
$1,112 per month ($1,279 per month in Northern Virginia), accompanied by
an $81 personal needs allowance. In 2007, JLARC estimated that auxiliary
grant recipients occupied 21 percent of all assisted living beds in Virginia. The
locations of these grant beds, however, were spread disproportionately
throughout the state. Using additional data from JLARC, we determined that
 auxiliary grant recipients occupied 964 (or 17 percent) of Hampton Roads’
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5,535 licensed assisted living beds in 2007. The greatest number (278) was
located in Chesapeake, followed by Newport News (150) and Norfolk (120).
By contrast, 21 percent of the assisted living beds in Greater Richmond were
auxiliary grant beds, but only 4 percent in Northern Virginia.  
Since these figures are estimates, JLARC staff could not identify the specific facili-
ties associated with each bed. The 2007 JLARC report does, however, assert
that the 114 ALFs of Concern are “more likely to house auxiliary grant recipi-
ents.” A Virginian-Pilot article from the same year depicted the difficulties one
Virginia Beach resident experienced in finding a high-quality ALF that would
accept his mother’s auxiliary grant. The article identified the nonprofit Marian
Manor in Virginia Beach as “one of the few larger, well-appointed facilities in
South Hampton Roads to accept the grants.” According to Tom Spivak, the
facility’s administrator, Marian Manor “takes a financial hit” by offering around
10 percent of its apartments to auxiliary grant recipients, “but considers that part
of its charitable mission.”
In sum, there is currently little incentive for ALFs in Hampton Roads or elsewhere
in Virginia to provide services to the financially needy. Excepting the minority of
facilities that are driven more by charitable mission than by the need to earn a
profit, it seems that the ALFs most likely to accept auxiliary grant recipients are
those with the lowest operating costs and offering the fewest services. Merely
increasing the level of auxiliary grants will not solve all of the problems wit-
nessed in Virginia’s most troubled facilities, but there is a kernel of truth in the
familiar saying “You get what you pay for.” Until assisted living facilities are
reimbursed more completely for the important social service they provide
(whether through Medicaid waivers, auxiliary grants, nonprofit foundations or
some other source), concerns about the quality of care are unlikely to go away.
Continuing Care Retirement
Communities (CCRCs)
Planning ahead for long-term care can be tricky. Some of us will never require
formal caregiving, while others may need months or even years of assistance.
Since it’s difficult to predict one’s own needs, when the time comes, the deci-
sion-making (and financial responsibility) for seniors’ long-term care often falls to
someone else, usually a child or other relative.  
What if seniors could eliminate this uncertainty by “aging in place” in a commu-
nity that guaranteed access to high-quality services all along the care con-
tinuum? This is the promise of Continuing Care Retirement Communities
(CCRCs), the fastest-growing long-term care option for seniors today. The first
such community was founded by Quakers in Montgomery County, Pa., in
1967. The idea took off, and there are now more than 1,800 CCRCs nation-
wide, including eight in Hampton Roads (see Table 8). CCRCs unite inde-
pendent living, assisted living and skilled nursing facilities under one roof (or
under several roofs on a single campus). New residents must generally be 60
years of age or older, and usually are able to live independently. The price of
admission is typically a large entrance fee or deposit that must be paid upfront,
followed by smaller monthly fees that cover rent and other services. These costs
are substantial, and they represent a significant barrier to most Americans who
are contemplating retirement. For those who can foot the bill, however, the pay-
back is substantial: guaranteed care for life.
As the number of CCRCs has proliferated, so too has the elaborate menu of
services and amenities that they offer. Today’s CCRCs “look a lot more like four-
star resorts than old folks’ homes,” as aptly stated by Money magazine in
March 2009. Multiple dining venues, swimming pools, spas, tennis courts and
movie theaters are among the amenities found in Hampton Roads CCRCs. Inde-
pendent living residences range in size from efficiency apartments to two- and
three-bedroom villas. The financial decisions to be made by prospective resi-
dents have proliferated as well. Many communities now offer a choice of mul-
tiple fee structures, refundable entrance deposits and/or à la carte service
plans. “Deciding to move to a CCRC and selecting the right one have serious
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lifestyle and financial ramifications and risks,” one consumer guide sternly
warns.6 Prospective residents should always obtain financial and legal counsel
before signing any contract. 
THE ABCS OF CONTINUING CARE RETIREMENT COMMUNITIES
Although they come in many variations, there are three basic types of CCRC
contracts: life care (Type A), modified (Type B) and fee-for-service (Type C).
Communities offering Type A, or life care, contracts do not substantially raise the
monthly fees of residents who require assisted living or skilled nursing care.
Excepting cost-of-living increases (Money magazine estimates that these average
3 percent to 6 percent per year), seniors in life care CCRCs can expect to pay
the same monthly fee throughout their residence, regardless of the care they
require. The price of this financial security is typically contained within the initial
entrance fee; residents pay more upfront, but they won’t need to budget for
long-term care later on. The first CCRCs were grounded upon this model, and
indeed, Hampton Roads’ oldest CCRC, The Chesapeake in Newport News
(established in 1969), is a traditional life care community. Seniors pay a one-
time entrance fee upon moving to The Chesapeake (currently between
$141,000 and $309,000 for a single resident). During the first 50 months of
residence, the fee is refundable on a declining basis. If a resident dies or leaves
the community for any other reason thereafter, the fee is nonrefundable. Table 9
provides analogous data for the CCRCs located in Hampton Roads.
Other Hampton Roads CCRCs with Type A contracts offer different refund
options for the initial entrance fee. Harbor’s Edge in Norfolk, for example, main-
tains a 90 percent refundable entrance fee (which currently ranges between
$321,379 and $876,750 for a single resident), regardless of the length of
time a senior resides in the community. Warwick Forest and Westminster-Canter-
bury on Chesapeake Bay allow residents to choose between multiple refund
plans. In general, larger refunds mean higher entrance fees. These plans are
best suited to seniors who wish to preserve their assets for passing along to heirs
or to charity – or for maintaining their financial independence, should they wish
to depart the community for any reason.
According to a June 10, 2007, report in The New York Times, “as recently as
1998, Type A communities were by far the most common type, with 42 percent
of the market … but that has changed with the proliferation of payment models:
in 2005, Type A communities accounted for just 29 percent of the total.” The
dominant CCRC model is now the Type C, or fee-for-service community, with a
47 percent market share in 2005. Hampton Roads’ eight CCRCs, however, do
not reflect this national trend – four are Type A, one is Type B and three are
Type C.
Hampton Roads’ three Type C communities are Lake Prince Woods in Suffolk,
Williamsburg Landing and Windsor Meade of Williamsburg. These CCRCs
guarantee their residents access to assisted living and skilled nursing care – but at
the cost of a higher monthly fee, if and when this care is needed. Residents enjoy
comparatively low entrance fees and monthly fees for independent living, but
they will face a greater financial burden if they require extended care later on.  
One reason for the increased appeal of fee-for-service communities is the
changing philosophy of long-term care that has been reflected elsewhere in the
rise of home- and community-based services, at the expense of traditional
nursing home residence. In other words, the belief that aging adults
move through a predictable continuum of assisted living and
skilled nursing care is increasingly being challenged. An adminis-
trator at Erickson Retirement Communities (which owns Greenspring, the largest
fee-for-service community in Northern Virginia) notes that more and more resi-
dents are remaining longer in independent apartments, “using home health
aides when necessary and taking advantage of wellness and fitness
programs.”7 Thus, residents of life care communities risk paying upfront for
 services that a growing number of them may not require.
One response to this dilemma is the Type B, or modified, contract. Less preva-
lent than the other two types of CCRCs, Type B communities offer a kind of
middle way between them. A typical modified contract might offer residents sev-
eral weeks of higher-level care before increasing their monthly fees. (This option
is particularly attractive for holders of long-term care insurance policies, which
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often do not pay benefits for the first 90 days of care.) Other CCRCs charge a
standard, discounted rate for assisted living or skilled nursing care that could in
some cases actually represent a decrease in a resident’s monthly fee, if he or
she had selected one of the community’s costlier independent living residences.
Such is the case for Patriots Colony in Williamsburg, which currently offers resi-
dential health care at $2,697 or $3,089 per month, depending upon the ini-
tial entrance fee selected.
HOW DO HAMPTON ROADS CCRCS MEASURE UP?
It’s difficult to draw direct comparisons between CCRCs in Hampton Roads or
elsewhere, since so many different variables influence residents’ total out-of-
pocket costs and the services they receive in return. For most seniors, the value
of a CCRC will depend not only upon its costs and quality of care, but also
upon the kind of lifestyle it promotes. Hampton Roads’ CCRCs offer a wide
spectrum of living options. Harbor’s Edge and Westminster-Canterbury on
Chesapeake Bay are essentially upscale high-rise apartment complexes.
Harbor’s Edge boasts “a prime location near the revitalized downtown Norfolk
district,” while Virginia Beach’s Westminster-Canterbury offers “waterfront retire-
ment living” and attractive views of the Chesapeake Bay. CCRCs in Suffolk and
Williamsburg, meanwhile, promote a more rural lifestyle, with expansive cam-
puses full of green space and individual cottages in neighborhood-like settings.  
The targeted audience of these communities differs as well. Williamsburg’s
CCRCs are among the most upscale in the region, attracting well-heeled retirees
from well beyond the Hampton Roads area. “You’ll meet actors, artists, scientists
and scholars from all over the country,” promises a glossy brochure from
Williamsburg Landing that touts the community’s “gracious, resort-style amenities
and services.” By contrast, other CCRCs place greater emphasis on their efforts
to provide cost-conscious seniors with the best value for their money. Lake Prince
Woods in Suffolk is among the most affordable fee-for-service CCRCs in
Hampton Roads, advertising “quality services with an affordable price tag.”
Among the region’s life care communities, Warwick Forest in Newport News
offers comparatively cost-effective residence plans.
The suitability of CCRCs’ independent living options is largely a matter of per-
sonal taste, but statistics can provide a basis for evaluating these communities’
nursing and assisted living facilities. Nursing facilities that are affiliated with
CCRCs tend to receive higher than average Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services (CMS) ratings. Two of the eight 5-star nursing facilities in
Hampton Roads are part of CCRCs (Lake Prince Woods and
Westminster-Canterbury on Chesapeake Bay). This advantage
is particularly prominent in Northern Virginia, where nearly all
4- and 5-star facilities are affiliated with CCRCs. Likewise, the
assisted living facilities associated with CCRCs measure up
well. With the exception of Lake Prince Woods and Windsor Meade of
Williamsburg (the latter of which still possesses a conditional license), all of the
assisted living facilities within Hampton Roads CCRCs have earned DSS licen-
sure for two or three years. Thus, these facilities have demonstrated a record of
meeting or exceeding minimum standards. Whether these advantages justify the
considerable costs paid by CCRC residents for long-term care, however,
remains an open question.
The current economic climate may discourage seniors from making large finan-
cial commitments. Nonetheless, the Hampton Roads market for CCRCs appears
still to have room for diversification and expansion. Hampton Roads has fewer
CCRC residences than either Northern Virginia or the Greater Richmond area,
both in real numbers and in proportion to our region’s total senior population.
CCRCs in Virginia’s other major metropolitan markets offer residents a choice
between life care and fee-for-service contracts, an option not yet publicized by
any Hampton Roads communities. (A representative from Patriots Colony told us
by telephone, however, that it was adding a fee-for-service option.) Likewise, a
substantial proportion of the CCRCs elsewhere in Virginia have been accredited
by CARF-CCAC – a distinction not held by any Hampton Roads communities
(although Williamsburg Landing is currently engaged in the accreditation
process). Accreditation is purely voluntary, so its absence does not necessarily
indicate that Hampton Roads’ CCRCs are deficient in any way. Accreditation
does, however, provide reassurance that a community is well managed, its
financials are in order and its facilities are well maintained.
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Aging in Place: Living
 Outside of a CCRC
Continuing Care Retirement Communities (CCRCs) are the most prominent resi-
dential option for seniors who live independently but seek reassurance that their
future long-term care needs will be fully met. CCRCs with hefty entrance fees are
not, however, the only retirement communities in Hampton Roads that offer inde-
pendent living, assisted living and skilled nursing care on a single campus. Sen-
iors desiring to “age in place” may also consider the following sites, all of
which receive comparatively high marks on the Nursing Home Compare and
Virginia Department of Social Services Web sites.
SANDERS (GLOUCESTER)
This “active adult community” sponsored by the Riverside Health System evolved
over the course of several decades, responding to the changing needs of sen-
iors in Hampton Roads’ northeastern corner. The community’s core is the Frances
N. Sanders Nursing Home, which was established in 1955. With the construc-
tion of independent living and assisted living residences in the 1980s and
1990s, Sanders now offers living options along the entire care continuum.
Sanders – like the town of Gloucester itself – is a small community. Indeed, it
advertises itself as a “village within a village” that is nestled within the heart of
historic Gloucester Court House. Monthly fees for independent living (currently
between $2,130 and $2,471) include housekeeping, interior and exterior
maintenance, a daily noon meal and 24-hour accessibility to a licensed nurse,
though perhaps not the resort-style amenities touted by other CCRCs in our
region. Demand for residence at Sanders is high. Marketing director Tami Nunn
reports that, as of April 2009, there was a wait list of 17 for the community’s
12 independent living cottages.
BETH SHOLOM VILLAGE (VIRGINIA BEACH)
Beth Sholom Village is Hampton Roads’ only continuum-of-care community
whose mission includes the promotion of Jewish values and traditions. This com-
munity, too, evolved and expanded over time. The Beth Sholom Home of
Eastern Virginia (now the Berger-Goldrich Home at Beth Sholom Village) was
established in 1980 in the College Park area of Virginia Beach. The 120-bed
skilled nursing facility now includes a rehabilitation pavilion and a specialized
wing for Alzheimer’s patients. In 1982, an adjacent set of independent living
residences known as The Sands opened its doors to low-income seniors. In
2004, an assisted living facility known as The Terrace became the village’s
newest addition. Although the entire care continuum is present at Beth Sholom
Village, each residential component serves a somewhat different population.
The Sands’ independent living residences participate in HUD’s Section 8
housing program, while The Terrace is an upscale assisted living facility with
monthly rates beginning at $3,600. Thus, a resident of The Sands in need of
some daily assistance would be unlikely to move to The Terrace. Seniors
receiving nursing care at the Berger-Goldrich Home do, however, regularly
move into or from the Village’s other two facilities, according to executive
director David Abraham.
ATLANTIC SHORES (VIRGINIA BEACH)
Atlantic Shores claims its unique niche among our region’s continuum-of-care
communities through equity ownership. Its approximately 600 independent
living residences – which include apartments and villa homes in a wide array of
sizes and floor plans – are purchased, not rented. Thus, when a resident eventu-
ally departs his home for any reason – including a move into assisted living or
skilled nursing care – he can expect to resell the home at its current market
value. (Needless to say, the favorability of this arrangement depends upon the
current state of the real estate market.) Home prices currently range from
$148,600 to $532,200; monthly fees range from $824 to $2,661. The “cost
of admission” and amenities at Atlantic Shores resemble those of other well-
appointed CCRCs in our region. The cooperative retirement community, which
was founded in 1995, boasts an attractive 100-acre campus on the shore of
Red Wing Lake. Residents can play tennis and shuffleboard, dine at their choice
of restaurants, and receive health care at an on-site wellness center, among
other perks of membership. Resident fees do not, however, include the guar-
antee of long-term care that is a hallmark of CCRCs. Atlantic Shores home-
owners do receive priority admission to the community’s two long-term care
71THE “SILVER TSUNAMI”
2009 State of the Region Booklet:Layout 1  9/3/09  11:00 AM  Page 71
residences: Harbourway, an assisted living facility with 54 apartments, and
Seaside, a 50-bed skilled nursing facility.
Focus on Award Winners
These long-term care facilities have received media attention and professional
accolades that extend well beyond Hampton Roads.
HANCOCK GERIATRIC TREATMENT CENTER (WILLIAMSBURG)
The Hancock Geriatric Treatment Center is part of Eastern State Hospital, the
first public facility in the United States built solely for the care and treatment of
people with mental illness. Since 1976, the Hancock Center has provided care
to seniors with particularly severe symptoms of Alzheimer’s disease and other
kinds of dementia, who could pose a danger to themselves or to others. Some
residents stay at the center for only a short period of evaluation and treatment;
others may remain for many years. As a part of Eastern State Hospital, the Han-
cock Center is overseen by the Virginia Department of Mental Health, Mental
Retardation and Substance Abuse Services (DMHMRSAS). Thus, all residents of
the Hancock Center must first be screened and referred by local mental health
authorities. 
In 2006, the Hancock Center was rated favorably by the Consumer Reports
Nursing Home Quality Monitor, which purports to be more discriminating than
the CMS Nursing Home Compare ratings.8 Drawing upon state inspection sur-
veys, staffing data and select CMS quality indicators, the Consumer Reports
staff generated a short list of “potentially good” facilities in each state. The Han-
cock Center was the only nursing facility in Hampton Roads to make the cut
(among 14 in Virginia).
In 2008, the Hancock Center moved into a $28 million, state-of-the-art facility
on the Eastern State campus.9 The new facility, which houses 150 residents, is
the fruit of a public-private partnership between DMHMRSAS and Gilbane
Development Co. According to a joint press release, the building’s design
“reflects a new national standard in evidence-based practices,” accommodating
the special needs of geriatric patients “by incorporating age-appropriate
activity, visual cues, acoustics and personal space.” Among the building’s most
striking features is its main hallway that unites four resident wings. Decorated in
bold colors to resemble traditional downtown storefronts, “Main Street” is an
easy-to-navigate communal space that leads to rooms for therapy and other
activities. The Hancock Geriatric Treatment Center was one of three locations
across the country to receive a 2008 Innovation Award from the National
Council for Public-Private Partnerships.
MARIAN MANOR (VIRGINIA BEACH)
Residents of Marian Manor, a 117-apartment assisted living facility near Town
Center in Virginia Beach, can claim honors in a very different field: wine-
making. Since their first entry in 2002, Marian Manor’s Vintage Vintners have
walked away with three medals in the WineMaker International Amateur Wine
Competition. Their top-ranked libation, a scuppernong wine called Golden
Glow, earned a gold medal in the competition’s White Native American
 Varietal category in 2003, besting all other entrants. Each year a group of 10-
20 residents, assisted by amateur vintner Ron Peperak, produces a small batch
of wine from start to finish – picking the grapes, pressing them by hand, and
bottling and labeling the finished product. In 2006, the winemaking program
drew the attention of AARP Bulletin Today, which included Marian Manor
among the nation’s “most innovative assisted living homes where residents are
well cared for and respected.”
72 THE STATE OF THE REGION    HAMPTON ROADS 2009    
8 Available online at: http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/health-fitness/nursing-home-guide/nursing-home-quality-monitor/0608_nursing-home-quality-monitor.htm
9 A slideshow of photographs of the new Hancock Geriatric Treatment Center is available online at:
http://www.behavioral.net/ME2/dirmod.asp?sid=BB72A6D997D64BC3A1560C92179825B8&nm=Design+Showcase&type=SlideShow&mod=Design%3A%3ASlide+Show+Titles&mid=5FC59CAE3ED7
4F5CB7962AA457AF518B&id=DBCB0119C18A426AB51A42EF6F9657D2&tier=3&p=1.
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Participation in the Vintage Vintners is one of many activities available to seniors
who reside at Marian Manor, one of several long-term care facilities in
Hampton Roads that is sponsored by the Catholic Diocese of Richmond.
According to DSS regulations, all licensed ALFs in Virginia must provide their res-
idents with 11 hours of planned activities per week (16 hours in special care
units). The offerings at Marian Manor exceed these minimums several times
over. Cooking and exercise classes, bell chimes practices, Bible studies and
game nights are just a few of the regular activities on the facility’s calendar.
Annual special events include a formal “senior” prom in the spring, and Santa
and Mrs. Claus training classes at Christmastime. Activities director Thess
Escobar reports that 12 Santa and Mrs. Clauses from Marian Manor answered
around 800 telephone calls from children during the past holiday season.
Marian Manor offers four distinct levels of assisted living care. Monthly fees
range from $2,974 to $5,220 per month, depending on the type of residence
and the level of care received. Fifteen of the facility’s beds are, however,
reserved for low-income seniors who pay with state auxiliary grants (currently
$1,112 per month). Predictably, the wait list for these beds is long – around 36
prospective residents, according to administrator Tom Spivak.
Final Thoughts
The operation of nursing homes and assisted living facilities is a difficult busi-
ness. Administrators face persistent cost pressures, shortages of trained per-
sonnel and a daunting amount of paperwork in their interactions with insurance
providers, Medicaid, Medicare and state regulatory authorities. Nurses and
other members of the long-term care workforce have great responsibilities, but
their financial compensation is often low. In Hampton Roads and elsewhere,
long-term care is a field with many unsung heroes.
Although statistics can never fully capture the quality of care
that long-term care facilities provide, Hampton Roads’ institu-
tions appear to measure up well with respect to others in the
Commonwealth of Virginia. Hampton Roads possesses a wide
array of residential long-term care options for seniors, at a
range of different price levels. Most of these facilities provide
outstanding care, although some clearly do not. No obvious corre-
lation exists between the cost and quality of care in our region’s nursing homes
(with the notable exception of CCRCs) – a situation that may be attributed to the
subsidizing role of Medicaid and Medicare. The same cannot be said of our
region’s assisted living facilities. Low-income seniors who rely upon auxiliary
grants to pay for assisted living care are more likely to reside in troubled facilities.  
As with many aspects of long-term care, funding is an issue that transcends the
boundaries of our region. The well-being of Hampton Roads’ long-
term facilities depends substantially upon policies formulated
by the Commonwealth of Virginia’s leadership in Richmond,
and administered by the departments of Health, Social Services
and Medical Assistance Services. Virginia’s rapidly aging population will
place unprecedented pressures upon these agencies in the years to come. The
success of our long-term care system will require not only the sufficient funding
and oversight of traditional nursing facilities, but also a greater investment in
assisted living and other home- and community-based services. 
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TABLE 1
OUR AGING POPULATION: A DEMOGRAPHIC PORTRAIT
Age Group Virginia United States
Population (000s) 2007 7,712 301,621
2030 est. 9,825 363,584
Pct. Chg. +27% +21%
Age 65+ 2007 11.8% 12.6%
2030 est. 18.8% 19.7%
Pct. Chg. 103% 89%
Age 85+ 2007 1.5% 1.8%
2030 est. 2.5% 2.6%
Pct. Chg. 114% 96%
Persons Aged 65+ With Disabilities, 2007
Sensory Disability 15% 16%
Physical Disability 31% 31%
Mobility Disability 17% 18%
Self-Care Disability 10% 10%
Any Disability 39% 41%
Persons Aged 65+ With Alzheimer’s Disease, 2010 Estimate
13% 13%
Sources: Virginia Department for the Aging and U.S. Census Bureau
TABLE 2
THE COSTS OF LONG-TERM CARE
Virginia United States
Medicaid Expenditures
Total Medicaid Expenditures
 (millions), 2007
$4,968 $311,848
Increase Over 2002 43% 28%
Medicaid Long-Term Care Expendi-
tures for Older People and Those
with Physical Disabilities $979 $64,169
Increase Over 2002 20% 18%
Increase in Nursing Facilities 3% 7%
Increase in Home and Community-
Based Services 123% 68%
Primary Payers
Medicaid Is Primary Payer 60% 64%
Medicare Is Primary Payer 17% 14%
Other Primary Payer 22% 22%
Public and Private Payment Rates
Medicaid Payment Per Day $145 $158
Medicare Payment Per Day $282 $305
Average Private Payment Per Day $180 $209
Sources: Virginia Department for the Aging and U.S. Census Bureau
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TABLE 3
NURSING FACILITY SUMMARY STATISTICS
Number
of NFs
Population Age
65+
NF Beds
Per 1,000
Age 65+
Average Occu-
pancy Rate
Average Semi-
Private Daily
Room Rate
Average Pri-
vate Daily
Room Rate
Percentage of
NFs with 5-
Star Rating 
Percentage of
NFs with 4-
Star Rating 
Percentage of
NFs with 3-
Star Rating 
Percentage of
NFs with 2-
Star Rating 
Percentage of
NFs with 1-
Star Rating 
Hampton Roads 57 181,315 35 92% $172 $190 15% 20% 24% 15% 26%
Richmond Area 44 141,641 38 91% $183 $201 5% 16% 16% 14% 49%
Northern Virginia 41 212,151 25 88% $213 $237 5% 24% 19% 16% 35%
Virginia 282 909,522 35 91% $182 $202 10% 20% 19% 19% 32%
United States 1,699,494 37,887,958 45 85% $191 $212 12% 23% 21% 21% 23%
Sources: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, at: www.medicare.gov/NHCompare (accessed January 2009)
2007 Population Estimates, at http://factfinder.census.gov
Across the States: Profiles of Long-Term Care and Independent Living, 8th ed. (2009), at: http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/il/d19105_2008_ats.pdf
Virginia Health Information, at: www.vhi.org (accessed February 2009)
The MetLife Market Survey of Nursing Home & Assisted Living Costs (October 2008), at: http://www.metlife.com/mmi/publications/research-studies/index.html
Virginia Department of Health, Division of COPN (statistics from fiscal years ending in 2007)
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TABLE 4
NURSING FACILITY RATINGS IN HAMPTON ROADS
Name
Profit
or
Nonprofit
Affiliated
Chain/
Corporation
(Total Nursing
Facilities)
Licensed
Beds
Occupancy
Rate
5-Star
Rating
(1/15/09) 
Health
 Inspections
(1/15/09) 
Staffing
(1/15/09) 
Quality
Measures
(1/15/09) 
Quality
First
Pledge
Joint
Comm.
 Accred.
Semi-
 Private
Daily Room
Rate
Private
Daily Room
Rate
Other
 Residential
Options
Chesapeake
Autumn Care of Great Bridge P Autumn Care (24) 55 92.0% **** **** *** **** $147 NA
Chesapeake Health and
Rehabilitation Center
P Medical Facilities ofAmerica (31) 240 94.1% ** *** * ** $172 $185 
Sentara Nursing Center - Chesapeake NP
Sentara Healthcare
(7) 120 92.5% * * ** *** X $188 $215 Asst Living
Carrington Place of  Chesapeake P
Traditions
 Management (12) 120 94.4% ** * **** ** $136 $147 
Hampton
Coliseum Park Nursing Home P 180 90.9% *** *** ** ** $160 $165 
Northampton  Convalescent Center P
Virginia Health
 Services Inc. (6) 60 97.1% *** **** * ** $169 $176 
Riverside Convalescent Center -
Hampton
NP Riverside Health System (9) 130 90.5% *** **** * ** X $158 $167 
Sentara Nursing and  Rehabilitation
Center - Hampton
NP Sentara Healthcare(7) 86 90.8% *** **** * **** $160 $280 
Newport News
The Chesapeake (CCRC) NP
Virginia Baptist
Homes (4) 52 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Ind, Asst Liv
James River Convalescent and
 Rehabilitation Center
P Virginia Health Services Inc. (6) 189 90.9% *** **** * *** X $172 $187 
Newport News Nursing and
 Rehabilitation Center
P Consulate HealthCare (57) 102 92.7% * ** * * X $153 $163 
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TABLE 4
NURSING FACILITY RATINGS IN HAMPTON ROADS
Name
Profit
or
Nonprofit
Affiliated
Chain/
Corporation
(Total Nursing
Facilities)
Licensed
Beds
Occupancy
Rate
5-Star
Rating
(1/15/09) 
Health
 Inspections
(1/15/09) 
Staffing
(1/15/09) 
Quality
Measures
(1/15/09) 
Quality
First
Pledge
Joint
Comm.
 Accred.
Semi-
 Private
Daily Room
Rate
Private
Daily Room
Rate
Other
 Residential
Options
Newport News
The Newport P
Virginia Health
 Services Inc. (6) 45 97.0% ***** ***** ** **** $174 $180 
The Gardens at Warwick Forest
 (includes CCRC)
NP Riverside Health System (9) 242 83.7% ** *** * *** X $158 $168 Ind, Asst Liv
St. Francis Nursing Center NP
Bon Secours Health
System Inc. (6) 115 88.8% * * NA *** X $161 $173 
Norfolk
Autumn Care of Norfolk P Autumn Care (24) 120 95.5% *** *** *** *** $153 $163 
Bon Secours DePaul - TCU NP
Bon Secours Health
System Inc. (6) 24 87.1% **** ***** ***** * $300 $350 Asst Living
Harbor’s Edge (CCRC) NP 33 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Ind, Asst Liv
Harbour Pointe Medical and
 Rehabilitation Center
P Kindred HealthcareInc. (226) 172 91.3% * SFF * NA * X $195 $221 
Lake Taylor Transitional Care Hospital NP 192 90.3% ***** ***** *** ** X $155 $170 
Norfolk Healthcare Center P
Medical Facilities of
America (31) 180 93.3% * ** * * $205 $213 
Envoy of Thornton Hall
(formerly Ruxton Health)
P Envoy Health Care(13) 60 95.8% ***** ***** *** ** X $136 $152 Asst Living
Sentara Nursing Center - Norfolk NP
Sentara Healthcare
(7) 193 95.5% *** ** **** *** $268 $275 Asst Living
Tandem Health Care of Norfolk P
Consulate Health
Care (57) 222 92.6% * * * ** X $155 $165 
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TABLE 4
NURSING FACILITY RATINGS IN HAMPTON ROADS
Name
Profit
or
Nonprofit
Affiliated
Chain/
Corporation
(Total Nursing
Facilities)
Licensed
Beds
Occupancy
Rate
5-Star
Rating
(1/15/09) 
Health
 Inspections
(1/15/09) 
Staffing
(1/15/09) 
Quality
Measures
(1/15/09) 
Quality
First
Pledge
Joint
Comm.
 Accred.
Semi-
 Private
Daily Room
Rate
Private
Daily Room
Rate
Other
 Residential
Options
Poquoson
Golden LivingCenter -  Bayside of 
Poquoson
P Golden Living (317) 60 96.3% **** ***** * **** X $175 $182 
Portsmouth
Autumn Care of Portsmouth P Autumn Care (24) 108 93.5% *** **** * *** $147 $155 
Golden LivingCenter - Portsmouth P Golden Living (317) 120 92.6% * * * **** X $142 $159 
Sentara Nursing Center - Portsmouth NP
Sentara Healthcare
(7) 132 93.0% ***** ***** ** ***** $210 $228 
Suffolk
Autumn Care of Suffolk P Autumn Care (24) 120 94.9% *** **** **** * X $158 NA
Lake Prince Woods (CCRC) NP
United Church Homes
and Services (3) 40 NA ***** **** ***** *** NA NA Ind, Asst Liv
Maryview Nursing Care Center NFP
Bon Secours Health
System Inc. (6) 120 93.5% **** **** ** *** X $147 $168 Asst Living
Nansemond Pointe  Rehabilitation and
 Healthcare Center
P Kindred HealthcareInc. (226) 160 97.5% ** *** ** * X $176 $195 
Virginia Beach
Bay Pointe Medical and
Rehabilitation Center
P Kindred HealthcareInc. (226) 118 83.3% * ** * * X $163 $178 
Bayside Health Care Center P
Medical Facilities of
America (31) 60 90.6% *** **** * ** $197 $208 
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TABLE 4
NURSING FACILITY RATINGS IN HAMPTON ROADS
Name
Profit
or
Nonprofit
Affiliated
Chain/
Corporation
(Total Nursing
Facilities)
Licensed
Beds
Occupancy
Rate
5-Star
Rating
(1/15/09) 
Health
 Inspections
(1/15/09) 
Staffing
(1/15/09) 
Quality
Measures
(1/15/09) 
Quality
First
Pledge
Joint
Comm.
 Accred.
Semi-
 Private
Daily Room
Rate
Private
Daily Room
Rate
Other
 Residential
Options
Virginia Beach
Beacon Shores Nursing and
 Rehabilitation Center
P 180 76.7% * SFF * *** * $150 $183 
Beth Sholom Home of Eastern Virginia NP 120 92.2% **** ** **** ***** $224 $231 Ind, Asst Liv
Heritage Hall - Virginia Beach P
American Healthcare
LLC (17) 90 88.7% * ** * *** X $147 $157 
Oakwood Nursing and  Rehabilitation
Center
FP 60 89.7% *** *** * ***** $155 $175 
Our Lady of Perpetual Help NP
Catholic Diocese of
Richmond / Coordi-
nated Services Man-
agement Inc. (4)
30 100.0% **** **** **** **** $179 $194 Asst Living
River Pointe Rehabilitation and
 Healthcare Center
P Kindred HealthcareInc. (226) 145 88.8% ** *** * *** X $157 $192 
Seaside Health Center at
Atlantic Shores
NP 50 NA **** *** **** *** NA NA Ind, Asst Liv
Sentara Nursing Center -
Virginia Beach
NP Sentara Healthcare(7) 120 92.5% **** **** *** *** $238 $268 Asst Living
Sentara Nursing Center - Windemere NP
Sentara Healthcare
(7) 90 94.7% ***** ***** * ***** $167 $180 
Virginia Beach Healthcare and
 Rehabilitation Center
P Medical Facilities ofAmerica (31) 240 91.5% * * * * $189 $203 
Westminster-Canterbury on
 Chesapeake Bay (CCRC)
NP 95 NA ***** ***** **** **** NA NA Ind, Asst Liv
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TABLE 4
NURSING FACILITY RATINGS IN HAMPTON ROADS
Name
Profit
or
Nonprofit
Affiliated
Chain/
Corporation
(Total Nursing
Facilities)
Licensed
Beds
Occupancy
Rate
5-Star
Rating
(1/15/09) 
Health
 Inspections
(1/15/09) 
Staffing
(1/15/09) 
Quality
Measures
(1/15/09) 
Quality
First
Pledge
Joint
Comm.
 Accred.
Semi-
 Private
Daily Room
Rate
Private
Daily Room
Rate
Other
 Residential
Options
Williamsburg
Consulate Healthcare of Williamsburg P
Consulate Health
Care (57) 90 95.2% * * *** **** X $173 $188 
The Convalescent Center at Patriot’s
Colony (CCRC)
NP Riverside Health System (9) 60 NA ** ** ** **** NA NA Ind, Asst Liv
Hancock Geriatric  Treatment Center NP 150 NA **** ** ***** ***** X NA NA
Envoy of Williamsburg
(formerly Ruxton Health)
P Envoy Health Care(13) 130 90.0% * * *** *** X $166 $174 
WindsorMeade of Williamsburg
(CCRC)
NP
Virginia United
Methodist Homes
Inc. (5)
12 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Ind, Asst Liv
Woodhaven Hall at Williamsburg
 Landing (CCRC)
NP 58 NA **** **** NA *** NA NA Ind, Asst Liv
Gloucester County
Frances N. Sanders  Nursing Home
(includes CCRC)
NP Riverside Health System (9) 55 60.1% **** *** **** *** $155 $171 
Walter Reed Convalescent and
 Rehabilitation Center
P Virginia Health Services Inc. (6) 191 91.5% ** *** * **** $172 $182 
Isle of Wight County
Riverside Convalescent Center -
 Smithfield
NP Riverside Health System (9) 95 90.3% ***** ***** ** *** X $145 $152 
Consulate Health Care of Windsor P
Consulate Health
Care (57) 114 96.5% *** ***** * * X $150 $160 
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TABLE 4
NURSING FACILITY RATINGS IN HAMPTON ROADS
Name
Profit
or
Nonprofit
Affiliated
Chain/
Corporation
(Total Nursing
Facilities)
Licensed
Beds
Occupancy
Rate
5-Star
Rating
(1/15/09) 
Health
 Inspections
(1/15/09) 
Staffing
(1/15/09) 
Quality
Measures
(1/15/09) 
Quality
First
Pledge
Joint
Comm.
 Accred.
Semi-
 Private
Daily Room
Rate
Private
Daily Room
Rate
Other
 Residential
Options
Mathews County
Riverside Convalescent Center -
 Mathews
NP Riverside Health System (8) 60 97.2% *** **** * ** X $166 $175 
York County
Regency Health Care Center P
Medical Facilities of
America (31) 60 91.3% ** **** * * $166 $175 
York Convalescent Center P
Virginia Health
 Services Inc. (6) 60 95.8% * ** * *** $172 $182 
6325
Source for ratings: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, at: www.medicare.gov/NHCompare (accessed January 2009)
Source for room rates: Virginia Health Information, at: www.vhi.org (accessed February 2009)
Source for beds and occupancy rates: Virginia Department of Health, Division of COPN (statistics from fiscal years ending in 2007)
Source for corporate affiliations: Billian’s Healthdata (2009)
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TABLE 5
ASSISTED LIVING FACILITIES: SUMMARY STATISTICS
Number of
ALFs
Population
Age 65+
ALF Beds
per 1,000
age 65+
ALFs “of
Concern”
Percent
ALFs “of
Concern”
Auxiliary
Grant Beds
Percent
Aux. Grant
Beds “of
Concern”
Hampton
Roads
104 181,315 31 13 12.5% 964 17.4%
Greater
 Richmond
123 141,641 48 10 8.1% 1,436 21.2%
Northern
 Virginia
107 212,151 36 24 22.4% 309 4.1%
Virginia 583 909,522 35 114 19.6% 6,697 21.0%
United States 39,005 37,887,958 26
Source for regional and Virginia assisted living data: Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission to the Governor and General Assembly of Virginia
(JLARC)
The JLARC final report on the Impact of Assisted Living Facility Regulations (2007) is available at: http://jlarc.state.va.us/pubs_rec.htm.
Source for Virginia and U.S. assisted living data: “Across the States: Profiles of Long-Term Care and Independent Living,” 8th ed. (2009), at:
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/il/d19105_2008_ats.pdf
Source for population figures: 2007 Population Estimates, at http://factfinder.census.gov
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TABLE 6
ASSISTED LIVING FACILITIES IN HAMPTON ROADS
Owner
Type
Affiliated Chain/Corporation
(Total  Assisted Living Facilities) Total Beds
Type of
License
Residential
Care Only
Non-
Ambulatory
Special
Care Unit
ALF of
Concern
(2007)
Other
Residential
 Options
Chesapeake
Allzwell Assisted Living Center FP 70 2-Year X
Carebridge Assisted Living FP 66 1-Year X
Cedar Manor NFP Chesapeake Regional Medical Center 93 1-Year X
The Charity House FP 26 1-Year
Chesapeake Home FP 34 1-Year X X
Chesapeake Place FP Capital Senior Living Corporation (55) 92 1-Year Ind Living
Colonial Home FP 32 1-Year X
Deep Creek Manor FP 22 2-Year
Dominion Village at Chesapeake FP Five Star Quality Care Inc. (140) 50 1-Year X
Georgian Manor at River Walk FP Commonwealth Assisted Living (12) 50 Conditional X
Hills Home for Adults FP 48 1-Year X
Indian River Residential Community FP 110 1-Year X
LAV’M Adult Residence FP 21 1-Year
Living Options of Chesapeake FP 20 1-Year X
Parsons Residential Care FP 60 1-Year X
Sentara Village at Chesapeake NFP Sentara Healthcare (3) 106 1-Year NF
Virginia Home for Adults FP 52 1-Year
Whitehurst Manor FP 16 1-Year
Hampton
Bethel Helping Hands FP 6 2-Year
Commonwealth Assisted Living
at Hampton
FP Commonwealth Assisted Living (12) 56 1-Year
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TABLE 6
ASSISTED LIVING FACILITIES IN HAMPTON ROADS
Owner
Type
Affiliated Chain/Corporation
(Total  Assisted Living Facilities) Total Beds
Type of
License
Residential
Care Only
Non-
Ambulatory
Special
Care Unit
ALF of
Concern
(2007)
Other
Residential
 Options
Hampton
The Devonshire FP 55 3-Year
Eden Court FP Commonwealth Assisted Living (12) 52 2-Year X
Rest Haven Manor FP 96 1-Year X X
Shelton on the Bay NFP 55 3-Year
Tender Care Adult Residence FP 7 1-Year
Newport News
Agape Home for Adults FP 14 1-Year
Assisted Living at Warwick Forest
(includes CCRC)
NFP Riverside Health System (5) 117 3-Year X Ind Living, Nursing
Caring and Sharing Home for Adults NFP 46 1-Year
The Chesapeake (CCRC) NFP Virginia Baptist Homes (4) 90 3-Year X Ind Living, Nursing
Cote De Neige FP 11 1-Year
Governors Inn Estate Assisted Living FP 56 1-Year
Heart & Soul I FP 8 1-Year
Heart & Soul II FP 9 1-Year
Heart & Soul III FP 27 Conditional
The Hidenwood FP Retirement Unlimited (7) 125 1-Year Ind Living
Hilton Plaza FP 71 2-Year
Mennowood Retirement Community NFP 90 2-Year X Ind Living
Mile-A-Way FP 10 2-Year X
Morningside of Newport News FP Five Star Quality Care Inc. (140) 110 1-Year X
Open Arms Adult Home FP 5 2-Year
Open Arms II FP 10 2-Year
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TABLE 6
ASSISTED LIVING FACILITIES IN HAMPTON ROADS
Owner
Type
Affiliated Chain/Corporation
(Total  Assisted Living Facilities) Total Beds
Type of
License
Residential
Care Only
Non-
Ambulatory
Special
Care Unit
ALF of
Concern
(2007)
Other
Residential
 Options
Norfolk
The Ballentine FP 96 2-Year
Ballentine Manor FP 60 1-Year
Envoy of Thornton Hall
(formerly Ruxton Health)
FP 25 Conditional Nursing
Harbor’s Edge (CCRC) NFP 50 2-Year X X Ind Living, Nursing
Hemal Blossom Vill Adult Home FP 5 1-Year X
Leigh Hall FP Commonwealth Assisted Living (12) 40 1-Year X
Lydia Roper Home NFP 27 1-Year X
Madonna Home NFP Catholic Diocese of Richmond 16 1-Year X
Pinewood Inn FP Commonwealth Assisted Living (12) 37 1-Year X X
Province Place DePaul NFP Bon Secours Health System Inc. (5) 97 1-Year X Nursing
Sentara Village at Norfolk NFP Sentara Healthcare (3) 96 2-Year X X X Nursing
Shepherd’s Village @ Park Avenue NFP First Baptist Church 20 1-Year
Poquoson
Dominion Village at Poquoson FP Five Star Quality Care Inc. (140) 48 3-Year
Portsmouth
Bell’s Residential Adult Care Home FP 30 1-Year
Churchland House FP Commonwealth Assisted Living (12) 74 1-Year X X
Emily Green Shores NFP Portsmouth Baptist Association 39 2-Year
Lillian’s Loving Care FP 32 1-Year X
Mayfair House FP 60 Conditional X
Province Place Maryview NFP Bon Secours Health System Inc. (5) 78 1-Year X Nursing
Westhaven Manor FP 31 1-Year
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TABLE 6
ASSISTED LIVING FACILITIES IN HAMPTON ROADS
Owner
Type
Affiliated Chain/Corporation
(Total  Assisted Living Facilities) Total Beds
Type of
License
Residential
Care Only
Non-
Ambulatory
Special
Care Unit
ALF of
Concern
(2007)
Other
Residential
 Options
Suffolk
Hillcrest Retirement Center FP 34 3-Year
Lake Prince Center (CCRC) NFP United Church Homes and Services (3) 54 1-Year X Ind Living, Nursing
NubJones ALF FP 100 1-Year X
Virginia Beach
Abundant Care FP 8 1-Year
Acredale Assisted Living FP 8 1-Year
Assisted Living at Pritchard Road FP 12 1-Year
Atria Assisted Living at Virginia Beach FP Atria Senior Living Group (127) 153 1-Year X X
Baylake Retirement Community FP Retirement Unlimited (7) 90 2-Year X
Brighton Gardens by Sunrise FP Sunrise Senior Living (391) 150 1-Year X X
First Colonial Inn ALF FP Kisco Senior Living (19) 36 1-Year Ind Living
Golden Living Community - Lynn
Shores Chateau
FP Golden Living Centers (16) 16 1-Year
Harbourway at Atlantic Shores NFP 74 1-Year X X Ind Living, Nursing
Hope Haven Adult Home NFP Union Mission Ministries 19 1-Year
King’s Grant House FP Commonwealth Assisted Living (12) 46 1-Year X
Marian Manor NFP
Catholic Diocese of Richmond/Coordinated
Services Management Inc. (6) 145 1-Year
Our Lady of Perpetual Help Health
Center
NFP Catholic Diocese of Richmond/CoordinatedServices Management Inc. (6) 95 3-Year X Nursing
Pacifica Senior Living Virginia Beach FP Northstar Senior Living (15) 103 1-Year X X
Sentara Village at Virginia Beach NFP Sentara Healthcare (3) 96 1-Year Nursing
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TABLE 6
ASSISTED LIVING FACILITIES IN HAMPTON ROADS
Owner
Type
Affiliated Chain/Corporation
(Total  Assisted Living Facilities) Total Beds
Type of
License
Residential
Care Only
Non-
Ambulatory
Special
Care Unit
ALF of
Concern
(2007)
Other
Residential
 Options
Virginia Beach
The Memory Center of Virginia Beach FP 48 Conditional X X
The Terrace at Beth Sholom Village NFP 78 2-Year X X Ind Living, Nursing
Virginia Beach Estates FP Sunrise Senior Living (391) 60 2-Year
Westminster Canterbury on
 Chesapeake Bay (CCRC)
NFP 109 2-Year X X Ind Living, Nursing
Williamsburg
Assisted Living at Patriot’s Colony
(CCRC)
NFP Riverside Health System (5) 68 2-Year Ind Living, Nursing
Colonial Manor FP 39 1-Year X Ind Living
Dominion Village of Williamsburg FP Five Star Quality Care Inc. (140) 58 2-Year
Madison Retirement Center FP 92 1-Year
Morningside of Williamsburg FP Five Star Quality Care Inc. (140) 100 2-Year X
Spring Arbor of Williamsburg FP H.H. Hunt Assisted Living (21) 92 2-Year
St. Charles Lwanga House NFP 8 1-Year
WindsorMeade of Williamsburg
(CCRC)
NFP Virginia United Methodist Homes Inc. (5) 20 Conditional Ind Living, Nursing
Woodhaven Manor at Williamsburg
Landing (CCRC)
NFP 60 3-Year X Ind Living, Nursing
Gloucester County
Assisted Living at Sanders (includes
CCRC)
NFP Riverside Health System (5) 45 3-Year Ind Living, Nursing
Cary Avenue Adult Home FP 60 1-Year
Gloucester House FP Commonwealth Assisted Living (12) 76 2-Year X X
Ransom Home for Adults FP 10 1-Year X
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TABLE 6
ASSISTED LIVING FACILITIES IN HAMPTON ROADS
Owner
Type
Affiliated Chain/Corporation
(Total  Assisted Living Facilities) Total Beds
Type of
License
Residential
Care Only
Non-
Ambulatory
Special
Care Unit
ALF of
Concern
(2007)
Other
Residential
 Options
Isle of Wight County
Magnolia Manor NFP Riverside Health System (5) 60 2-Year X
New Horizon Home for Adults FP 19 1-Year X
James City County
Chambrel at Williamsburg FP Brookdale Senior Living (496) 68 2-Year Ind Living
York County
Lakeside Adult Home FP 12 2-Year X
Sources: JLARC, Billian’s Healthdata (2009) and the Virginia Department of Social Services, at: http://www.dss.virginia.gov/facility/search/alf.cgi
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TABLE 7
ASSISTED LIVING FACILITY BASE RATES (COSTS)
Base Rates Per Month
Area Low High Average
Richmond
(232 ZIP codes)
$1,900 $4,300 $3,557
Northern Virginia
(220-223 ZIP codes)
$2,500 $5,800 $3,709
Remainder of Virginia $2,040 $5,685 $3,734
Virginia $1,900 $5,800 $3,651
United States NA NA $3,031
Source: 2008 MetLife Market Survey. Note that MetLife did not compute data for Hampton
Roads, and its Richmond and Northern Virginia data are restricted to only some ZIP codes in those
regions.
TABLE 8
CONTINUING CARE RETIREMENT COMMUNITIES SUMMARY DATA
Location
Number of
CCRCs
Number of
Accredited
CCRCs
Population
65+ Years
Number
of CCRC
 Residents
Residents Per
1,000 Persons
65+ Years
Hampton Roads 8 0 181,315 1,841 1.02%
Richmond 8 4 141,641 1,866 1.32%
Northern Virginia 10 6 212,151 4,106 1.94%
Sources: 2007 Population Estimates at http://factfinder.census.gov, and Commission on Accreditation of Rehabilitation Facilities,
http:www.carf.org
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Gasoline Prices,
Carbon Emissions and
Other Unpleasant Subjects
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The rapid spike in gasoline prices nationally elicited howls of pain and not a
few assertions that the market for gasoline was monopolized. Of course, during
the subsequent fall in prices to $1.80, those allegations were quickly forgotten.
After all, if the oil companies really were monopolists, why did they allow the
price of gasoline to fall by more than 50 percent in the space of only a few
months?
The primary causes of the upheaval in gasoline prices lay elsewhere. They
included:
 Rapid increases in the demand for gasoline in India, the People’s
Republic of China and various other countries;
 A concern that the world may have hit its peak in terms of oil produc-
tion;
 Uncertainty as to levels of future oil production in unstable countries in
the Middle East and Western Hemisphere countries such as Venezuela;
and
 Fear of hurricanes disrupting the production and distribution of gasoline
in the United States. 
In other words, the price spikes primarily reflected ordinary
supply and demand influences rather than nefarious activities.
Nevertheless, $4 per gallon gasoline (the highest “real,” infla-
tion-adjusted price for gasoline in the United States since 1918)
was a shock and it caused many people and organizations to
re-evaluate their lifestyles. Did we really need to drive that much and
could we find ways to economize on our gasoline usage? Would such a price
spike occur again in the near future? Could we look more to “green” alterna-
tives as a response to the challenge of higher gasoline prices? Was now the
time to figure out how to reduce carbon emissions, deal with global warming
threats and reduce environmental pollution? These are the topics that we explore
in this chapter. 
What Determines
Gasoline Prices?
Hampton Roads and Virginia are completely dependent on other states for the
gasoline they consume. Virginia has no currently producing crude oil fields and
Western Refining Yorktown is the only oil refinery in the state. Virginians get the
largest share of their gasoline from oil port facilities located in Newport News
and Norfolk. Further, Virginia does not have a crude oil pipeline running into the
state. All of this doesn’t sound good, but as we shall see, it’s not as bad as it
may seem. 
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J
uly 16, 2008. A day of infamy? Probably not, but that was the day the average price of a gallon of regular, unleaded gasoline maxed out at $3.99 per gallon here
in Hampton Roads. In a few locations within our region, the price at the pump climbed as high as $4.20 per gallon. During that memorable summer, Louisville, Ky., led
the “east of the Mississippi” crowd with a maximum average price per gallon of $4.27 (see Table 1).  
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By far the largest factor in the price of gasoline is the price of the crude oil from
which gasoline is obtained. While the share of crude oil of the total price of
gasoline has changed somewhat over time, since the turn of the century, crude
oil prices have accounted for about one-half of the price of gasoline. Since
2007, this share has risen to almost 60 percent. 
A second significant determinant of the price of gasoline is the cost of refining
crude oil into gasoline and any profits earned by refiners. Since 2000, the per-
centage of the price of gasoline going to refiners has been relatively stable at
about 17 percent.  
A third large factor influencing the price of gasoline is the cost of distributing
and marketing the product. The Energy Information Administration (an agency of
the U.S. government) estimates this share to be about 10 percent to 12 percent
of the price of gasoline.  
The fourth major contributor to the price of gasoline is state and federal taxes.
These taxes, which are denominated in cents per gallon (not a percentage tax
rate), fall as a percentage of the price when the price of gasoline increases.
The current federal tax rate on gasoline is 18.4 cents per gallon. The federal
tax on diesel fuel is higher at 24.4 cents per gallon, while the federal tax on
gasohol is lower at 13.3 cents per gallon. Table 2 provides data on state fuel
taxes in Virginia and selected other states. The data reveal a wide variance
between the taxes imposed by the states. Included in the table are the states
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TABLE 1
GASOLINE PRICE SPIKES IN SUMMER 2008
Location
Highest
Price Date,
Regular
Unleaded
Highest
Price,
Regular
Unleaded
March 27,
2009
Price,
 Regular
Unleaded
VR
Ratio 1
2009 Q1
Price
VR
Ratio 2
Reformulated
 Gasoline
Norfolk/
Virginia Beach/
Newport News
7/16/08 3.989 1.932 2.0647 1.732 2.3031 Yes
Roanoke 9/15/08 4.138 1.904 2.1733 NA NA No
Richmond 7/16/08 4.000 1.941 2.0608 NA NA Yes
Charlottesville 7/15/08 4.015 1.950 2.0589 NA NA No
Washington, D.C. 7/16/08 4.188 2.076 2.01731 2.006 2.0877 Yes
Atlanta 9/16/08 4.114 1.934 2.1272 1.632 2.5208 No
Baltimore 6/19/08 4.029 2.003 2.0115 1.812 2.2235 Yes
Charlotte 9/15/08 4.181 1.999 2.0915 NA NA No
Louisville 6/30/08 4.268 2.048 2.0840 1.852 2.3045 Yes
Memphis 7/17/08 3.901 1.919 2.0328 1.792 2.1769 No
Philadelphia 6/20/08 4.155 2.041 2.0358 1.901 2.1857 Yes
Sources: American Automobile Association, Oil and Gas Journal and Energy Information Agency
TABLE 2
STATE GASOLINE TAXES
State
Gasoline and Gasohol
Tax, Cents per Gallon
Diesel Tax,
Cents per Gallon
Virginia 17.50 16.00
North Carolina 29.70 29.70
Washington, D.C. 20.00 20.00
West Virginia 27.00 27.00
South Carolina 16.00 16.00
Maryland 23.50 24.25
Pennsylvania 31.20 38.10
Tennessee 21.00 18.00
Georgia 7.50 7.50
Washington 36.00 36.00
Average for All States 21.50 22.05
Source: Energy Information Administration, Petroleum Marketing Monthly
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with the highest and lowest tax rates on fuel – Washington and Georgia,
respectively.  
Virginia maintains the lowest fuel taxes in the mid-Atlantic region. South Car-
olina is the closest state to have lower fuel taxes. Virginia is one of the few
states that taxes diesel fuel less than gasoline and gasohol. Only nine of the 50
states tax diesel fuel at a rate less than gasoline.
Gasoline Price Spikes in
Hampton Roads: 2008
Referring back to Table 1, we can see both the date and the amount of the
highest recorded average price of a gallon of regular, unleaded gasoline in
2008 for cities in Virginia and selected other cities. In general, the highest per-
gallon prices for gasoline occurred in July 2008. For comparison purposes, we
also have provided the price of gasoline in the same cities during March 2009.
The simple ratio of the July to March prices provides a rough measure of the
size of gasoline price spikes, and we label this VR1 (our first “vulnerability
ratio”). The larger the ratio, the larger the spike during summer 2008 and the
more economically vulnerable the region. 
Within Virginia, Roanoke experienced the largest gas price
shock during summer 2008. The price spike in Hampton Roads
was smaller and was similar to that experienced by Richmond
and Charlottesville. One can see in Table 1 that the price spike in
Hampton Roads was not unusually high or low. We experienced a relatively
greater gasoline price shock than Baltimore, Washington, D.C., Memphis and
Philadelphia, but a smaller shock than Atlanta, Charlotte and Louisville. With the
exception of Memphis, the cities that experienced smaller price hikes all were
located close to the East Coast. This reflects the obvious influence of transporta-
tion costs on the price of gasoline.
How did the high prices of summer 2008 compare to early 2009 prices?
Using data from the Oil and Gas Journal, Table 1 also records the average
price of unleaded gasoline for the first quarter of 2009, though the sample of
cities differs somewhat. The ratio of peak price in summer 2008 to the average
price in first quarter 2009 produces VR2, our second measure of the vulnera-
bility of Hampton Roads to gasoline price spikes. Once again, Baltimore, Mem-
phis, Philadelphia and Washington, D.C., all had lower vulnerability ratios than
Norfolk.
The final column of Table 1 indicates whether or not gasoline in the market is
“reformulated.” Reformulated gasoline utilizes a recipe designed to make it burn
cleaner and produce less pollution. The Clean Air Act of 1990 specifies trig-
gers that allow the governor of a state to require reformulated gasoline. Cur-
rently, about 30 percent of the gasoline sold in the United States is
reformulated. Most of the residents of Hampton Roads patronize gasoline sta-
tions that pump reformulated gasoline. Adjacent areas that do not use reformu-
lated gasoline include Isle of Wight County, Gloucester, northeastern North
Carolina and Virginia’s Eastern Shore. Richmond also utilizes reformulated gaso-
line, as does the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. 
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The Implications of
Gasoline Price Spikes for
Hampton Roads 
When gasoline prices spike, as they did in summer 2008, drivers react in a
fashion similar to any consumers who face a price increase – they attempt to cut
back on their usage. The demand for gasoline, however, is “price
inelastic,” a term economists use to reflect a situation where
the quantity consumed of a good is not very responsive to
price changes. In the very short run (a week or less), increases
in the price of gasoline generate only very small decreases in
gasoline purchases. A 10 percent increase in gasoline prices
may stifle gasoline purchases by less than 1 percent.
As time passes, however, gasoline consumers find ways to adjust. They drive
less; they use public transportation; they carpool; they tune up their vehicles to
obtain better gas mileage; and, ultimately, they purchase more fuel-efficient vehi-
cles. In the long run (one to three years), a 10 percent increase in gasoline
prices causes a 7 percent decline in gasoline purchases.  
Thus, in summer 2008, when gasoline prices approximately doubled (let’s
round this off by making it a 100 percent increase), this reduced regional gaso-
line consumption hardly at all.  However, by fall 2008, regional gasoline con-
sumption had declined by almost 4 percent. At the close of 2008, however, the
restoration of “cheap” gasoline brought most of this gradual adjustment to an
end. The moral to this story? Drivers do react to changes in the price of gaso-
line. But it takes them a while to do so.
Estimates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics indicate that urban citizens desig-
nate about 8 percent of their total expenditures for energy, with 3.8 percent of
those expenditures devoted to gasoline consumption. A report by the Natural
Resource Defense Council (NRDC) during the height of the gasoline price
increase in summer 2008 ranked Virginia 30th in the vulnerability of its house-
holds’ budgets to gasoline price increases, as measured by the percentage of
income allocated to gasoline consumption. In 2007, drivers in Virginia
on average spent 5.13 percent of their income (or $2,121 on
average) on gasoline.  
In this regard, the state with the highest proportion of household budgets
devoted to the purchase of gasoline was Mississippi, at 7.87 percent, while
Connecticut was the lowest, at 3.17 percent. It is easy to see that the residents
of poorer states spend more of their incomes on gasoline than those living in
more wealthy states. Table 3 discloses these data. 
95GASOLINE PRICES, CARBON EMISSIONS AND OTHER UNPLEASANT SUBJECTS
TABLE 3
PROPORTION OF INCOMES SPENT ON GASOLINE,
SELECTED STATES, 2007
State
Percent of Income
Spent on Gasoline
State Ranking
Virginia 5.13 30
North Carolina 5.70 24
West Virginia 6.17 11
Mississippi 7.87 1
Maryland 4.52 41
Pennsylvania 4.41 43
Tennessee 5.82 17
Georgia 7.08 3
Connecticut 3.17 50
Source: “Ranking States’ Oil Vulnerability and Solutions for Change,” Natural Resources Defense
Council 
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Environmental Issues
Because of its proximity to the ocean and the winds that result, air pollution
levels in Hampton Roads are lower than in other similarly sized metropolitan
areas. Nevertheless, we are vulnerable to air pollution because of traffic con-
gestion, especially during our tourist-heavy summer months; when military traffic
is particularly heavy; or virtually anytime our tunnels and bridges are congested.
Further, Hampton Roads is not immune to natural events that increase pollution,
such as the wildfires that burned in Hyde County, N.C., and Chesapeake
during summer 2007. 
A 2008 report by the Brookings Institution investigated the “carbon footprint” of
U.S. metropolitan areas. A region’s carbon footprint is its per capita emissions
of carbon, measured in metric tons, from transportation activities and from resi-
dential use. We will focus on the carbon emissions from transportation here.  
Table 4 presents Brookings Institution data on transportation carbon emissions
for selected metropolitan areas in 2005. The better the ranking of the metropol-
itan statistical area (MSA), the smaller the carbon footprint for that area – that is,
the lower its carbon emissions. Hampton Roads emerges rather well
from the Brookings analysis in terms of its carbon footprint.
This is particularly true where trucks are concerned. This comes
somewhat as a surprise, since our region’s location and the
presence of the port make it a trucking-intensive area. How-
ever, emissions that otherwise might produce a bad score are
vitiated by the size of Hampton Roads and the reality that
large portions of our region still are predominantly rural. 
The Hampton Roads MSA has a much smaller carbon footprint than Richmond,
which ranks in the bottom one-quarter of the largest 100 MSAs in terms of its
overall carbon emissions. The only MSA with a better transportation carbon foot-
print than Hampton Roads is Philadelphia. The Hampton Roads data are slightly
worse for auto emissions, but better in terms of truck emissions, than the Wash-
ington, D.C., data. 
What can be done to reduce carbon emissions? The Natural Resources Defense
Council report mentioned earlier discussed four different categories of solutions:
Clean Vehicles and Efficient Use, Research and Development, Clean Fuels, and
Smart Growth and Transit. From these four categories, 10 different solutions
were identified, most of which relate to transportation policies, such as devel-
oping an efficient state vehicle fleet. Virginia ranked only 31st in carbon emis-
sion reduction among the states, according to the NRDC. On the positive side,
the Commonwealth has taken steps to develop an efficient fleet of state vehi-
cles, has imposed idling restrictions on inspected cars, and is attempting to
coordinate growth investments across state agencies (see Table 5).    
On the negative side of the ledger, however, Virginia does not provide incen-
tives for the purchase of plug-in hybrid cars, or require emission standards con-
96 THE STATE OF THE REGION    HAMPTON ROADS 2009    
TABLE 4
TRANSPORTATION CARBON EMISSIONS IN SELECTED
METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS, 2005
MSA
Total
 Emissions and
Rank Among
100 MSAs
Auto
 Emissions and
Rank Among
100 MSAs
Truck
 Emissions and
Rank Among
100 MSAs
Virginia Beach/ Nor-
folk/Newport News
1.145 (18) 1.004 (33) 0.141 (4)
Richmond 1.738 (79) 1.335 (92) 0.404 (56)
Charlottesville 1.724 (77) 1.256 (73) 0.068 (73)
Washington, D.C. 1.157 (20) 0.984 (30) 0.173 (10)
Atlanta 1.634 (66) 1.224 (73) 0.410 (58)
Baltimore 1.355 (40) 1.044 (44) 0.311 (40)
Charlotte 1.724 (77) 1.256 (79) 0.468 (73)
Louisville 1.700 (73) 1.129 (59) 0.571 (91)
Memphis 1.692 (72) 1.162 (65) 0.530 (85)
Philadelphia 1.023 (6) 0.789  (5) 0.234 (22)
Source: “Shrinking the Carbon Footprint in Metropolitan America,” the Brookings Institution
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sistent with California’s clean cars program. Also, Virginia does not offer state
grants for research and development for smart cars, and does not specify stan-
dards, or provide incentives, for low-carbon fuels. The NRDC study also com-
puted an index of mass-transit spending by state, which it measures as the share
of money spent on transit divided by total highway spending. The NRDC gave
Virginia high marks for its high ratio (7.9 percent) of mass-transit spending to
highway spending. This ranked the Commonwealth 14th among the 50 states.
It is worth noting, however, that most of this spending has been on the Wash-
ington, D.C., Metro system extensions in Northern Virginia and does not include
significant expenditures in Hampton Roads. 
The upshot is that Hampton Roads is not excessively burdened
with pollution generated by gasoline consumption (at least
compared with other metropolitan areas). However, the state
has not been as aggressive as many other states in taking
steps to reduce carbon emissions. For example, Virginia is not a
member of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. The RGGI consists of New
England and mid-Atlantic states that have agreed to set limits on the greenhouse
gases from power plants.     
One of the policies favored by President Obama involves the use of carbon
taxes, or “cap and trade,” in order to reduce carbon emissions. The intent is to
set specific limits on carbon that can be emitted by a region or a state. There
are two major variations on this theme. In the most commonly proposed cap-
and-trade scenario, those who wish to emit carbon will have to purchase per-
mits in a competitive auction that would give them the “right to pollute.” Thus,
cap and trade would simultaneously limit carbon emissions and invoke price
penalties on those who elect not to curtail emissions. Because the carbon emis-
sion permits would be distributed via a competitive auction, these permits pre-
sumably would be purchased by those who will earn the highest profits if they
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TABLE 5
TRANSPORTATION-EFFICIENT PUBLIC POLICIES IN SELECTED STATES
State HybridIncentives
Fleet
Efficiency
R&D
Grants
Clean Fuel Station
Incentives
Coordinated
 Development or
Growth Management
Percentage Spent
on Mass Transit
Virginia No Yes No No Yes 7.9
North Carolina No Yes Yes Yes No 4.12
West Virginia No Yes No No No 1.11
Mississippi No No No No No 0.67
Maryland Yes Yes No No Yes 38.08
Pennsylvania Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 14.82
Tennessee No Yes No Yes Yes 3.22
Georgia No Yes No Yes Yes 5.99
New York Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 50.31
Source: “Ranking States’ Oil Vulnerability and Solutions for Change,” Natural Resources Defense Council 
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own the permits. In turn, this means that the permits ultimately will be purchased
by the individuals and firms that produce the goods and services that consumers
regard as most essential.     
In another commonly discussed version of cap and trade, current emitters of
carbon (for example, manufacturing plants) would receive a free allocation of
permits, but the number of those permits would be limited to a level that would
reduce total carbon emissions. Then, those who desire more permits than they
received initially will be forced to bid to acquire more if they want to emit addi-
tional carbon. In this cap-and-trade scenario, those who choose to discharge
additional carbon will incur higher costs. Simultaneously, an incentive is created
for some individuals not to emit carbon so that they are able to sell their permits.     
Under either cap-and-trade scenario, however, consumers end up paying higher
prices for the things they purchase because carbon-emitting businesses will do
their very best to pass the costs of their carbon permits on to consumers. For
obvious reasons, this aspect of cap-and-trade proposals often is glossed over by
elected officials who propose cap-and-trade systems. Elected officials also tend
to say little about the additional tax revenue a cap-and-trade system will gen-
erate for the federal government, though those in the know clearly have plans
how to spend these incremental dollars.
By most accounts, Virginia would be less affected by a cap-
and-trade system than many other states because it is not
home to many manufacturing operations that emit carbon. In
general, the same “we won’t be affected as much as other
regions” judgment applies to Hampton Roads because our
region is characterized by relatively low carbon emissions per
person. Geographically, the most vulnerable region in Virginia where cap
and trade is concerned appears to be the Richmond metropolitan area,
because of its elevated carbon emission levels.  
At this point, however, we must insert a note of reality. Because a cap-and-trade
system, properly understood, introduces a new, broad tax on economic activity,
and new taxes always are unpopular, it is not preordained that such a system will
be adopted. Even so, as this material is being written, it does appear that some
type of cap-and-trade system seems likely to be legislated at the federal level.
Sustainability in
Hampton Roads
The notion of sustainable economic activity is one that has attracted consider-
able attention in recent years. At its most basic, it focuses on economic activity
that can be perpetuated and sustained over very long periods of time. The
question is: Can humans develop patterns of economic activity
that meet current needs, yet replenish resources and preserve
the environment in ways that do not impoverish future gener-
ations?
One can extend the notion of sustainability to cities and regions. Based upon a
variety of indicators, www.sustainlane.com provides a ranking of the degree of
sustainability of the 50 most populated cities in the country. Graph 1 presents
information for the only Virginia city in the Top 50, Virginia Beach. The Beach
receives high marks for some of its policies, for example, having 10 percent of
its school buses that run on biodiesel and introducing LEED-certified (environmen-
tally efficient) buildings. It also does well in terms of air quality, water supply
and the relative absence of traffic congestion. However, Virginia Beach ulti-
mately ranks only 45th overall among the 50 largest cities because of long
commutes (often to Norfolk), low usage of mass public transportation, relative
low usage of farmers’ markets, and inadequate planning and land use. Even
so, this represents an improvement over 2006, when it was ranked 48th.
Of course, not all observers would choose the same criteria, or assign the same
weights on these criteria, as www.sustainlane.com. Further, there are many
other significant economic enterprises in Hampton Roads (the military, Norfolk
Southern, Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, Smithfield Packing, K-12 public
schools, universities) whose sustainability might usefully be measured.   
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GRAPH 1
VIRGINIA BEACH’S RANKINGS AS A SUSTAINABLE CITY, 2008
Source: www.sustainlane.com  
Note: The sample consists of the largest 50 cities in the country. The highest (most favorable) ranking a city can receive is 1st; the lowest (least favorable) is 50th. Virginia Beach was not measured in five of the
categories. 
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Final Thoughts
This chapter started by examining the vulnerability of Hampton Roads to price
spikes in gasoline and ended by probing our region’s long-term economic sus-
tainability. How are these topics related? First, rising energy prices (and the
extent to which these prices rise in Hampton Roads) could disadvantage the
region in the future. However, our region appears to be somewhat
less vulnerable to energy price spikes (for example, in gaso-
line) than many other regions, primarily because of our coastal
location. In this respect, our economic model may be more sus-
tainable than that of many other metropolitan areas.
Second, sustainable economic development worldwide appears to require lim-
iting carbon emissions, and several cap-and-trade taxation schemes have been
proposed to use prices and markets to achieve this goal. Because Hampton
Roads is one of the lower carbon-emitting regions, we will not be affected as
much as other areas (such as Richmond) that emit much larger amounts of
carbon.  
Third, however, our region is not particularly “green” in terms of
its daily existence. Virginia Beach is the only city in the region
examined for its sustainability practices by
www.sustainlane.com and it ranked only 45th among the
largest cities in the country. In general, topics such as recy-
cling, protecting our numerous waterways and even “turning
off the lights” are not at the top of most individuals’ agendas
in our region. Clearly, Hampton Roads is not to be confused with Portland,
Ore., on environmental and sustainability issues.       
Ultimately, we will reduce our vulnerability to gasoline price spikes, and
increase our long-term viability, if we:
 Rely more heavily upon mass transportation;
 Pay higher prices for gasoline and other fuels so that people will drive
fewer miles, purchase more fuel-efficient vehicles, increase carpooling,
utilize mass transportation more often, and emit fewer carbons and
other pollutants;
 Utilize increased amounts of reformulated gasoline; 
 Build more LEED-certified, environmentally efficient buildings; and
 Increase recycling.     
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Climate Change, Global
Warming and Ocean Levels
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Global Warming
Few reputable scientists argue against the proposition that the Earth has been
getting warmer, though not all agree why the warming has been occurring.
Even so, average global temperatures have been rising for at least 50 years.
Graph 1 illustrates this trend.
The average rise in sea levels worldwide has been about 8
inches per century, or about 2 millimeters per year. Graph 2,
which depicts average sea-level measurements from 23 long
tide gauges in locations around the world that have been geo-
logically stable, illustrates this trend.  
Several reputable models predict that Hampton Roads will be more than 3
degrees Celsius (5.4 degrees Fahrenheit) warmer by 2100. The Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change’s Fourth Assessment Report states that its cur-
rent climate models predict that mean global warming in 2100 will range from
1.1 degrees C to 6.4 degrees C higher than today. A mid-range estimate, and
one that assumes only moderate changes in carbon emissions over this century,
forecasts global warming of 2.8 degrees C (5.04 degrees F). 
Scientists at George Mason University and the Center for Ocean-Land-Atmos-
phere Studies in Maryland predict warming for the same period in Virginia and
nearby areas to be 3.1 degrees C (5.58 degrees F) and precipitation to
increase by 11 percent.
Global warming comes about in part because of increased burning of fossil
fuels, such as coal and oil, and from deforestation. All of these activities result in
the concentration of heat-trapping “greenhouse gases” in the atmosphere that
prevent heat from escaping into space. According to the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, energy-consuming activities account for three-quarters of human-
generated greenhouse emissions, mostly in the form of carbon dioxide emissions
from burning fossil fuels. Industrial processes (such as the production of cement,
steel and aluminum), agriculture, forestry, other land use, waste management
and transportation are also significant sources of greenhouse gas emissions.
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Climate Change, Global Warming and Ocean Levels in
Hampton Roads
Global warming is too serious for the world any longer to ignore its danger or split into opposing factions on it.   
–Tony Blair, Prime Minister of Great Britain, 1997-2007
H
ampton Roads could be a very different place for our great-grandchildren to live, if predictions by reputable scientists con-
cerning global warming and rising sea levels come true.  In a nutshell, here’s what might happen: Large amounts of prime
beach and waterfront property will sink underwater; our tunnels will periodically fill with water; our port facilities will
incur huge costs in order to continue operating; many residential and commercial properties will become uninsurable; and
certain wildlife and fauna will disappear.
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GRAPH 1
GLOBAL WARMING: 1880-2000
Source: Wikipedia.com
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Rising Sea Levels
Warming of the Earth increases the thermal volume of water in the ocean; water
molecules expand when heated. However, warming also melts ice, for
example, at the poles, though notably also in non-polar locations such as Mount
Kilimanjaro and Glacier National Park. Although this melting occurs slowly, it
pushes more water into our oceans. Warmer, larger oceans also alter weather
patterns and may lead to more frequent and severe weather conditions,
including hurricanes. Graph 2 illustrates average rising sea levels since 1880,
based upon observations at 23 geologically stable sites around the globe.  
According to a study endorsed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, Hampton Roads is the 10th-largest coastal metropolitan area
in the world in terms of total assets exposed to increasing flooding from rising
sea levels. This reflects the fact that much of the land in our region is at or near
sea level. It does not take very much of a rise in the sea level for water to spill
over the land. Graph 3 illustrates especially vulnerable regions of the United
States, including Hampton Roads.
Approximately 3.4 million people in the mid-Atlantic coastal region (about 10
percent of the U.S. population) live on land less than one meter above monthly
highest tides (“Coastal Sensitivity to Sea Level Rise: A Focus on the Mid-Atlantic
Region,” U.S. Climate Change Science Program, Environmental Protection
Agency, January 2009, p. 333). This has particular relevance to Hampton
Roads because the sea level is expected to rise between 0.7 meters and 1.6
meters (2.3 - 5.2 feet) by 2100, according to the Chesapeake Bay Program’s
Scientific and Technical Advisory Committee. Table 1 summarizes the evidence
on rising sea levels in Hampton Roads and other Atlantic Coast communities.
Let’s assume that a mid-range estimate of a 3.7-foot higher
sea level is correct for 2100. Vast areas of the region will be
inundated with water unless a massive dike and levee system
is developed to prevent such flooding. Most of the land east of
highway U.S. 17 could be covered with water. From north to
south, vast areas of Mathews, Gloucester and York counties,
most of Poquoson, and much of the cities Hampton, Norfolk,
Chesapeake and the Virginia Beach oceanfront will be under-
water unless protected by dikes and levees. A recent report, “The
Impact of Climate Change on Hampton Roads,” written by the Hampton Roads
Research Partnership and funded by NASA Langley Research Center, provides
detail.
There is yet another fly in the ointment for Hampton Roads, however. Most of the
land in our region is slowly sinking at a rate between 0.15 meter and 0.23
meter (5 - 7.5 inches) per century. The land continues to sink because of the
“isostatic rebound” of the crust of the Earth from the weight of long-absent gla-
ciers, groundwater removal and slippage of the coast into the crater we now
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TABLE 1
POTENTIAL FOR SHORELINE CHANGES DUE TO SEA-LEVEL
RISE ALONG THE U.S. MID-ATLANTIC REGION
RATES OF RELATIVE SEA-LEVEL RISE FOR SELECTED LONG-TERM TIDE GAUGES
Station
Rate of Sea- Level
Rise (mm/yr)
Time Span of
Record
Atlantic City, NJ 3.98 ±0.11 1922-1999
Philadelphia, PA 2.75 ±0.12 1900-1999
Lews, DE 3.16 ±0.16 1919-1999
Annapolis, MD 3.53 ±0.13 1928-1999
Solomons Island, MD 3.29 ±0.17 1937-1999
Washington, DC 3.13 ±0.12 1931-1999
Hampton Roads, VA 4.42 ±0.16 1927-1999
Wilmington, NC 2.22 ±0.25  1935-1999
Charleston, SC 3.28 ±0.14 1921-1999
Miami, FL 2.39 ±0.22 1931-1999
Key West, FL 2.27 ±0.09 1913-1999
Sources: Woods Hole Science Center and the U.S. Geological Survey
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know as the Chesapeake Bay. The bottom line is that this “sinking land effect”
must be added to the projected sea-level rises we have just noted in order to
determine the total tidal increase that we will observe in Hampton Roads.
What does all of this add up to? Table 2 reports estimates of the impact of
water inundation on regional habitat (much would be destroyed), while Graph
3 illustrates the flooding impact of various magnitudes of hurricanes upon
Hampton Roads. The colored areas will be covered by water when a hurricane
strikes. While designed to illustrate hurricane water damage, Graph 3 also
aptly shows which regional land areas are most susceptible to water coverage
from rising sea levels. There is a very high correlation between those land areas
that would be covered with water in a hurricane and the land areas that would
be inundated by slowly rising sea levels (unless countered by dikes and levees).
An unpublished Pennsylvania State University master’s thesis, “Modeling the Vul-
nerability of Coastal Communities to Hurricane Storm Surge Associated with
Sea-Level Rise: A Case Study of Hampton Roads, Virginia” (PSU, Lisa M. Rygel,
2004), found that the areas with the highest risk of exposure to storm-surge
flooding in Hampton Roads are the heavily developed portions of Norfolk,
Portsmouth, Chesapeake, Virginia Beach and Hampton. It is not unoccupied,
low-value land that will be covered with water as sea levels rise.   
107CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING AND OCEAN LEVELS
TABLE 2
PROJECTED CHANGES IN COASTAL HABITAT BY 2100 WITH
A 27.2-INCH SEA-LEVEL RISE
SELECTED REGIONS OF TIDEWATER, VIRGINIA
Upper Tidewater Region Lower Tidewater Region
(Norfolk and Virginia Beach)
Acres
Relative
Change
Acres
Relative
Change
Undeveloped
dry land
-18460 -17% -10780 -19%
Tidal fresh
marsh
-8 -3% -17 -38%
Tidal swamp -680 -30% -2290 -83%
Brackish marsh -8130 -85% -890 -29%
Tidal flats -1940 -76% -740 -67%
Estuarine
beach
+1860 8-fold +560 4-fold
Ocean beach na na -87 -79%
Transitional
salt marsh
+4370 11-fold +1170 14-fold
Salt marsh +2260 12-fold +4040 255-fold
Estuarine open
water
+15740 14% +5360 10%
Source: “Sea-Level Rise and Coastal Habitats of the Chesapeake Bay,” National Wildlife Federa-
tion, 2008
2009 State of the Region Booklet:Layout 1  9/3/09  11:01 AM  Page 107
GRAPH 2
RISING WORLDWIDE SEA LEVELS
Source: Wikipedia.com
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Adverse Impacts 
Gov. Timothy Kaine’s Commission on Climate Change (“Final Report: A Climate
Change Action Plan,” December 2008, available at www.deq.Virginia.gov)
found that the impacts of climate change and global warming for the Hampton
Roads region and the Commonwealth could include:
■  Sea-level rise could pose a serious threat to roads, railways, ports, utili-
ties and other critical infrastructure.
■ National security could be affected, as several major military installa-
tions are located in low-lying areas.
■ Insurance rates could continue to increase along coastal areas and the
availability of insurance could become an increasing problem.
■ Some of the region’s “foundation species,” such as blue crabs, eelgrass
and oysters, could decline or disappear.
■ Coastal wetlands that serve as a critical habitat for the Chesapeake
Bay’s plants and animals could be lost.
■ An increase in extreme weather events would affect people’s health,
safety and homes.
■ Responses to climate change mandated by all levels of government
would affect the way people live, play and do business.
The National Wildlife Federation report “Global Warming and Virginia,”
updated in March 2008, offers some additional dire predictions for the
 Commonwealth:
■ Warmer water temperatures due to global warming could encourage
the spread of diseases among oysters in the Chesapeake Bay.
■ Warmer average temperatures could increase concentrations of ground-
level ozone, which is known to aggravate respiratory problems such as
asthma.
■ Loss of wildlife and habitat could mean a loss of tourism dollars.  
■ Sand replenishment costs for beaches would range between $200
 million to $1.2 billion by 2100.   
The greatest impact of climate change for transportation systems will be flooding
of coastal roads, railways, transit systems and runways because of global rising
sea levels, coupled with storm surges, and exacerbated in some locations by
land subsidence, according to “Potential Impacts of Climate Change on U.S.
Transportation,” a 2008 report by the Transportation Research Board of the
National Academies.
Crystal Ball Gazing
How accurate are the predictions that we have reported above? There are
some naysayers. The Virginia Climate Change Council, a wing of the Virginia
Manufacturers Association, issued a report in early 2009 titled “Simplifying Cli-
mate Change & Global Warming.” In the report, the council argued that “thirty
percent of climate scientists worldwide disagree that human introduced green-
house gases are causing climate warming and slightly over 14 percent are
undecided because the science of climate change and global warming is ever
changing.” They conclude that “due to the legitimate uncertainty about the pre-
cise causes we urge caution before deciding a course of action to implement
solutions.” The Cato Institute ran a full-page advertisement in The Washington
Post on March 30, 2008, that included the names of 115 scientists who
endorsed a statement that said in part that the “alarm regarding climate change
is grossly overstated.”  
Nevertheless, very few reputable scientists dispute the contention that global
warming is occurring, even though there is some disagreement over the precise
causes of that warming. Further, in 2007 a group of three- and four-star flag
and general officers from all the services – Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine
Corps and Coast Guard – and representing all combatant commands, was
convened by the Center for Naval Analyses to examine the issues relating to cli-
mate change and global warming. These participants, accompanied and sup-
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ported by service scientists, had no axes to grind and probably would have
preferred to issue a “no problems” report because of the competition for limited
funding any global warming conclusion might encourage. Even so, their report,
“National Security and the Threat of Climate Change,” was strikingly clear in its
tone:
As military leaders, we know we cannot wait for certainty. Failing to act
because a warning isn’t precise enough is unacceptable. The intelligence
community should incorporate climate consequences into its National Intelli-
gence Estimate. The National Security Strategy should directly address the
threat of climate change to our national security interests.
The 2008 National Intelligence Assessment reiterated these judgments and con-
cluded that climate change is a serious threat to national security and long-term
global stability. A Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program
has been launched to evaluate sea-level rise and the ecological impacts on mili-
tary installations posed by climate change.
The National Council for Science and the Environment in its January 2008
report, “Climate Change: Science and Solutions,” lists its No. 1 reason why we
must act now: “Global climate change is not a future or hypothetical situation; it
is occurring now with some of its effects happening more rapidly than the scien-
tific models have predicted.”
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Sobering Conclusions
Professor John P. Holdren of Harvard University, president and director of the
Woods Hole Research Center, has placed the issue in perspective:
Global warming is a misnomer, because it implies something that is
gradual, something that is uniform, something that is quite possibly benign.
What we are experiencing with climate change is none of those things. It is
certainly not uniform. It is rapid compared to the pace at which social sys-
tems and environmental systems can adjust. It is certainly not benign. We
should be calling it “global climatic disruption” rather than “global
warming.” (“Meeting the Climate-Change Challenge,” National Council for
Science and the Environment, Jan. 17, 2008)
The necessity for society to take a long-range view of global warming is empha-
sized in the Federal Coastal Zone Management Act (16 US Code § 1451),
which provides that “because global warming may result in a substantial sea-
level rise with serious adverse effects in the coastal zone, coastal states must
anticipate and plan for such an occurrence.” Alas, a key finding of the U.S. Cli-
mate Change Science Program report, “Coastal Sensitivity to Sea Level Rise: A
Focus on the Mid-Atlantic Region,” issued in January 2009, is that “the compre-
hensive high-resolution and precise analyses of the spatial distributions of popu-
lation and infrastructure vulnerable to sea-level rise in the Mid-Atlantic required
for planning and response do not exist at the present time.”
Action is needed on three fronts. First, Hampton Roads as a region must do its
part initially to control and subsequently to diminish carbon emissions. This will
not be easily accomplished, but certainly will involve less vehicular travel and
greater attention to green building practices.  
Second, the Commonwealth of Virginia would be well advised (for a variety of
reasons) to increase the taxes it imposes on gasoline and diesel fuel. These
taxes have not risen since the 1980s. Higher fuel taxes easily are the most effi-
cient way to decrease carbon emissions from vehicles, and this conclusion
would hold even if Virginia and Hampton Roads did not need additional rev-
enue to deal with road and rapid-transit transportation needs. 
Third, Hampton Roads must prepare for gradual, but seem-
ingly inexorable increases in ocean and river water levels. A
century of evidence documenting rising water levels – interna-
tional, national and regional – warns us about what is coming.
If current trends continue, then sea levels in Hampton Roads in
2020 will be at least another 2 inches higher than today. We
will see the ocean creep up into backyards and witness
increased flooding during rainstorms and at high tide. Only
those with no concern for the future can afford to ignore this
development. This directly implies that we ought to be actively
planning a system of dikes and levees unless we intend to for-
feit huge portions of our land to the sea.  
We belabor the obvious when we observe that the planning and construction of
dikes and levees is so far removed from public attention in Hampton Roads that
anyone who broaches the subject is likely to elicit a quizzical look. After all,
isn’t there a consensus regionally that transportation improvements actually con-
stitute our major agenda item? Probably. However, we predict that increased
flooding in future years, capped by some disaster, will inspire epiphanies on the
subject among citizens, businesses, the defense community and elected officials.
The region will then predictably move into crisis mode. In the meantime, we
harbor the modest goal of increasing regional awareness of the looming issues
associated with the rising sea levels that will occur because of global warming
and other factors.    
113CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING AND OCEAN LEVELS
2009 State of the Region Booklet:Layout 1  9/3/09  11:02 AM  Page 113
2009 State of the Region Booklet:Layout 1  9/3/09  11:02 AM  Page 114
Traffic Congestion
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Such a significant drop in traffic volume is unprecedented in recent history. As
longtime residents of Hampton Roads should easily recognize, traffic volume
tends to rise from year to year, along with the population and size of the
economy. But 2008 was no ordinary year, in Hampton Roads or elsewhere.
The first half of the year witnessed a steady increase in U.S. fuel prices – from
$3.11 per gallon in January to $4.11 in July ($2.54 to $3.53 in Virginia). Inrix
data demonstrate that the rising cost of fuel had a direct and immediate effect
on urban traffic congestion, as drivers sought to economize by scaling back
their time on the road. Gasoline prices then plunged below $2 per gallon in the
final weeks of 2008, as the global recession became fully apparent. Unemploy-
ment figures rose steadily throughout 2008, ending at a high of 7.2 percent in
December. Unemployment in Hampton Roads increased at a similar rate,
though ended the year much lower at 5.5 percent. Despite lower fuel prices at
the year’s end, fewer people traveling to and from jobs eased traffic congestion
further, particularly during morning and afternoon peak travel hours.
Not all metropolitan areas experienced these trends in the same way. Although
virtually all of the 100 most populous U.S. metropolitan areas witnessed a
decline in traffic congestion (Baton Rouge, La., with a 6 percent increase, is the
sole exception), the rates of this decline vary considerably. Smaller metro areas
with fewer than 1 million residents often saw larger drops in congestion, since
their traffic woes were typically less intense to begin with. (Toledo, Ohio, had
the most dramatic decline in peak hour traffic, at 76 percent.) A notable excep-
tion is the Riverside, Calif., metro area, which claims more than 4 million resi-
dents – and one of the nation’s highest foreclosure rates. Riverside’s traffic
congestion fell dramatically by 57 percent, the 7th-largest decrease among
U.S. metro areas. Table 1 supplies comparative information on traffic conges-
tion in Hampton Roads and other metropolitan areas.  
Hampton Roads experienced a 29 percent decline in traffic congestion in
2008, matching precisely the average rate of decline among the 100 largest
metro areas. In other respects, however, our traffic patterns deviate significantly
from national averages. In this chapter, we’ll take a closer look at Hampton
Roads’ rankings in the Inrix National Traffic Scorecard. We’ll explore where
and when our traffic congestion is at its worst – and how this has changed
between 2007 and 2008. Finally, we’ll suggest what implications the Inrix
data might have for regional transportation policy.
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TRAFFIC CONGESTION IN HAMPTON ROADS: IDENTIFYING
AND MEASURING OUR BOTTLENECKS
I
f you’re looking for a bright side to the past year’s economic woes, take a drive on I-64 or any of our region’s other interstate highways. In Hampton Roads and
throughout the United States, traffic congestion decreased by nearly one-third between 2007 and 2008. This is the startling conclusion presented by the traffic infor-
mation provider Inrix in its National Traffic Scorecard of 2008 (available at www.inrix.com). The hours of weekly congestion on Hampton Roads’
busiest stretches of interstate highway decreased by 10 percent, while drivers’ average speeds at these bottlenecks (when con-
gested) rose from 14.2 to 15.9 miles per hour.
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TABLE 1
METROPOLITIAN RANKINGS — HOW WE COMPARE
Peak Hour Congestion Peak Hour Travel Time Index Worst Hour Congestion, All Hours/Days
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Summary Top 100 Markets 197,281 47,029 -29% 1.09 -3.5% F 5pm 1.20 60% 40%
5 Most Congested Metro Areas
Los Angeles/Long Beach CA 2 12,876 1,560 1 100% 1 0 -24% 1 1.33 2 1 -8.2% Th 5pm 1.63 2 2 82% 1 100% 68% 32%
NY/Northern NJ/Long Island 1 18,816 2,073 2 87% 2 0 -25% 5 1.22 5 0 -5.8% F 5pm 1.48 5 1 100% 2 98% 60% 40%
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet IL-IN-WI 3 9,525 1,320 3 48% 3 0 -17% 9 1.19 10 1 -3.4% Th 5pm 1.36 9 3 45% 3 50% 66% 34%
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington TX 4 6,145 1,618 4 39% 5 1 -13% 18 1.12 22 4 -2.4% F 5pm 1.31 17 5 29% 4 38% 70% 30%
Wash DC Metro Area 8 5,307 903 5 36% 4 -1 -26% 7 1.20 8 1 -5.9% Th 5pm 1.42 8 4 30% 5 36% 67% 33%
Hampton Roads and Other Southern Metro Areas
Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord NC-SC 35 1,652 444 27 8% 28 1 -25% 23 1.1 26 3 -3.0% F 5pm 1.24 24 25 11% 24 10% 56% 44%
Hampton Roads 34 1,659 305 32 6% 32 0 -29% 20 1.11 21 1 -3.7% F 4pm 1.32 14 46 6% 35 7% 65% 35%
Jacksonville FL 40 1,301 475 44 5% 34 -10 -47% 43 1.05 41 -2 -4.0% T 5pm 1.10 53 32 8% 37 6% 50% 50%
Raleigh-Cary NC 49 1,048 295 51 3% 60 9 -26% 48 1.05 57 9 -1.6% Th 5pm 1.12 45 64 4% 59 3% 53% 47%
Richmond VA 43 1,213 625 60 2% 56 -4 -47% 91 1.02 87 -4 -1.4% Th 5pm 1.04 92 49 6% 54 4% 38% 62%
Charleston-North Charleston SC 81 630 90 71 1% 71 0 -45% 34 1.08 27 -7 -4.7% Th 5pm 1.20 29 98 1% 89 1% 63% 37%
Source: Inrix National Traffic Scorecard: 2008 Annual Report
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How Inrix Keeps Score
Inrix is a private, Seattle-area corporation that was established by former
Microsoft executives Bryan Mistele and Craig Chapman in 2004. Inrix monitors
traffic conditions on more than 800,000 miles of U.S. roads, using a data col-
lection network composed of “hundreds of public and private sources, including
traditional road sensors and the company’s unique network of nearly a million
GPS-enabled vehicles and cellular probes.” Inrix works with Clear Channel
Radio, Total Traffic Network and other partners to provide real-time traffic infor-
mation for an array of different users, including the broadcast media and
owners of portable navigation devices. The billions of data points collected by
Inrix inform the National Traffic Scorecards of 2007 and 2008, which assess
congestion on the major highways of the country’s 100 largest metropolitan
areas.
A key scorecard concept is the Travel Time Index (TTI), which can be defined as
the “ratio of peak period travel time to free flow travel time.” In other words, TTI
expresses the average amount of extra time it takes to complete a trip during the
busiest driving hours of the day, relative to overnight hours when traffic is freely
flowing. (Inrix identifies peak travel hours as 6-10 a.m. and 3-7 p.m., Monday
through Friday.) Hampton Roads’ TTI is 1.11, which means that a trip during
peak hours is likely to take 11 percent longer than when traffic flows freely. This
means you’ll take an extra 3.3 minutes to complete an otherwise 30-minute
drive between Portsmouth and Virginia Beach at peak hours. Inrix has deter-
mined that Hampton Roads traffic is at its heaviest between 4-5 p.m. on Friday,
when our “Worst Hour” TTI climbs to 1.32. Get in the car then, and you’ll need
an additional 9.6 minutes for the same drive.
Inrix determines the TTI for an entire metro area by aggregating the individual
TTIs for each of the area’s road segments. Road segments typically include “the
interchange and the portion of linear road leading up to the interchange across
all lanes in a single direction of traffic.” Each segment is identified by a stan-
dardized location code. According to the 2008 Scorecard, Hampton Roads’
worst bottleneck is “City Hall Ave./Exit 10” on westbound I-264, the final exit
before the Downtown Tunnel. Only .15 miles long, this road segment is con-
gested during 28 of 40 peak driving hours, with a sluggish average speed of
8.9 mph when congested. Inrix considers the TTI as well as length of all road
segments such as this when calculating the overall congestion of a given metro
area.
How Hampton Roads
 Measures Up
Unsurprisingly, Inrix identifies Los Angeles highways as the most congested in
the United States, followed closely by those in and around New York City.
Compared to these two metropolises, traffic congestion elsewhere seems min-
imal. Sixty-seven of the 100 most populous metro areas have a rate of conges-
tion that is 5 percent or less that of Los Angeles. Hampton Roads (at 6 percent)
doesn’t quite make this cutoff, which places us within the top third of the most
congested metro areas around the country. Given the size of Hampton Roads,
our position on the scorecard is not unexpected. We are the 34th most popu-
lous metro area, and we rank 32nd in congestion.  
A closer look at the Scorecard (see Graph 1), however, reveals
some important idiosyncrasies about Hampton Roads traffic
patterns. To begin, 65 percent of our total congestion derives
from peak driving hours. (The national average is 60 percent.)
Thus, our region’s TTI – and particularly our Worst Hour TTI – is
comparatively high. At 1.32, our Worst Hour TTI is, in fact, the
14th-highest in the country. By contrast, we rank only 46th in
off-peak congestion. Together these figures suggest that a
majority of our traffic woes are compressed into a few hours
of intense congestion at particularly stubborn bottlenecks – a
conclusion that should surprise few Hampton Roads residents
who rely upon the Downtown Tunnel and Hampton Roads
Bridge-Tunnel for their daily commutes.
In 2008 (as in 2007), our region’s top 13 bottlenecks were located on either
side of these two tunnels. Graph 2 illustrates this reality. Last year’s most con-
gested road segments were on westbound I-264 at the City Hall Avenue and
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Waterside Drive exits, as well as on the Berkley Bridge just before the Down-
town Tunnel. Eastbound I-264 at Effingham Street came in fourth place, fol-
lowed by eastbound I-64 at the two exits immediately preceding the Hampton
Roads Bridge-Tunnel. Table 2 lists the top 15 traffic bottlenecks in the region.
Our region’s top six bottlenecks range between the 165th and 301st most con-
gested nationwide. For a metro area of our size, this is a dubious distinction.
Outside of the top seven most congested metro areas (all of which claim more
than 4 million residents) only Seattle, Honolulu and Austin, Texas, have a larger
number of the nation’s 350 worst bottlenecks.   
Thus, even by national standards, traffic conditions at the
Downtown Tunnel and Hampton Roads Bridge-Tunnel are quite
poor. What’s more, our tunnel traffic has worsened relative to other bottlenecks
around the country. Although both hours of weekly congestion and average
driving speed when congested improved at our region’s worst bottlenecks
between 2007 and 2008, most of these bottlenecks also received a higher
(which is to say, less favorable) congestion ranking in 2008. Congestion
declined almost everywhere, but it declined less at the Downtown and Midtown
tunnels than at other traffic hot spots around the country. 
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GRAPH 1
OVERALL CONGESTION
1 TTI is the ratio of actual to uncongested travel time. A ratio of 1.10 means 10 percent additional trip time due to congestion.
2 Peak hours are Monday to Friday, 6 to 10 a.m. and 3 to 7 p.m. 
Source: Inrix National Traffic Scorecard: 2008 Annual Report 
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Congestion Compared to
2007: -28.6%
Worst Metro Area (L.A.): 6%
Travel Time Index (TTI)1
TTI: 1.11
National TTI Rank: 20
Compared to 2007: -3.7%
Peak Travel Hour2
2008 Worst: Friday, 4-5 PM (TTI=1.32)
2007 Worst: Friday, 4-5 PM (TTI=1.38)
TRAVEL TIME INDEX1 BY MONTH
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TABLE 2
HAMPTON ROADS’ WORST BOTTLENECKS3
Regional Ranking National Ranking Road / Direction Segment / Interchange City Length (Mi)
Hours of Congestion
Per Week
Average Speed When
Congested (mph)
2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007
1 3 165 220 I 264 WB CITY HALL AVE / EXIT 10 Norfolk 0.15 28 27 8.9 7.7
2 2 175 204 I 264 WB WATERSIDE DR / EXIT 9 Norfolk 0.62 26 21 11.0 7.4
3 5 228 305 Berkley Brg / I 264 WB BERKLEY BRG Norfolk 0.39 31 32 12.6 11.9
4 4 231 258 I 264 EB HWY 141 / EFFINGHAM ST / EXIT 7 Portsmouth 0.92 26 34 12.1 13.4
5 6 238 350 Hampton Roads Brg Tnl / I 64 EB MALLORY ST / EXIT 268 Hampton 0.58 34 30 17.6 15.0
6 1 301 188 I 64 EB US 60 / HWY 143 / EXIT 267 Hampton 1.79 27 35 16.7 13.6
7 7 687 580 I 64 WB 4TH VIEW ST / EXIT 273 Norfolk 1.25 20 21 20.2 14.8
8 8 917 1039 I 264 EB DES MOINES AVE / EXIT 6 Portsmouth 0.67 9 13 10.5 12.0
9 9 1084 1057 I 64 WB PATROL RD Norfolk 0.63 12 13 16.5 12.7
10 11 1268 1801 I 264 WB CLAIBORNE AVE / EXIT 11 Norfolk 0.09 8 8 11.3 10.4
11 12 1629 1916 Hampton Roads Brg Tnl / I 64 EB HAMPTON ROADS BRG TNL (HAMPTON) Hampton 0.77 14 17 23.8 22.4
12 10 1779 1526 I 64 WB OCEAN AVE / EXIT 274 Norfolk 0.85 10 16 20.5 19.3
13 13 2146 1943 I 64 WB OCEAN VIEW AVE / EXIT 272 Norfolk 1.61 10 17 24.7 24.5
14 14 2212 3939 I 64 WB I 564/US 460/GRANBY ST/EXIT 276 Norfolk 0.46 7 10 18.3 21.0
15 15 2255 3891 I 664 SB US 60/25TH ST/26 ST/EXIT 6 Newport News 0.17 6 9 15.6 18.1
Total Hours
of Congestion
Per Week
Total Average
Speed When
 Congested (mph)
268 303 16.0 14.9
3 Bottleneck “congestion” is defined as times when average hourly speed is half or less than the uncongested speed for that road segment.
Source: Inrix National Traffic Scorecard: 2008 Annual Report
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Implications for the Future
“While we all should cheer the reduction in congestion in 2008,” conclude the
authors of the Inrix Scorecard, “we should be under no illusion that this is perma-
nent.” Assuming that the economy gradually revives and fuel prices remain mod-
erate in upcoming months, traffic congestion is likely to return to 2007 levels
(and eventually to outstrip them). Last year’s respite to our traffic woes should in
no way discourage the development of a smart, proactive transportation policy
that can help to alleviate congestion on our busiest roadways – something that
our region and others in the Commonwealth of Virginia sorely need.
The following conclusions from the Inrix Scorecard are particularly pertinent for
Hampton Roads:
SMALL CHANGES IN TRAFFIC VOLUME CAN HAVE A BIG IMPACT
ON CONGESTION.  
The 29 percent decline in peak hour congestion from 2007 to 2008 does not
mean that there were 29 percent fewer vehicles on the road. Rather, the Federal
Highway Administration estimates that total traffic volume on urban interstates
decreased by a mere 3 percent in 2008. Because so many of our nation’s
major commuting roads operate at maximum capacity during peak travel hours,
even a small reduction in vehicles eases traffic flow substantially. Thus, we
should take care not to underestimate the positive effect that one or more of the
much-discussed proposals to alleviate tunnel congestion might have on regional
commuting times. Adding lanes to our existing tunnels, creating a “third
crossing” or expanding public transportation all have the potential to reduce
peak hour congestion dramatically.
THINGS CAN GET WORSE BEFORE THEY GET BETTER.
Major construction and road improvement projects make congestion worse in
the short term. This should be readily apparent to anyone who drives in or near
downtown Norfolk, where construction on the city’s new light rail system has
been under way for several months. The 2008 Scorecard reveals a clear
linkage between work zones and bottlenecks, underscoring “the need to focus
on managing work zones in ways that mitigate congestion.” The current intensity
of congestion at the Midtown, Downtown and Hampton Roads Bridge-Tunnels
means that any future expansion or improvement projects at these sites must be
undertaken with great care. It seems likely that some degree of increased con-
gestion in the short term will be necessary to make our region’s worst bottlenecks
more drivable in the years to come.
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The Tunnels that Connect
Hampton Roads
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The opening of the first major tunnel connecting the Peninsula with Southside (the
3.5-mile Hampton Roads Bridge-Tunnel in 1957) changed matters dramatically.
Now it was possible for automobiles and trucks to travel back and forth
between the Peninsula and Southside directly and with comparative ease. This
cut many miles and considerable time off such a trip and might well be
regarded as a definitive move in support of the notion of a region called
Hampton Roads.
Four other major tunnels exist in our area: the .65-mile Downtown Tunnel (1952)
and the .8-mile Midtown Tunnel (1962), connecting Norfolk and Portsmouth;
the 17.6-mile Chesapeake Bay Bridge-Tunnel (1964), linking Virginia Beach to
the Eastern Shore; and the 4.6-mile Monitor Merrimac Memorial Bridge-Tunnel
(1992), connecting Suffolk and Newport News.   
Taken together, these five bridge/tunnel complexes unite the region and stimu-
late commerce. Without them, the bustling Port of Hampton Roads would be a
shadow of what we see today because trucks handle significant proportions of
the goods that flow through the port. The bridges and tunnels also provide crit-
ical infrastructure to support the numerous Department of Defense installations
and activities within the region. And, during hurricane season, they provide the
promise of serving as evacuation routes.  
A recitation of the positive impact of our region’s bridges and tunnels on eco-
nomic and social life in Hampton Roads virtually begs the question: What if
they were closed, for whatever reason, or were rendered inoperable for long
periods of time? 
Are European Examples
 Relevant to Hampton Roads?
Tunnel incidents since 1995 have killed 713 people worldwide. Among the
highly publicized have been:
 Mont Blanc Tunnel Fire (March
1999): The Mont Blanc Tunnel con-
nects Italy and France. This disaster
(41 deaths) occurred when a truck
carrying nine tons of margarine and
12 tons of flour caught fire. All but
seven of those who died stayed in
their cars rather than attempt to
access “escape” rooms located inside the tunnel, though it is not clear
they could have survived even had they tried. The fires burned for two
days. Opened in 1965, the Mont Blanc Tunnel was designed for
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THE TUNNELS THAT CONNECT HAMPTON ROADS:
WONDERFUL ASSETS OR POTENTIAL ACHILLES’ HEELS?
Achilles’ Heel: a metaphor describing a potentially fatal weakness despite overall strength
H
ampton Roads hosts the second-largest seaport on the Atlantic Coast and the largest naval base in the world. Its very existence is defined by the Atlantic Ocean
and the many bodies of water that flow from many parts of Virginia into the ocean. Waterways such as the James River once profoundly divided the region.
In 1930, an individual wishing to travel from downtown Hampton to downtown Norfolk faced two choices – a long and circuitous land trip that could
approach 25 miles (via the James River Bridge on Route 17, which opened in 1928), or a boat ride.  
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450,000 vehicles per year, but already was handling 1.1 million vehi-
cles annually by 1997.
 Tauern Tunnel Accident/Fire (May 1999): The Tauern Tunnel is located
near Salzburg, Austria, and was only two lanes at the time of the acci-
dent, which was caused by an early-morning collision and fire involving
60 trucks and killing 12 people.  
 Gotthard Tunnel Accident/Fire (October 2001): Located in Switzerland,
this tunnel is more than 10 miles long. A collision between two trucks
resulted in fires that killed 12 people, primarily from smoke and heat
that reached more than 1,800 degrees. 
 Channel Tunnel Fires (November 1996, August 2006, September
2008): The Channel Tunnel connects the United Kingdom and France.
Three significant fires aboard trains have closed the tunnel since it
opened in 1994.
What lessons did Europeans learn from these accidents (none of which involved
terrorism)?
 Tunnels are constantly vulnerable to accidents and mishaps that not only
result in deaths, but also close them to traffic for periods of time –
ranging up to three years, as was the case following the Mont Blanc
Tunnel fire.
 Some fires in tunnels are virtually unavoidable and therefore are consid-
ered to be routine incidents. (The Lincoln and Holland tunnels in New
York City each experience several car fires per year.) The possibility of
fire requires that routine, easily implemented protocols exist to deal with
such occurrences.
 Bidirectional (two-lane) tunnels are substantially more susceptible to acci-
dents than dual (twin-tube) carriageway tunnels.
 Not surprisingly, tunnels that allow transiting vehicles to carry flammable
and explosive materials are susceptible to much more destructive acci-
dents. Convincing drivers not to carry illegal materials through tunnels is
a never-ending task.
 Bad driving and unwise employee judgments have caused nearly every
major tunnel accident. Terrorism might produce the same effects, but no
major tunnel disaster has been the result of terrorism, although English
authorities reported they foiled an attempt by Islamic terrorists to blow
up the Channel Tunnel in 2006.   
 The first 10 minutes are decisive when it comes to saving people’s lives
and limiting material damage (e.g., in the case of the Gotthard Tunnel
accident, experts were surprised by how rapidly toxic fumes spread and
visibility declined; this led to the loss of life).
 Tunnel users often fail to recognize emergency signs, which has resulted
in fatal consequences for those trying to escape. 
 The probability of a tunnel accident increases as the volume of traffic in
the tunnel increases.  
 It is possible to screen many, but not all, potentially dangerous cargoes
before they enter tunnels; however, the costs associated with detecting
sophisticated dangers (for example, those relating to radiation) can be
very high.
 Among the most efficient and low-cost means of reducing the frequency
and severity of tunnel accidents are: (1) mandating smaller fuel tanks for
heavy-goods vehicles; (2) providing tunnels with heat-seeking cameras;
(3) restricting the amount of fuel that heavy-goods vehicles may carry
into a tunnel; (4) requiring certain vehicles to carry fire-extinguishing
equipment; and (5) regulating distances between vehicles.
Readers will recognize that several of the recommended precautions could be
implemented immediately in our region’s tunnels, but others (such as regulating
distances between vehicles) would cause immediate problems. We can only
wish good luck to any authority that attempts to enforce meaningful “distance
between vehicles” regulations in the Downtown and Midtown tunnels during
weekday rush hours.  
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How Vulnerable Are We in
Hampton Roads?
It should come as no surprise that regional authorities are paying increased
attention to Hampton Roads’ bridge-tunnel vulnerabilities and are actively
involved in assessing emergency preparedness and critical infrastructure protec-
tion plans. Addressing these risks and mitigating their potential impacts remain
top priorities, not only among the general public, but also with Hampton Roads
policy makers.
Let’s look at some of the considerations. The overall level of risk to one of our
tunnels due to an adverse event is a function of three primary factors:
a. Importance Factor (I) – This is a straightforward measure of the socioeco-
nomic importance of a tunnel and its operation. Typically, a quantitative
measure is developed to account for the following attributes of the tunnel: 
1. Financial importance to the regional economy 
2. Importance to the regional transportation network 
3. Importance as an emergency evacuation route 
4. Exposed population in the tunnel when the adverse event occurs
b. Occurrence Factor (O) – This variable measures the probability of an
adverse event occurring. Most often, this measure takes the following into
account: 
1. Level of exposure to risk events
2. Level of security 
3. Frequency of exposure to adverse events (e.g., frequency of large-truck
traffic with potentially dangerous cargoes)
c. Vulnerability Factor (V) – This variable measures the consequences of an
adverse event to the tunnel, its occupants and neighboring populations. It usu-
ally incorporates the following measures: 
1. Expected financial damage to the tunnel 
2. Expected replacement value 
3. Expected downtime or closure of the tunnel 
4. Expected number of casualties (deaths or severe injuries)
5. Value of reduced economic activity.
The I, O and V factors enable risk evaluators to evaluate the impact of adverse
events. Let’s delve into this process in more detail to get a better sense of how
this occurs.  
Table 1 provides an example of how the Importance, Occurrence and Vulnera-
bility factors might be defined and developed. It uses ranges (low to high), likeli-
hoods and expected losses (denoted by red, yellow and green, which
correspond to high, medium and low severity) to describe a given adverse
event in one of the region’s five tunnels. A 1-5 scale is used to assign probabili-
ties (least likely to most likely) and losses (smallest to largest) to each adverse
event to which a tunnel might be exposed.  
Table 2 extends this analysis to the five tunnels in Hampton Roads for 2008 to
reflect the size of monetary and human losses connected to an adverse event.
The next step is to translate Table 2’s values into a scale that varies between 0
and 1. The translation in Table 3 is based upon a “fuzzy” equation where the
translated factor is equivalent to the average of the values for all risk events,
divided by 10. The translation for the importance factor is a one-to-one map-
ping where an assessment of “high” corresponds to a value of 1, an assessment
of “medium” corresponds to .50 and an assessment of “low” corresponds to a
value of 0, etc.
Finally, let’s take the values of Table 3 and translate them into an overall risk pri-
oritization score (RPS) that takes into account all three factors (importance, fre-
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quency of occurrence and vulnerability). The risk prioritization scores in Table 4
are the product of the equation RPS  = I • O • V. These scores enable us to
say that, all things considered, the Hampton Roads Bridge-Tunnel (HRBT) merits
our greatest attention if and when we worry about adverse events. Taking
into account the HRBT’s importance, the likelihood of an
adverse event occurring there, and its potential vulnerability,
the HRBT receives the highest risk ranking. The lowest risk
ranking belongs to the Chesapeake Bay Bridge-Tunnel (CBBT)
and hence it merits the least attention of any of the five tun-
nels when we consider how to deal with adverse events. Note
that “least attention” is not equivalent to “no attention.” Adverse events (e.g., car
and truck accidents, flooding, fire) are fully capable of causing significant prob-
lems at the CBBT. However, all things considered, these problems are much
smaller for the CBBT than is the case for the HRBT and MMBT.
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TABLE 1
CONNECTING RISK FACTORS TO AN EVENT’S IMPORTANCE
Risk Scale Example
Importance
Factor
Occurrence
Factor
Vulnerability Factor
Scales Low / High Likelihood
Monetary
Loss
Human Loss
Severity
(Dollars)
Severity
(Deaths)
1 Low <1%
2 Low to Medium 1-5%
3 Medium 5-10%
4
Medium to
High
10-50%
5 High >50%
TABLE 2
ADVERSE EVENT EXAMPLES FOR THE FIVE
HAMPTON ROADS TUNNELS
2008 Factor Translation Example
Risk Events ImportanceFactor
Occurrence
Factor Vulnerability Factor
Low – High Likelihood Monetary Loss(Dollars)
Human Loss
(Deaths/Injuries)
HRBT
Car Accident
High
5 1 2
Flooding 3 3 2
Fire 2 2 2
MMBT
Car Accident
High
4 1 1
Flooding 3 3 1
Fire 2 2 1
Midtown Tunnel
Car Accident
Medium
5 1 2
Flooding 4 3 2
Fire 2 2 2
Downtown Tunnel
Car Accident
Medium
5 1 2
Flooding 4 3 2
Fire 2 2 2
CBBT
Car Accident
Medium to
High
3 1 1
Flooding 3 4 1
Fire 1 2 1
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Regional Infrastructure
 Independence
The tragic events of Sept. 11, 2001, in New York City and at the Pentagon
served to re-emphasize what often is termed the “cascade” effect. The major
building blocks of a modern urban civilization are interrelated and interde-
pendent. When one part of New York City’s infrastructure was destroyed or
failed, this rippled into other parts of the city and knocked out other vital func-
tions as well.  
Suppose a destructive hurricane were to hit Hampton Roads. Likely, it would
knock out electricity, disrupt natural gas delivery, diminish our ability to communi-
cate, limit our ability to access television and radio, and perhaps flood or block
off one or more tunnels. Clearly, our ability to deal with any one of these
calamities depends at least partially upon the continuing operation of the
remaining pieces of infrastructure.  
Unfortunately, somewhat like a domino effect, the destruction of one piece of
infrastructure (electrical service) often does impede or even knock down other
pieces of infrastructure (television and radio reception and, in the case of New
York City, subways). Hence, any analysis of the impact of adverse events upon
our region’s tunnels must be approached from an overall systems point of view.
Everything is related and the experience of 9/11 reveals that infrastructure fail-
ures often cascade. Both foresight and wise planning are required to minimize
the probability that infrastructure failures spread like a contagious disease. 
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TABLE 3
A SCALE FOR ADVERSE EVENTS:
THE FIVE HAMPTON ROADS TUNNELS
Importance Factor Occurrence Factor Vulnerability Factor
HRBT
1 .33 .20
MMBT
1 .30 .15
Midtown Tunnel
.5 .37 .20
Downtown Tunnel
.5 .37 .20
CBBT
.75 .23 .17
TABLE 4
RELATIVE RISK RANKINGS:
THE FIVE HAMPTON ROADS TUNNELS
Tunnel
Risk Prioritization
Score
Risk Rank
HRBT .0670
MMBT .0450
Midtown Tunnel .0370
Downtown Tunnel .0370
CBBT .0293
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Final Reflection:
Accidents and Terrorism
All of the major European tunnel episodes that we described earlier were
accidents and not the result of terrorist actions. Even so, a terrorist,
 especially a suicidal terrorist, could replicate the tragic results of these
 accidents. In fact, Hampton Roads is vulnerable to terrorist
attacks directed against many different key components of
its infrastructure – not just bridges and tunnels, but also
electrical, natural gas and water supplies, and tall build-
ings. The possibility of chemical and radiation attacks on
the region, or even the  detonation of small atomic
weapons, cannot be  discarded due to the overriding
importance of the  military installations located in our
midst. Prudence requires that we be mindful of and
 prepare for such possibilities.    
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The Chrysler Museum in 2009
2009 State of the Region Booklet:Layout 1  9/3/09  11:02 AM  Page 133
The Chrysler’s collections fall into six major areas: (1) American painting and
sculpture, including works from American impressionists such as Mary Cassatt
and Childe Hassam; (2) European painting and sculpture, including works by
French impressionists such as Degas and Renoir; (3) contemporary art; (4) deco-
rative arts; (5) a world-renowned glass collection; and (6) a highly regarded
photography collection that includes venerable daguerreotypes as well as
remarkable modern photographs.  
Our focus here is upon the current status, health and prospects of the Chrysler
Museum. This is a subject of particular interest because changing economic
conditions have battered the ability of many nonprofit organizations to sustain
their activities. Also, there is interest in whether the sometimes-controversial per-
sonnel reductions and decisions over the past few years have affected the
quality and character of the institution’s operations. Fortunately, as the suc-
ceeding analysis will argue, the Chrysler’s wonderful resources continue to offer
superb artistic experiences to the Hampton Roads region that are unmatched
among many comparable metropolitan areas. 
Some Early History
Like many museums founded in the early 20th century, the forerunner of the
Chrysler was organized by small arts consortia interested in both the museum’s
social and aesthetic potential. Hence, in its early years, it included installations
devoted to local history and the region’s fauna. However, its recent history – as
a museum dedicated to the comprehensive collection amassed by a single
major donor – is unique.  
What began through the efforts of the Irene Leache Art Association, which
exhibited its members’ work alongside a miscellaneous collection of artifacts in
the Norfolk Public Library on Freemason Street starting in 1914, became the
foundation of the Norfolk Museum of Arts and Sciences. In 1928, Florence
Sloane, whose mansion on the Lafayette River would become the Hermitage
Foundation, offered to head a committee to find an appropriate building. When
the city donated a site on the Hague, contributions began to flow, ranging from
pennies collected by schoolchildren to donations from the wealthy.
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The Chrysler Museum contains artistic items that “any museum in the world would kill for.” 
– Art critic John Russell in The New York Times  
J
ohn Russell was engaging in hyperbole (perhaps) when he averred that other museums would kill to have some of the items in
the collections of the Chrysler Museum of Art. What is abundantly clear is that the Chrysler’s collections are unparalleled in the
Commonwealth of Virginia. The museum constitutes a cultural jewel whose activities attract almost 130,000 guests annually. Its
many and varied programs provide ample demonstration that a major art museum acts as a magnet for a city, attracting cor-
porations that value cultural amenities, residents that wish to return to the excitement of a revitalized downtown core, and national
and international attention that fuels tourism.  
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In 1938, a federal grant helped build an imposing Renaissance Revival struc-
ture with adequate room for growth. But for decades, the galleries continued to
resemble a traditional chamber of curiosities, a Kunstkammer, exhibiting along
with artworks, stuffed screech owls, Confederate relics and examples of
Southern furniture in idiosyncratic assemblages. Prior to the Civil Rights era, Jim
Crow laws kept many in the city from visiting the museum, and even after the
social climate changed, William Parker, a powerful lawyer on its board,
declared it a “private club,” a statement flying in the face of national, state and
municipal laws. Walter P. Chrysler Jr.’s arrival in 1971 would change the
museum’s name, its contents and its staff, but the turmoil would never completely
disappear. 
Son of the builder of the eponymous automotive empire as well as the premier
Art Deco skyscraper in New York City, Chrysler had long been searching for a
venue to house his personal eclectic collection. In 1958, he attempted to settle
it in the freewheeling artists’ colony of Provincetown, Mass., purchasing a large
deconsecrated church, which locals came to refer to as “St. Walter’s” or “First
Church of Chrysler.” The atmosphere lent an appropriate sanctuarial air to his
rapidly expanding cache of Baroque paintings, but the church building was too
small to fulfill its new owner’s ambitions, leaving Chrysler determined to
find a larger venue, preferably an equally ambitious, if likewise provin-
cial, museum. 
Not many such professional institutions were willing to take his offer
seriously, given his list of requirements, which included his authoritative
(some still deem it authoritarian) directorship, for he planned to be on-
site and fully involved. Many potential locations demurred because of
the controversial nature of some pieces in the collection, whose prove-
nance seemed to be plucked from thin air rather than from traditional
records of ownership, a perception that had long bedeviled Chrysler.
His penchant for obsessive acquisitions that occasionally led to dubious
purchases gave him a reputation as an undiscriminating accumulator.
And yet, his desire to broker a deal served to make him quite pre-
scient. He acquired French Art Nouveau furniture and glass, 19th-cen-
tury French Academic paintings, and early works by mid-20th-century
Americans when prices reflected the lack of interest in these now-impor-
tant areas. But this desire for bargains could also mean hasty studio
visits during which slightly damaged contemporary work could be had for a
good price. The Chrysler still displays one of Frank Stella’s hard-edge Protractor
paintings, though it is rumored to have had a large hole in it on purchase. Sto-
ries of Chrysler’s regular arrivals at the museum bearing paper grocery bags
stuffed with additions to the glass galleries have circulated for years, becoming
part of the “lore” that Rick Salzburg, now helming the Roanoke Arts Festival, so
loved when he worked in public relations at the museum.
Walter Chrysler was obviously bringing a considerable – and
often great – collection to Norfolk, but one freighted with con-
troversial attributions to match its often-combative owner.
After protracted encounters, the city finally capitulated to his
demands and reached an agreement that satisfied many in
local government. His wife, Jean Outland Chrysler, a Norfolk
native, was happy to return to her hometown, and indulged
her own desire to collect books, merging them with the old
museum’s holdings to create the exceptional library it now
houses. 
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So began the life of Walter Chrysler Jr.’s museum and the tangled tale of the
auto manufacturer’s scion’s success in his wife’s hometown, a procession of
events detailed in Peggy Earle’s 2008 account, “Legacy: Walter Chrysler Jr.
and the Untold Story of Norfolk’s Chrysler Museum of Art.” Unfortunately, the
book, heavily (some might say “carefully”) edited by William Hennessey, the
museum’s current director, leaves the struggles, personalities and vicissitudes of
this man’s life to our imagination, or to future chronicles. But many aspects of the
collector’s psyche are well known: Chrysler had a “take-no-prisoners” kind of
mentality when it came to his new staff, the collection that was already in place
and the city’s culturati. He had developed a distrust of professionals in the art
world, summarily firing all such members of the museum’s staff en bloc.  
In their stead, Chrysler imported friends from New York to play at curatorial
work, notably the critic Mario Amaya, whose milieu included the soon-to-be
scandalous photographer Robert Mapplethorpe and other denizens of Warhol’s
Factory scene. Amaya, who was in fact well educated and definitely an insider,
in turn hired a new staff consisting of youthful curators-in-training like Brooks
Johnson, who was able to build one of the best photography collections in the
country despite Chrysler’s occasional indifference to the medium. Meanwhile,
Chrysler had scientific artifacts accumulated by the old museum thrown into
dumpsters, and he sometimes fired personnel with abandon. 
In the years between 1971 and his death in 1989, the museum’s trustees
valiantly contended with their new “board president,” a title Chrysler preferred
to any other, whose agreement with the city gave the municipality power to
appoint 15 of the 28 board members, some of whom were content to let him
have his way. According to Hennessey, this agreement continues to determine
the nature of the board, and while the city heeds the museum’s recommenda-
tions for its appointees, the municipality by necessity considers criteria other than
aesthetics when it makes its decisions. Currently, the board includes in its mix
corporate members alongside local art patrons and collectors. 
More Recent Developments
Throughout the early years, the museum’s most pressing need was to attain
national certification, a problem that Chrysler himself refused to acknowledge in
his hiring practices or in his sometimes inflated provenance decisions. The
museum needed a resolute professional voice as director, strong enough to over-
rule the tough collector. Those characteristics were finally found in David
Steadman, the director from 1980-89, who mollified Chrysler, and propelled
both staff and facilities to accreditation with the American Museum Association,
even while mounting an unprecedented capital campaign that enlarged and
revitalized the original building. 
In addition, Steadman attended to the kind of exhibition programming that
would not interfere with Chrysler’s own interests, bringing in another young
curator, Tom Sokolowski, to continue a series of contemporary shows begun by
Tom Styron, his predecessor. The urbane Sokolowski became one of the
museum’s most popular curators, with sold-out lectures detailing his cutting-edge
choices. After his departure, he moved up in the museum world hierarchy, now
holding the position of director of the Andy Warhol Museum in Pittsburgh. 
Recent years have been less kind to the curatorial department. Beginning in
2003, the museum began to “downsize” across departments. Lynn Marsden-
Atlass, then curator of the American collection and now director of the Arthur
Ross Gallery at the University of Pennsylvania, and several other members of the
staff were terminated.   
About the same time, some Chrysler Museum members were perplexed by the
institution’s Ferrari exhibition, which involved dismantling part of an exterior wall
to position automobiles in the gallery. The expenses surrounding this show,
which failed to attract large numbers of visitors, were thought by some to be
connected to the decision to reduce the staff. Most recently, glass curator Gary
Baker and 28-year museum veteran and photography curator Brooks Johnson
have left the staff. These downsizings of museum cadres and the internal reshuf-
fling of duties caught the attention of the regional press. The Virginian-Pilot’s
Teresa Annas, for example, carefully described the non-transparent circum-
stances surrounding Johnson’s departure on Aug. 30, 2008.
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Prior to these departures, it would have been fair to characterize the lengthy
tenure of much of Chrysler’s curatorial staff as somewhat unusual. Many direc-
tors and curators play a professional game quite similar to Lewis Carroll’s tea
party in “Alice in Wonderland.” They switch their positions in a sequence of
moves, a “clean-cup-move-down (or up)” pattern that infuses each subsequent
new institution with new energy and, often, new money. Even in the current
recessionary period, as of this spring there were approximately 40 open posi-
tions nationwide for directors, though far fewer were demanding curatorial
expertise. Lengthy employee tenure can be stabilizing to institutions and nurture
strong relationships with supporters, or it can act as an anchor that stifles
needed change. Which of these two interpretations is the more accurate con-
cerning recent personnel changes at the Chrysler has been a matter of dispute.
The museum has had six directors since 1971 and many people
associated with the Chrysler regard David Steadman’s tenure in the
1980s as a high point in the institution’s history. His achievements
– establishing a professional credentialed staff and nationally
approved procedures, along with an ambitious and successful cap-
ital campaign to raise funds for the facility’s expansion – resulted in
full accreditation by the American Association of Museums. The
conversion of the open courtyard into the airy, glass-ceilinged
Huber Court gave visitors a spectacular introduction to the galleries
surrounding it. Second-floor visitors could overlook the space from
the original windows, an architectural feature that preserves the
spatial history of the building, while lending additional charm to the
gallery experience.   
Huber Court quickly became the heart of the museum and a
notable venue for space rentals. Steadman was following a
national trend, as these commodious public spaces are revenue
boosters that attract large parties and weddings. New York’s Met-
ropolitan Museum placed its Temple of Dendur, a sizable Egyptian
structure complete with 19th-century graffiti, off-center in a court
obviously designed for such opportunities. Many a Hampton Roads
couple has pledged undying devotion under the Huber’s immense
skylight, and other special events, dinners, parties and support-group activities
continue to enjoy its spacious ambience, with rental fees adding to the
museum’s budget.   
Yet, despite such heady successes, Steadman failed his third
challenge: to convince the mortally ill Walter Chrysler to sign a
new inclusive will that deeded his entire collection to the
museum, as well as the additional support of a healthy
endowment. Stubborn to the last, Chrysler waited for his
favorite attorney, who was also hospitalized, to bring the doc-
ument to him. The collector died in 1989, just hours before this
could happen, thus depriving the museum of many of the
objects on loan, including a number of superb Tiffany lamps,
all of which had to be auctioned to pay estate taxes owed by
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a hitherto unknown heir, a nephew, who sent many prized
works to Sotheby’s block. One of the most valuable works, a
large moody landscape by the founder of French Realism,
Theodore Géricault, best known for his “Raft of the Medusa,”
now belongs to New York’s Metropolitan Museum of Art.
Steadman left the museum soon after the grand opening of its new facilities,
and the top position has changed hands several times since, once quite force-
fully when financial irregularities were discovered. If most of the directors were
undistinguished, then they were strongly supported by excellent curators on the
staff. A particularly successful team, Nick and Trinkett Clark, energized the
American and contemporary areas. But even then traditions were abandoned,
as the distaff Clark offered living artists a double-edged sword: Reluctant to con-
tinue hosting the biennial juried Irene Leache Memorial exhibitions, which
required considerable time and effort, she mounted the last such show in 1998,
but then compensated with opening the Parameters Gallery, showcasing
emerging American artists, a series which helped the museum boost its contem-
porary collection. 
During that time, the museum added several significant works from these one-
person exhibitions, notably Jaune Quick-to-See Smith’s “Trade (Gifts for Trading
with White People)” of 1993. In the mid-’90s, the Clarks left first for the High
Museum in Atlanta, and then for a northeastern museum devoted to children’s
book illustrators; their positions have since failed to attract long-term curators.
The holders of these positions have come and gone quickly in the last 10 years.
Besides the huge exhibition of works in storage, the primary in-house exhibitions
since Hennessey’s arrival in 1998 have been mounted around the photography
collection. This steady and often exciting series of shows was balanced by one-
person exhibitions such as those given to Bob Lerner and Ernest Withers. Their
shows were the first to examine and evaluate their careers in the documentary
field, and offered historical assessments of the medium’s vast impact.  
When William Hennessey arrived in 1998 from the University of Michigan’s art
museum, he appropriately began to examine the Chrysler’s priorities – a lengthy
list that included the potential expansion of the library’s space and a number of
necessary gallery reconfigurations. With this in mind, he initiated an ambitious
capital campaign, using the omnibus installation of works chosen from storage
by the three curators as a convincing argument. The public and board
responded positively to this superb exhibition, and the campaign raised or
obtained commitments for an impressive $35 million to support a variety of pro-
posed alterations in space and programming. By all odds, the capital cam-
paign was an important positive move forward for Hennessey and the museum. 
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Changes in Economic
 Fortunes and Related
Adjustments
The past decade has seen a narrowing of the Chrysler’s possi-
bilities, primarily because of conditions of economic stagnancy
and recession. It must be said that Hennessey and the board of
trustees have been confronted with difficult choices at every
turn. Indeed, while not all agree, the most persuasive expla-
nation of events at the Chrysler over the past decade could be
its challenge of having to deal with constant or declining rev-
enues in certain years. As Table 1 below indicates, in the
2005-06 and 2007-08 fiscal years, the museum’s total rev-
enues were stagnant. Also, between June 30, 2008, and April
30, 2009, the value of the Chrysler’s endowment declined
from approximately $45 million to approximately $37 million
(about 22 percent). It seems likely that this will negatively
influence the institution’s future budgets. 
Even so, over the past four fiscal year budget cycles, the
Chrysler’s revenues have increased at the rate of 5.62 percent
per year, compounded. This demonstrates that its fiscal prob-
lems have not been permanent. Hence, some of the significant
changes in personnel and programs that have occurred appear
to have been the result of choices made by the board and the
director rather than solely a function of financial stress.
The new millennium has not been good for arts institutions in general and the
ongoing recession has cut deeply into most museums’ plans. February 2009
was particularly cruel, with The New York Times reporting almost daily on clos-
ings and cutbacks, including layoffs of 10 percent of the workforce at the Indi-
anapolis Museum after its endowment lost $100 million in the last quarter of
2008. The long-suffering Detroit Institute of the Arts announced a 20 percent
staff reduction and canceled plans for two major exhibitions on the Baroque
and the mid-century trio of Robert Rauschenberg, Jasper Johns and Jim Dine,
citing the expense for shipping and insurance. The Philadelphia Museum of Art
announced pay cuts for staff along with staff reductions. The High Museum of
Art in Atlanta was planning to cut its staff by 7 percent, with pay cuts for those
remaining. And in Las Vegas, once a boom town for contemporary art, the Sun
reported the Feb. 28, 2009, closure of the 13-year-old Las Vegas Art Museum,
with its board president lamenting to The New York Times, “We’ve tried every-
thing to keep it afloat. It’s just a challenging time.” Part of the financial challenge
lies in diminishing endowment money tied to the markets; usually 4 percent to 5
percent of these funds are available for use, but when the market lost up to 50
percent of its value, these funds were reduced drastically. 
Our region’s flagship museum is not immune to these economic problems.
Although the Obama and Kaine administrations say they strongly support the
arts in general, and indications of increasing federal support for the National
Endowments for the Arts and Humanities are contained within the stimulus
package, it is not clear at the time of this writing that one-time-only federal grant
money will reach the Chrysler, which has had trouble keeping its development
officers in place; in six years, there have been six such employees. Brownie
Hamilton, an award-winning grants writer and director of the Hamilton Group in
Williamsburg, was contracted to prepare grants for the museum a total of eight
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TABLE 1
THE CHRYSLER: THE FINANCIAL STORY
Year Revenues Percent Change
2004-2005 $5,774,229 —
2005-2006 $5,748,725 - 00.44%
2006-2007 $6,551,229 +13.96%
2007-2008 $6,603,395 +00.80%
2008-2009 $7,184,569 +08.80%
2004-2005 to 2008-2009 =  +24.42% total increase, or a +5.62% annual
compound rate of increase
Source: Chrysler Museum of Art
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times. Her last success was an unusual one: $112,500 from the Insti-
tute of Museum and Library Services for operational support, which is
used in part to speed the final stages in the digital transfer of the col-
lection to the Chrysler’s Web site. Normally, such operational grants
are given to smaller arts organizations, but it was clear that, without a
grant, this lengthy and essential task would have to be put on hold. In
the current economic crisis, grants may be the only way that museums
can continue to perform near peak efficiency, but the competition for
these finite funding sources will be more intense than ever.
The Chrysler’s 2008-09 budget, totaling $7,184,561, reflects
declines in governmental funding (particularly from the Common-
wealth), along with significant reductions in the value of the museum’s
endowment portfolios. In this light, the 2005 State of the Region study
of the economic health of art galleries and museums in southeastern
Virginia was prophetic, since the current situation differs by mere
degrees from that of four years ago.  
In the 1990s, when the Chrysler had committed allies in Richmond in
Speaker of the House Thomas Moss and President Pro Tempore of the
Senate Stanley Walker, the Commonwealth allocated $1 million a
year to the museum’s coffers. This sum may seem substantial, but must
be weighed against the state’s former allocation of $10 million to the Virginia
Museum of Fine Arts in Richmond. After Moss and Walker left state government,
no one with political heft took up the torch for the Chrysler, and Commonwealth
funding diminished to $750,000 per year, then fell to amounts that would
essentially match the internal budget allocation of $41,900 for 2008-09
shared by the curatorial and conservation departments. Peggy Baggett, execu-
tive director for the Virginia Commission for the Arts, does not have much hope
for an increase in state monies, having recently overheard conversations
between members of the state legislature questioning whether arts-related posi-
tions are “real jobs.”
As a consequence, for several years, the Chrysler has been combining tasks for
its curators. It has eliminated positions and cut its hours. The curatorial position
in American art, vacated in 2003 when Lynn Marston-Atlass jumped to the
Pennsylvania Academy of Fine Arts, remains unfilled at this writing six years
later, and it has been joined in limbo by two other top positions, in photography
and decorative arts. The latter position had become a threesome combined with
glass and the historic houses (the Moses Myers House and the Willoughby-
Baylor House, which the museum administers); a recent hire replaced only the
glass curator, quite possibly with an eye to fulfilling the requirements of the
museum’s pivotal role in the second region-wide exhibition of contemporary
glass that opened in April 2009. All positions are frozen as of this writing.
One recent initiative stimulated by the capital campaign has provoked disap-
pointment, if not controversy. Several years ago, the nearby Wachovia Bank
building at the corner of Duke and Grace streets was purchased as a potential
site for the Jean Outland Chrysler Library, though members of the Friends of the
Chrysler Library advised that two things argued against this move: the branch
bank’s small size and inadequate structural support for the weight of the books.
Even so, in early 2008, the board approved the use of $25,000 for a full
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architectural study. By April 2008, the completed renderings were ready, and
plans were made to host an invitation-only soirée in the building to attract poten-
tial donors. The Friends of the Chrysler Library allocated $5,000 from its
endowment for invitations to the event. The architect’s elaborate renderings were
displayed for those who crowded this fundraiser cum celebration, but the experi-
ence appears to have backfired, because one prominent board member bluntly
informed the architect that the building was far too small to contain the library’s
80,000 books and countless files, much less allow necessary expansion.
At the February 2009 meeting of the Friends of the Library, Hennessey pre-
sented an update in which he agreed that the Wachovia building had proven
too small to house the current collection. He also explained that an expansion of
the museum into the current parking lot, which seemed the most feasible solu-
tion, would call for the city’s financial support, a doubtful prospect given the cur-
rent economy. As a consequence, the library project was at a standstill. This
meant that the $30,000 expended to examine the library possibility would not
lead to a firm project.   
Hennessey subsequently discussed with the Friends of the Library their organiza-
tion’s future. Suggesting that the Friends’ social nature taxed the staff’s time and
that the organization did not raise significant funds, he offered that it might
operate more effectively as a financial support group than as a conventional
friends group. In any case, fees for membership in the group would rise in order
to finance the hiring of a summer intern for the library.  
The bank building’s footprint may yet have a function, as its demolition would
provide additional parking if current library space were to be extended into the
lot adjacent to the museum. Then again, the building might not disappear at all,
but instead change its purpose to accommodate the contents of a decrepit
storage facility in Portsmouth long owned by the Chrysler. For the present, how-
ever, plans for the bank’s future and the Jean Outland Chrysler Library appear to
be on hold. 
The most consistently successful area of the Chrysler Museum remains its photog-
raphy collection. People “connect with the medium,” says its ex-curator, Brooks
Johnson. Johnson not only put the museum’s collection securely within the nation’s
top 10, but his inclusive appreciation of documentary trends also led him to
showcase the works of African Americans with regularity. Always well funded,
the photo collection has several dedicated endowments – for exhibitions, collec-
tions, publications and discretionary spending (used for travel and networking) –
all of which have kept that area the most vital in the museum.  
Johnson was a proficient fundraiser, though increasing demands that the curators
themselves raise money began to take him away from his curatorial duties,
which were arguably more demanding than those of others at the museum. In
his almost 30 years at the Chrysler, Johnson attracted major donors like Robert
and Joyce Menschel, New Yorkers who have been on the boards of the
Museum of Modern Art and the Metropolitan Museum and who have seeded
the collection at the Chrysler.  
An early show, “Appeal to This Age: Civil Rights and the African-American
Community,” which was destined to raise money by offering works on display
for sale, helped to enlarge the museum’s holdings in an under-appreciated area.
This expressed a generational sea change in the region’s sociopolitical aware-
ness, and Johnson would continue to devote considerable energy to this seg-
ment of photographic history. His efforts led to the establishment of the Civil
Rights Photo Collection and to further exhibitions of African American photogra-
phers. In 2000, a MetLife Foundation grant for $150,000 helped fund the first
museum show ever devoted to Memphis documentarian Ernest C. Withers, who
had chronicled civil rights battles in the Deep South since the 1950s.   
Photographic subject matter has often been the flash point for controversy in
modern museums. But it is undeniable that the Chrysler’s collection, paired with
Johnson’s breadth in exhibitions (which included the first retrospective and schol-
arly catalog detailing the accomplishments of Civil War photographer
Alexander Gardner), propelled the Chrysler to national status in the field.  
Johnson provided the text for more than 15 scholarly catalogs for original exhibi-
tions, a task traditionally left to the curators, who would also create didactic
materials connected to the exhibitions: gallery brochures, labels and newsletter
essays meant for monthly distribution to the membership. In addition, curators
once took a large part in training docents to interpret works throughout the
museum. In the last decade, these responsibilities have increasingly rested with
the education department.
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The Chrysler’s realignments reflect an accelerating trend among museums nation-
ally, many of which are adjusting to challenges brought by new and larger
audiences, viewers who often have more education and art-historical sophistica-
tion. Even while museum budgets are stagnant or falling, gallery visitations and
memberships are growing in many American museums. Museums frequently
train docents to enlighten adult groups touring the galleries and special exhibi-
tions, and have initiated programs for the schools that have been utilizing the
collection for decades. 
Scott Howe is now the director of education and public programs. With a small
staff and a refurbished classroom for classes, the museum is able to offer pro-
gramming to the region’s schools. Howe also supervises the Jean Outland
Chrysler Library and has editorial responsibility for all the information contained
in the labels, programs and literature offered to the Chrysler’s visitors.   
LEADERSHIP
Whether public or private, for profit or nonprofit, any organization is
heavily dependent upon the leadership of its chief executive officer.
Leaders are capable of inspiring, motivating and moving organizations
and constituents forward to new heights. They can proffer exciting
agendas, unify otherwise disparate constituents, raise money, attract
donors and change the atmosphere. Witness Presidents Reagan and
Obama. Whether one voted for one or both of them, one must agree
that they were (are) charismatic leaders who knew (know) how to pursue
their agendas.
Hence, we turn to assessing the role of William Hennessey, who has
served as the president and director of the Chrysler Museum since
1998. Given the adverse fiscal winds that the museum
has encountered in recent years, it is a credit to Hen-
nessey and others that it has continued to function as an
attractive cultural resource for the region. In 2007, more
than 128,000 visitors entered the Chrysler and it
received more than $600,000 in gifts and almost
$870,000 in memberships. Both collections and facilities have
been upgraded in recent years. It is apparent that the
Hampton Roads community continues to believe in the
museum and its purposes.  
Hennessey has found ways to continue most of the Chrysler’s most vital pro-
grams and to economize in areas that he and the board have deemed less crit-
ical. He has persuaded the city of Norfolk to augment its financial support for
the museum, no mean feat in these trying economic times. As a result, there is
no sense in the general public that the quality and prominence of the Chrysler
Museum have declined. Those more closely connected to it are aware that the
institution is not able to do as much as before. They also know that significant
personnel changes have been made as one means to deal with imposing finan-
cial constraints. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the Chrysler continues to be
regarded by admirers near and far as one of Hampton Roads’ crown jewels.        
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It also should be noted that Hennessey has endeavored to see that the Chrysler
Museum no longer is an enclave designed for what an early trustee, “Judge”
Parker, deemed an institution “just as private ... as the German Club.”  The
museum once was a very different, segregated organization that sponsored the
city’s annual crop of (white) debutantes. Today, with Hennessey at the helm, it
attempts to serve the larger community, reflecting the growth of tolerance typified
by the entire country in all aspects of public life. In this regard, it is notable that
the one group that does not perceive itself to be threatened with marginalization
is the Friends of African-American Art. The youngest of the “friends” groups, it
most recently has funded visits by the surviving quilters of Gee’s Bend, Ala., in
connection with the museum’s installation of a popular show of large-scale utili-
tarian fiber art (still placed in the category of craft on the traditional hierarchic
scale of importance). This project was entrusted to Gary Baker, whose airy
installation – with free-hanging quilts complementing the more traditional wall-
based presentation (the method chosen by the Whitney Museum in New York,
which exhibited the show prior to the Chrysler) – was truly an inspired one, and
the Alabama artists gave the Norfolk museum the highest marks of any of this
landmark exhibition’s many venues. Several years later, aficionados still continue
to talk about the quality displayed at the Gee’s Bend Quilt show, while exhibi-
tions devoted to artists like John Singer Sargent are seldom, if ever, mentioned.  
Even so, those familiar with the Chrysler Museum do not
always speak with one voice about Hennessey’s leadership. All
things considered, this is not surprising given the economic stresses the museum
has faced and the significant number of personnel changes that have occurred.
The misgivings of some about personnel actions and procedures at the Chrysler
impress others as constituting (to switch metaphorical universes) “inside base-
ball” – i.e., relevant only to the direct participants and largely not of interest to
anyone else. “All organizations have some of these things going on,” com-
mented a major donor, “and the Chrysler isn’t all that different.” Further, while
many donors and employees would like to see greater transparency where per-
sonnel changes are concerned, another donor queried, “What other major
organizations in the region publicize their internal personnel changes?”  
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Summing It Up
Alas, as one art museum director has put it, “It’s all about
money.” Hennessey struggles with a budget that slightly exceeds $7 million
annually, while comparable peer institutions have budgets ranging from $12
million to $15 million each. The Chrysler receives most of its operating budget
from the city of Norfolk, which deserves kudos for its continued support. Norfolk
contributed $2,988,443 for the 2008-09 budget, a 5 percent increase over
2007 and considerably more than in 2006, when the museum received
$2,481,100.  
Staff salaries and exhibition expenses are justifiably the largest outlays in any
museum’s budget. At the Chrysler, salaries, payroll taxes and benefits together
amounted to $3,677,658 for 2007-08; the 2008-09 budget shows a cost of
$3,959,084, an increase of $281,426 from the previous year, indicating that
the financial savings from the loss of the senior curatorial position in photog-
raphy and other staffers has been reinvested in other positions and in main-
taining staff fringe benefits.  
The direct costs for exhibition expenses for 2009 came to $767,250, a spike
from 2008, when this important outreach category was $473,683. The current
increase is likely due to the expenses incurred by two shows: a Norman Rock-
well exhibition and the region-wide Art of Glass show. If the economy remains
lackluster, then the Chrysler, like many museums in the country, will reduce its
requests for traveling exhibitions. Instead, the curatorial staff may mount a
number of in-house exhibitions drawn from the collection in storage, perhaps
augmented by loans from other institutions. The Chrysler’s walls sometimes dis-
play a notice indicating that a particular work, such as Gauguin’s masterly “Loss
of Innocence,” is on loan to another museum for a span of months. This is com-
mendable and stands in contrast to other major national museums that have
severely restricted loans to other museums. It also opens the door for the
Chrysler to receive loans from other institutions.  
With only two curators now on staff, the Chrysler has been hard-pressed to
mount in-house shows, though the new glass curator is busy with the largest
component of a second regional marathon of exhibitions devoted to the
medium, bringing in pieces owned by the collection to balance those traveling
to the site. Several traveling exhibitions have filled the gap, notably a substantial
exhibition of John Singer Sargent’s portraits and landscapes, a modestly suc-
cessful show that did not quite offset a number of highly touted, though disap-
pointingly thin, presentations of Impressionist and Soviet paintings. In 2008, the
region’s scholarly community was delighted by a fine exhibition of Rembrandt’s
etchings as well as a show devoted to the pioneering English photographer,
Peter Henry Emerson, forerunner of the international Pictorialist movement. An
intensive loan exhibition of many of illustrator Norman Rockwell’s prolific works,
timed for the holiday season of 2008-09, proved attractive to many who other-
wise might not have entered the museum.   
Over the past decade, the Chrysler Museum of Art has been
the region’s art powerhouse, a repository of acclaimed master-
works in all genres and periods that has become an educa-
tional and aesthetic hub on the Atlantic Coast.   
The Chrysler and its director, William Hennessey, have been vexed by declining
state support, tight budgets and deteriorating economic conditions. These
adverse circumstances necessarily have resulted in personnel and programmatic
reductions. It will suffice for us to note that this is not an easy time to lead and
direct even an artistic gem such as the Chrysler.  
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On June 30, 2009, the Chrysler announced that six
 additional employees (four full-time, two part-time) were
being terminated in order to save money. Director William
Hennessey stated, “This is about finances and strategy, not
individuals.”
(The Virginian-Pilot, July 1, 2009)  
2009 State of the Region Booklet:Layout 1  9/3/09  11:02 AM  Page 144
145THE CHRYSLER MUSEUM IN 2009
2009 State of the Region Booklet:Layout 1  9/3/09  11:02 AM  Page 145
Cover: Diane Cebula/Daily Press
Page 1: Chris Daniel (top row, center)
Chuck Thomas (bottom row, center)
Norm Shafer/The Virginian-Pilot (bottom row, right) 
Page 6: U.S. Navy photo
Page 13: Jake Denton
Pages 45, 49 and 57: Chris Daniel
Pages 59, 103, 115 and 125: Chuck Thomas
Page 119: Steve Earley/The Virginian-Pilot
Page 123: Vicki Cronis-Nohe/The Virginian-Pilot
Page 133: The Chrysler Museum of Art’s Joan P. Brock Galleries house many of the permanent collection’s finest works by American and English artists.
Photo by Ed Pollard, museum photographer
Page 135: The Chrysler rests at the end of the Hague, a picturesque branch of the Eastern Elizabeth River. Photo by Ed Pollard, museum photographer
Page 137: In 2009, the Chrysler taught more than 18,000 adults and children from Hampton Roads public and private schools through educational tours and gallery
talks. Photo by Ed Pollard, museum photographer
Page 138: The Chrysler’s Huber Court exudes Italianate influence with its sweeping marble staircase and Romanesque arches. Photo by Ed Pollard, museum photographer
Page 140: Katherine Gray’s “Forest Glass” was one of the most popular installations of “Contemporary Glass Among the Classics,” one of three “Art of Glass 2”
 exhibitions at the Chrysler. Photo by Jake Gillespie for the Chrysler Museum of Art
Page 142: The Chrysler’s participation in the region-wide celebration “Art of Glass 2” featured live glassblowing at the museum throughout the month of May.
Photo by Jake Gillespie for the Chrysler Museum of Art
Page 143: “Silea” was among 120 of Lino Tagliapietra’s works on display during the exhibition honoring his 60-year career in glassblowing. “Lino Tagliapietra in
 Retrospect: A Modern Renaissance in Italian Glass” was the keynote show for the Chrysler’s celebration of “Art of Glass 2.” Photo by Jake Gillespie for the
Chrysler Museum of Art
Page 145: Stephen Knapp’s dancing light painting “Heritage Jitter” heralds the arrival of “Art of Glass 2” to the Chrysler. Knapp was one of four artists featured in the
museum exhibition “Contemporary Glass Among the Classics.” Photo by Cathy Dixson for the Chrysler Museum of Art
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